

ISSUES IN INTELLIGENCE MANAGEMENT AND NATIONAL SECURITY

KAYODE BOLAJI

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ABOUT US

PBDC started in Jeffrey's Bay, South Africa, in 2004 as a research group that seeks to explore and teach multiple approaches to dealing with the wide range of conflict and peace-related matters with specific reference to Africa and Africans in Diaspora. Still, now we have grown into different spheres of influence and partnerships across the globe, exploring every means to advocate for a better universe.

Our vision is to inspire a community where a commitment to peace, development, reconciliation, and justice transcends competing identities and interests. Our mission is to equip leaders, build peace and trust in diverse communities through a process of personal change, inclusive dialogue, healing memories and historical conflicts, and team building.

We developed ten main arms of operation to help achieve our vision, which include: healing of memories, community peace, training, human security, peace table, post-conflict reconstruction programmes, countering violent extremism, non-violent politics, mediation & negotiation services, and diplomacy. Through our operations, we equip these leaders with the necessary tools to advance peace, security, and sustainable development across the globe. We partner with both national and international organizations.

This compendium is one of the initiatives of the Peace Building Development Consult (PBDC) to extend its core values to the world. Our core value is to advocate for, develop and promote a deeper understanding of peace and security in our world.

Kayode Bolaji

Executive Director

Peace Building Development Consult

PREFACE

This volume on “Issues in Intelligence Management and National Security” aims to promote a deeper understanding of intelligence among security operatives. It seeks to explore and teach multiple approaches to intelligence management for proper security surveillance within and across the nation and as well, addressing the challenges and providing remedial solutions. Thus, intelligence is one of the core areas in security management that provides strategic measures in handling security issues. This is the most vital area in security strategy to sustain and uphold national peace

This trend in security stirs a vision of community where commitment to peace, development, reconciliation and justice transcend competing identities and interests on personal, regional or sectional ideology. Much attention is on how to provide the most needed intelligence to security agencies and stakeholders who manage and strategize operational and tactical measures in security management.

This volume provides various arms of intelligence management's acumen that could help in achieving the stipulated mandate of maintaining sustainable national development, with proper collaboration among all the security agencies working for national unity. However, the book provides original analysis of current events as they relate to intelligence management and national security.

Therefore, as part of our core values to promote peace and reconciliation in the world, necessitated the need to have a wider range of reaching out to people in diverse areas who may not have the opportunity to meet us at the point of our services and trainings, by compiling all the problem solving papers, articles, concept notes, workshop trainings notes, and lecture notes on intelligence management, into compendium that runs into series, which is the reason behind this book.

Our lectures and trainings are carried out by professionals who have undergone a series of training, witnessed and engaged in the strategic interactions in the field of intelligence management. Our series is regarded as a first-hand source of information. They speak more volume than what other literatures offer. The benefit of it all is that these works can be used as a guide for further training, as lecture notes for academic works, and as references for further academic papers.

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INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT FOR SECURITY AGENCIES IN COMBATING OIL BUNKERING, MILITANCY AND ARMS TRAFFICKING IN LITTORAL STATES AND MARITIME DOMAIN


By Godwin Bassey Eteng



Source: Google Map; Some activities of oil bunkering, militancy and arms trafficking¹

INTRODUCTION

Africa at a Glance



Source: Google Map of Africa showing its ecological system²

Africa is a beautiful continent. Its mountains and rivers, and cultural diversity are a source of attraction to many. Romantically, it is the land of the blacks, it is the continent flowing with the world's precious metals of gold, diamond, columbite, titanium, uranium and sapphire amongst others. However, in reality, it is a turbulent continent and land afflicted by political and economic challenges, social

upheavals that tend to dwarf its relevance on the world stage. Its people are poor, disease-stricken and lacking in several social amenities, as three-quarters of the countries on the continent fall to the lowest ladder of the World Economic and Development Index.

In recent months, the continent is faced with return to the era of Military coups, as witnessed in Mali, Niger, Guinea Conakry, Sudan, and political infighting, Insurgency in Libya, Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad, and Nigeria. International terrorist groups of Alqaeda, and most recently ISIS, have expanded their influence from the Middle East, and now prominently seeking to establish footholds in Mozambique, South Africa, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Central Africa Republic, and the Lake Chad Basin shared by the Countries of Cameroon, Chad and Nigeria. There is the Farmers/Herders crisis in Niger, Chad and Nigeria for a push for greener pastures for grazing. The Ambazonian separatist agitations in Southern Cameroon, IPOB and Yoruba pro-secessionist groups in Nigeria remain rife.

The situation in Ethiopia is serious, with separatist Tigray advancing on Addis Ababa, the capital of Ethiopia and seat of the African Union (AU). At the moment, there are concerns that the rebels may overrun the capital city. The ravaging COVID-19 pandemic brought huge and more devastating impacts on the economies in African countries, with further implications for cybercrimes, youth unemployment and depressed oil sales. Meanwhile, Maritime security is a pressing issue in Nigeria and the Gulf

of Guinea region. The energy sector and international business/trade depend to a large extent on seaborne transport. Nigeria has a large expanse of territorial waters and coastal towns, with the Gulf of Guinea having a link to the country.

The Gulf of Guinea is vast, covering a diverse territorial area that stretches and draws from Senegal down to Angola, covering a coastline of over 6,000km. An important fact to note is that the Gulf of Guinea is a vital geopolitical chokepoint for shipping, maritime transportation of oil extracted in the Niger delta, as well as the transportation of goods to and from various areas in the African continent and beyond (European Union, 2018)³.

The Gulf of Guinea has been described as covering about eleven (11) coastal countries from the West and Central African countries, from Senegal, Ghana, down to Angola. In an attempt to conceptualise the maritime domain, it is described as “all areas and things of, on, under, relating to, adjacent to, or bordering on a sea, ocean, or other navigable waterways, including all maritime-related activities, infrastructure, people, cargo, and vessels and other conveyances” (Gilpin, 2007; Onuoha, 2012)⁴.

In discussing the maritime security challenges in Nigeria and the Gulf of Guinea, the European Union (2018), reports that “piracy, armed robbery at sea, illegal fishing, smuggling and trafficking, pose a major threat to maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea and ultimately to the economic development of the entire region”. Maritime security

challenges entail that the benefits accruing to the country and region as a result of the maritime resources are lost. This study is set to provide intelligent support on the maritime security challenges in Nigeria and the Gulf of Guinea while making ideal recommendations.

WHY INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

The intelligence bodies are to provide fact-checked data and relevant information to support operational actions, as well as guide Government decision-making at a strategic level. In the maritime domain, given the contemporary threats such as oil theft, piracy, kidnapping and vandalization of oil pipelines, human and drug trafficking by criminal syndicates and their impact on human safety as well as the national economy.

Maritime resources, not limited to fish, aquaculture and other ecosystems, have a direct contribution to the means of livelihoods of several persons in Nigeria and other countries around the Gulf of Guinea. Maritime security is vital for the exploration of maritime resources, preservation of livelihoods, ensuring socio-economic development and protection of lives and resources (Uadiale, 2012)⁵.

Maritime security challenges in the Gulf of Guinea have disrupted shipping lanes and have affected global trade, while putting the lives and safety of seafarers and other crew members in severe danger. "Maritime security challenges have threatened the activities of fishermen, the oil trade, mineral exploration, and the shipment of goods (Mansaray, 2017)." While efforts have been put in place by different

governments, agencies and stakeholders in other to combat maritime security challenges in Nigeria/Gulf of Guinea; “the issue still seems to be getting worse owing to specific aspects of maritime security challenges which have been neglected (Ezeozue, 2019)⁶ A strong intelligence support is necessary to avert as well as contain current and anticipated threats.

Therefore, following from this background, this study aims to provide Intelligence support for security agencies in combating oil bunkering, militancy and arms trafficking in littoral states and the maritime domain this is with the view of proposing remedies to their strategic operations.

Gulf of Guinea



Source: *Google Map; Enhancing maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea*⁷

The Gulf of Guinea region is adjudged to be the most significant and lucrative area on the continent of Africa. It is

a coastal area that traverses twenty (20) sovereign States from Senegal in West Africa to Angola in Southern Africa, facilitating trade between these countries and the rest of Africa, Europe and America... The Countries here border the Atlantic, and they are rich in biodiversity, and most possess hydrocarbon deposits. Of these Countries, Nigeria and Angola are front nations in oil production.

Forceful interventions of key world Navies of the US, Europe, Japan and some others shifted the centre of gravity of criminality to the Gulf of Guinea. Indeed, until the last two (2) years, criminality increased in the Gulf of Guinea, with most taking place in Nigerian waters. These developments are exacerbated by the weak disposition of the security forces in the Gulf, as well as the weak/fragile political systems.

Piracy is one of the activities constituting maritime security challenges in the Gulf of Guinea. In most of the cases of pirates' attacks at the Gulf of Guinea, their aims are often to kidnap victims for the sake of ransom, capture vessels and commandeer the cargo and crew members to extort money from the owners of the ship/vessels. It is observed that "most of the pirates operating in and around the Gulf of Guinea do launch their attacks mainly from Nigeria. These attacks ensure that the pirates seize and steal cargoes, tools or valuable items from a vessel and the crew" (Onuoha, 2012)⁸.

There have been cases where the crew members are kidnapped and held hostage until a ransom is paid and the worse is the fact the pirates at Nigeria/Gulf of Guinea like

their colleagues in Somalia, operate with highhandedness and severe levels of violence as they are less concerned with ensuring the welfare, safety and health of hostages. This study finds that “the rate of piracy attacks and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea is on average the fifth largest of all recorded and known maritime attacks and incidents across the globe, counting between 2010 and 2016” (Fattah, 2017; International Maritime Bureau, 2018).⁹

STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE OF THE NIGERIAN MARITIME DOMAIN AND THE GULF OF GUINEA

In contemporary times, Nigeria's maritime domain has become even more significant, because the area which covers most of the Southern coastal cities has port infrastructures and serves as the economic lifeline of the Country, such as Lagos, Port Harcourt, Calabar, and Warri. The area is also blessed with a concentration of mineral deposits of oil and gas that has, since the 1970s, become the mainstay of the nation's economy. The oil and gas pipelines and refinery infrastructure, multi-national investments, and a huge population of over two hundred million people would mean that a lot is at stake.

Although traditionally, scholars have defined Nigeria's maritime waters only in terms of the coastal littoral States linked to the Atlantic, however for purpose of strategic relevance for National Maritime Security, we should not forget the Lake Chad area, a natural lake of fresh water with

marine life, and species of fishes, ecosystem that has for several years contributed hugely to the economies of Chad, Nigeria, Niger and Cameroon. Today, the fish market in Lake Chad is dominated by terrorists who exercise some level of control in the area. Since 2017, ISWAP, a breakaway group from Boko Haram, has controlled the economically viable Islands of Lake Chad.

In other words, Nigeria has a deep maritime environment that needs to be secured, both in the North and South. With Terrorists and bandits increasing attacks in the North East, North West and North Central geo-political zones, a drift of these criminal groups towards the maritime zones in the south should be seen as a huge possibility and only a matter of time. This is especially against the known ISWAP agenda, not only to establish a foothold in the Sahel, but also in other parts of Africa, including the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Mozambique.

The Gulf of Guinea is an important maritime route for commercial shipping from Europe and America to West, Central and Southern Africa. "Its proximity to Europe and North America for the transportation of the low-sulphur crude oil from the region further raises its importance in the global supply of energy. The region produces about 5.4 million barrels of crude oil per day."¹⁰ However, issues of maritime security challenges have bedevilled Nigeria from exploring the benefits accruing from the Gulf of Guinea and other territorial waters comprising its maritime areas.

Maritime security issues in Nigeria/Gulf of Guinea are not limited to oil theft/bunkering, acts of terrorism, piracy, fish trawling, etc.

The maritime security challenges identified are not limited to poor civil-military cooperation, poor rate of interagency collaboration, inadequate staffing, ineffective and poor training of security personnel, non-utilisation of modern security tools and gadgets, and underfunding/corruption. The maritime security challenges in Nigeria and the Gulf of Guinea range from hostage-taking, oil theft, piracy and armed robbery at sea.¹¹

The maritime security challenges have affected maritime transport and the security of vessels in Nigeria and the Gulf of Guinea. The maritime security challenges in the region affected investment in Nigeria, the Gulf of Guinea and other neighbouring territories in severe ways. The maritime security challenges have affected the shipping of cargo goods, fishing trawlers, crude oil tankers, etc. Also, the maritime security challenges in Nigeria and the Gulf of Guinea have brought about the illegal establishment of offshore trading and transactions in crude oil and refined petroleum, as well as bunkering.

Criminality at the Nigerian Maritime Domain and the Gulf of Guinea



Source: Google Maps; *Criminal activities on the maritime domain*

The levels of criminal activities in the Nigerian maritime domain include but not limited to; Proliferation of small arms, illegal fishing by foreign trawlers, piracy as a major threat to maritime trade, trans-national crime, especially along Nigeria/Cameroon waterways, Gulf of Guinea, cyber-attacks by Niger Delta militant using satellite phones to target ships/vessels, arms and drugs trafficking, pipeline vandalism, illegal bunkering/oil theft, and illegal oil refining.

CURRENT INSTITUTIONAL APPROACH TO CURBING CRIMINALITY IN THE NIGERIAN MARITIME DOMAIN AND THE GULF OF GUINEA

Following the initiative by the Muhammadu Buhari administration, through the Transport Ministry, under the leadership of Rt Hon Rotimi AMAECHI, a new platform, the Deep Sea Project, was set up, with NIMASA providing technology and an integrated time early warning and intervention platform to curb piracy. This arrangement has today given NIMASA the edge, which has to a great extent stabilized the Nigerian waters. The Navy also has deployed Falcon Eye for reconnaissance and operational coverage of the maritime domain; however, more needs to be done, especially in forging a sustainable intelligence structure as well as the Forces' readiness/capability to have a significant effect on the nation's maritime environment and the Gulf of Guinea. Recall that in 2016, it was a well-known fact that criminality was high to the level that at a point in time, 94% of all crew kidnapped in the Gulf of Guinea were traced to Nigerian waters.

STATE OF THE LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES OPERATING IN THE MARITIME DOMAIN

1. There is an absence or near absence of a national threat focus in the domains, where illegal activities could take place without anyone checking them.
2. Politicization and sentimentalism of the recruitment process in contrast to the National objectives.

3. Failure to upgrade our training and doctrines to match current and anticipated threats.
4. Lack of effective synergy at the planning, simulation, and execution, as well as intelligence sharing.
5. Lack of background knowledge of the Maritime communities, waterways, and creeks.
6. Lack of adequate knowledge about the criminal gangs, their modus operandi, motivation and sources of funding.
7. Increasing cases of indiscipline, corrupt and unethical conduct by some unscrupulous officers and men.
8. Poor budgetary provisions, as well as delayed and insufficient releases, to address prevalent and anticipated security challenges.
9. Low morale arising from poor service conditions for serving officers and men.
10. Lack of adequate and functional fighting gear, insufficient platforms and logistic supplies required to effectively police the Maritime environment.
11. Sketchy intelligence to operational Forces.
12. Sour relationship between operating agencies and local communities resulting in unnecessary rivalry, infighting and consequent failed operations.
13. Inadequate training sessions, simulation exercises with participating operatives getting rusty over time.
14. Absence of standard operational guidelines for joint operations, leading to Services operating at cross purposes in some situations.

INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

The intelligence supports needed in the border or maritime domain are; human intelligence (HUMINT), technology

Support, early warning support, capacity building support, data base, intelligence projections, vetting- this is the most critical support intelligence can provide, intelligence on the plans, intentions, and activities of Neighbouring States in the Gulf of Guinea and Western Countries of Britain, France, Germany and USA Countries.

Also, to provide updated maps, sketches of routes, waterways, creeks and hideouts/key joints, based on technical intelligence updates and HUMINT. Then, the financial networks that will propel the whole activities to function effectively and efficiently. In addition, build non-kinetic support in Local Communities and establish a think tank.

Institutional framework to provide intelligence support are, the Department of State Services (DSS), the National Intelligence Agency (NIA), the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA), the Nigeria Police Force (NPF), Intelligence Departments of Armed Forces- This includes; the Army Intelligence, the Naval Intelligence, and the Air Intelligence. Also, the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), the Independent Corrupt Practices & Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC), the Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit (NFIU), Customs Intelligence (CI), THE Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC) Intelligence Unit, THE Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), the Nigerian maritime Administration Safety Agency (NIMASA), and the Nigeria Port Authority (NPA)

INSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES

The issues of incessant neglect of the welfare of creek towns, riverine settlements and oil-rich states in Nigeria have escalated the issues of maritime security challenges in Nigeria/Gulf of Guinea. “The neglect and denial of good quality of life have brought about increased rates of militant activities, terrorism, among others, along with the marine environment” (Tepp, 2012)¹². The poor rate of civil-military cooperation has been cited in some cases as being amongst the maritime security challenges in the Gulf of Guinea and Nigeria.

The concept of civil-military cooperation is relating to the means and processes of enhancing the workability and collaboration of both the civilian actors and military actors in carrying out the security and State functions geared towards the protection of the State against internal insurrection and external aggression, as well as preserving the sovereignty of the State (Wakawa, 2018)¹³.

In most cases, the civilians do have information that may be utilised by the military in combating the maritime security challenges; however, due to a poor rate of cooperation between the civilian (especially host communities in creek towns and riverine settlements) and the military, maritime security is being frustrated. There are perceived military’s poor relations with civilians as well as poor interagency cooperation amongst personnel that should ensure maritime security.

Wakawa remarked that the poor state of the relationship between the actors is reckoned as one of the major causes behind the incessant challenges of maritime security in Nigeria. Observation shows that the military being used to combat maritime security in Nigeria/the Gulf of Guinea is not adequately staffed. In some cases, the security personnel are inadequately trained and a troop of over-stretched staff. "It is reported that the ratio of military personnel when compared to Nigeria's population is poor at a ratio below 1:1,000, which is relatively low when compared to other developing countries that are neighbours to Nigeria" (Phinos & Ogbu, 2019)¹⁴.

Another challenge of maritime security in Nigeria/Gulf of Guinea is the structured network and organised system in which the crime is perpetrated. The structured network and organised system ensure that the perpetrators are connected to other high-class members of society in and outside the country who aid and abet them in the crime. There are cases where the perpetrators are aware of sensitive and high-profile security details and intelligence, thereby foiling any attempt to apprehend them.

A Way Forward

There is a need to embark on the transformation of the Navy and other security forces involved in fighting criminality in the Gulf of Guinea. The review of the recruitment is to reflect technological and technical demand in the system. Redesign the Military Academies, especially the Faculty of

Engineering, towards producing students who are innovative and forward-looking. Russian Mig 25 Fox bat, was designed by a Cadet Officer; this is a supersonic interception and reconnaissance aircraft, with all-weather capabilities; institute forces readiness/contingency planning; in the mid-1980s and early 1990s, it was the forces readiness of some units of Nigerian Armed Forces that facilitated Nigeria's outstanding performance in Liberia and Sierra Leone.

Invest in New Innovations and Technologies to Facilitate operational action in our maritime environment: review the budgeting process to prioritize the provision of funds for innovation on new maritime defence components/strategies. Also ensure that DICON becomes our primary research base in arms manufacture, and ensure that we can produce our weapons using mainly locally sourced materials- (small arms, heavy machine guns, armoured vehicles, amphibious vehicles, Navigation gears, ships, special maritime weapons including missiles and drones).

In addition, ensure a comprehensive data coverage of our maritime domain, liaise with friendly countries, AFRICOM and other strategic partners. Build human assets to provide early advanced intelligence on criminal gangs not only in our domain, but also in other countries within the Gulf of Guinea, especially Somalia. Assets that can also help in case of kidnap incidents, piracy actions and sundry threats and behind-the-scenes assets within official administrative

echelons of friendly Navies/diplomatic missions/and multinational firms. Invest in mapping of our Littoral states, and those of other countries in the Gulf of Guinea; work in concert with the office of the Surveyor General of the Federation, DSS and State Governments. The Navy is to embark on a periodic aerial survey of the Nigerian maritime domain. The return of an age-long tradition that has made the Military an effective fighting force. Military colours and badges of famed units and brigades should be returned. What happened to 3 Marine Commando Division that fought in the civil war?

While we lost our identities easily, in some armies, like that of the USA, the special combative divisions like 82 Airborne and the 101st Airborne have remained, even having been involved in several campaigns. Honour brave security operatives with badges of honour for distinguished services, just as you punish those who err; redefine the core mandate of security forces. Return troops to purely military duties, while equipping/training the Police/other security agencies to live up to their statutory roles and expectations, as the Armed Forces are simply over-stretched at the moment; improve on relationships between Security agencies and civilians- rebrand Security Forces/Civilian relationship through social and economic interventions; exemplary leadership by officers and men.

Use media channels and other platforms to present friendly narratives which respect the cultural/social values of the people. Sensitize the legislature (Senate, House of

Representatives and Houses of Assembly of Riverine States) on the strategic threat in the Nigerian Maritime domain and the need to maintain realistic budgeting. NASS to conduct periodic oversight, NIMASA and Navy to brief NASS, NSA to review findings in the maritime domain

Moreover, the maritime security of Nigeria and the Gulf of Guinea is beyond the capacity of a single country or a particular regional body acting alone. Therefore, Nigeria and other countries linked to the Gulf of Guinea must share a common interest in maritime security. It is also necessary for the regional organisations within and around the Gulf of Guinea to share common interests in maritime security. Thus;

Instead of the overlapping duties and duplication of functions, the regional organisations not limited to the “Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Maritime Organization of West and Central Africa (MOWCA) and the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC), should strategize for more effective and efficient integration and coordination of maritime initiatives/strategies concentrated towards maritime security.¹⁵

There is a need to frame a national and regional policy that is beyond immediate needs and reactive responses. The policy should be one that ideally contemplates civil-military cooperation, interagency collaboration, and competent staff training as parts of the strategies and initiatives to combat maritime security challenges in Nigeria/Gulf of Guinea.

CONCLUSION

For Nigeria to harness and maximize the socio-economic potentials of her maritime domain and the Gulf of Guinea, a secure environment must be ensured, and the ills of oil theft, kidnapping and vandalism of oil infrastructures must be largely checked. Intelligence must be proactive. We must enhance the confidence, combat readiness of the Security Forces to respond to emergencies/crisis situations. The strategic picture shows that intelligence support would only be effective if Nigeria can modernize its intelligence posture through the adoption of enhanced technology, use of modern gadgets and also its human assets in communities of the coastal States, and the Gulf of Guinea. This modernization should be national, professional and forward-looking, and devoid of primordial sentiments, knowing that Nigeria is the largest Country in the Gulf of Guinea, with in fact more stakes when the chips are down.

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INTELLIGENCES IN ASYMMETRIC WARFARE: OPENING A SECOND FRONT AGAINST INSURGENCY AND TERRORISM IN NIGERIA

By Maj Gen S A Adebayo (Rtd)

INTRODUCTION

Intelligence practice across the globe is basically about pre-empting threats with a view to neutralizing them before they degenerate into a crisis. It is only achieved through the foreknowledge of enemies' capability, intention, vulnerability and tactics. Intelligence acquisition is, therefore, a product of evaluated data from information; it remains the key to unveiling enemies of the state. In dealing with asymmetric warfare which implies containing the excesses of 2 belligerents with opposed strength as in the case of "David versus Goliath" classical biblical story, the need for actionable intelligence on all potential unconventional tactics employed by the weaker force becomes imperative. Often, terrorism, insurgency, rebellion, ambushes, kidnapping, banditry, political murders propaganda are strategies adopted to harass the superior power by attempting to subvert its subjects. The terrorists have also engaged in psychological warfare, influencing values, emotions and behaviour of citizenry and targets while attacking civilian and soft targets.

Artificial intelligence (AI) has received considerable attention globally as a tool that can process vast quantities of


data and discover patterns and correlations in the data unseen to the human eye, which can enhance effectiveness and efficiency in the analysis of complex information. As a general-purpose technology, such benefits can also be leveraged in the field of counterintelligence operations. It is against this backdrop that security and intelligence agencies globally are exploring how the intelligence potential of AI can become a second front in combating asymmetric threats. Invariably, actionable intelligence therefore remains the key to dealing with all forms of asymmetric threats, including terrorism and insurgency.

CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATIONS

Intelligence

The 2007 Joint Intelligence (JP 2-0) defines intelligence with a military undertone as: “The product resulting from collecting, processing, integrating, evaluating, analysing and interpreting available information concerning foreign nations, hostile or potential hostile forces of elements or areas of actual or potential operation”¹⁶

The Intelligence Cycle



Asymmetric Warfare

Asymmetric warfare entails unconventional strategies and tactics adopted by a force when the military capabilities of belligerent powers are not simply unequal but are so significantly different that they cannot make the same sorts of attacks on each other. Asymmetric warfare is a form of irregular warfare, e.g., the onslaught of the Boko Haram terrorists in collusion with the Islamic State of West Africa Province (ISWAP).

Insurgency

Insurgency is “a violent, armed rebellion against authority waged by small, lightly armed bands who practice guerrilla warfare from primarily rural base areas”¹⁷.

Insurgency attacks are directed towards the government and public institutions to destabilize the existing constituted authority. Its ultimate aim is to subvert and alter the balance of power in their favour. The key descriptive feature of insurgency is its asymmetric nature; small irregular forces face the state's large, well-equipped, regular military.

Terrorism

Terrorism is “the calculated use of violence to create a general climate of fear in a population and thereby bring about a particular political objective”¹⁸. It is the use of violence or an act of terror to achieve an ideology or political end. It is a creation of fear to intimidate through inflicted punishment. Terrorism has been practiced by political organizations with both rightist and leftist objectives, by nationalistic and religious groups, by revolutionaries, and even by state institutions such as armies, intelligence services, and police.

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE




Artificial intelligence (AI) is the ability of a digital computer or computer-controlled robot to perform tasks commonly associated with intelligent beings. The term is generally understood to describe a discipline concerned with developing technological tools, exercising human qualities, such as planning, learning, reasoning, and analysing.


The use of AI holds considerable potential for intelligence agencies in their efforts to counter all forms of asymmetric threats, especially terrorism online.



AI can be particularly helpful in supporting law enforcement in dealing with the large amounts of collected data by classifying new entries, extracting patterns, flagging significant information, developments or relationships, and visualizing results. It can aid in finding patterns and relations that may otherwise stay unrecognized and can, thus, greatly benefit intelligence and counter-terrorism agencies to turn the tide in the fight against terrorism online.



The Components of Artificial Intelligence



OPEN-SOURCE INTELLIGENCE

Open-source intelligence (OSINT) is the method of gathering, analysing, and interpreting publicly available data. OSINT sources can vary from media (print newspapers, television, etc.), Internet (online publications, blogs, and other social media websites), public government data, professional and academic publications, commercial data or what is sometimes called “grey literature” (technical reports, patents, newsletters, etc.).

SOCIAL MEDIA INTELLIGENCE

Social media intelligence (SOCMINT) is a subcategory of OSINT that focuses on intelligence gathering on social media.

NEURO-LINGUISTIC PROGRAMMING

Neuro-linguistic programming (NLP) is a psychological approach that involves analysing strategies used by successful individuals and applying them to reach a personal goal. It relates thoughts, language and patterns of behaviour learned through experience to specific outcomes. Herein lies the rationale for the need for the intelligence community to exploit the benefits of AI in countering all forms of asymmetric threats.

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE EFFORTS AT COMBATING ASYMMETRIC THREATS

Current intelligence efforts at combating asymmetric threats are coordinated from the Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA). Intelligence is conducted and shared at various levels, namely:

1. Strategic Level Intelligence

It is concerned with broad issues such as economic, political, military capabilities, non-state actors, scientific, population and so on. This covers intelligence gathered on national or international activities that cover issues of national security and capabilities.

2. Operational Level Intelligence

This is focused on support to an expeditionary force commander and will be attached to the formation headquarters. A classic example is the intelligence support for Commanders of Joint Task Forces, e.g., OP HADIN KAI.

3. Tactical Level Intelligence:

This is focused on support for operation at the tactical level and would be attached to the battle group. At the tactical level, briefings are delivered and intelligence shared with the patrols on current threats and collection priorities. These patrols are then debriefed to elicit information for analysis and communication through the reporting chains.

4. Counter-Level Intelligence

Counter-Intelligence information is also shared to protect and maintain the secret of a country's intelligence operations by preventing spies from penetrating the country's government, armed services or intelligence community. Counterintelligence operations sometimes involve the manipulation of an adversary's intelligence services by placing moles or double agents in sensitive areas. Beyond the four levels above, intelligence sharing could cut across regions and go global, hence the Interpol. The major agencies in charge of Intelligence, as coordinated by the ONSA, are:

- a. Defence Intelligence Agency
- b. National Intelligence Agency
- c. Department of State Services
- d. Services Intelligence Outfits (NA/NN/NAF)
- e. Forces Criminal Investigation and Intelligence Department (NPF)
- f. The Intelligence Arms of other Paramilitary Services
- g. However, current efforts are largely focused on Human Intelligence Sources; hence, the need for a Second Front in the overall intelligence efforts at countering asymmetric threats.

APPLICATIONS OF AI IN COUNTERING ASYMMETRIC THREATS

The application of AI in countering asymmetric threats can be discussed in 6 use cases. These include: Predictive analysis of terrorist activities, identifying red flags of radicalization, detecting misinformation and disinformation

spread by terrorists for strategic purposes, automating content moderation and takedown, countering terrorist and violent extremist narratives, and managing heavy data analysis demands

A. Predictive Analysis of Terrorist Activities

The application of predictive analytics for counter-unconventional threats can, in some ways, be described as the “Holy Grail” for security and intelligence forces, enabling them to transcend a traditionally reactionary approach and become more proactive by anticipating future activities and intervening before an attack occurs. To allow for this, an AI model would need to be fed large quantities of real-time data regarding the behaviour of a terrorist or a suspected individual. By analysing this data, such a model could potentially, for instance, make predictions regarding the likely future activities of these individuals.

The massive growth over the past decade in the amount of data regarding individuals’ behaviour online, especially on social media, has brought about a growing interest in exploring how social media data collected regarding individuals’ behaviour online can be used to predict terrorist activities. This analysis, based on aggregated data, can be helpful to support security and intelligence agencies prioritizing scarce resources as operational support, making strategic decisions or providing warnings to the competent authorities.

B. Identifying Red Flags of Radicalization

Another AI use case for countering terrorism online concerns the use of AI-powered technology to help identify individuals at risk of radicalization in online communities to facilitate appropriate investigation and intervention, which, as already noted, is an increasingly pertinent phenomenon online. It is also one that is impossible to detect using traditional intelligence methods. While radicalization is a complex social phenomenon and the path to radicalization is very personal and often political, machine learning techniques such as NLP can provide valuable support to intelligence and counter-terrorism agencies, as well as other relevant actors within the community, such as social workers

NLP can be used, for instance, to identify keywords that may indicate the state of radicalization of a social media account or the vulnerability of an individual to terrorist narratives online. It can also be helpful to recognize specific behavioural patterns of individuals, such as consuming or searching for terrorist and violent extremist content, which fit radicalization indicators. AI-enabled technology can be beneficial in supporting analysts to identify potential vulnerabilities to radicalization online. Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that automated assessments of vulnerability to radicalization prompt very serious ethical concerns.

The technology is far from being in a position where it could replace the work of experienced security professionals. It is important to acknowledge that, even if the technology was in such an advanced state that it could be leveraged

confidently and reliably, activities such as this in the preventative domain do not necessarily always provide grounds for law enforcement intervention.

C. Detecting Mis and Disinformation Spread by Terrorists for Strategic Purposes

The phenomenon of mis and misinformation is not new. Yet, the capability for such “fake news” content to reach wide audiences at relatively low costs via online means is unprecedented. While the fabrication or distortion of information is not necessarily illegal, it can certainly be harmful and has the potential to contribute to the spread of terrorist or violent extremist narratives into the mainstream discourse. While humans play a major role in spreading misinformation and disinformation, so-called bots compound the scope and scale of the problem. Short for “robot”, bots are a type of software application that operates online and performs repetitive tasks. Chabot, a type of bot, can, for instance, simulate basic conversation and, for this reason, is often used on websites to facilitate and perform rudimentary customer services.

While it is not likely to stem the flow of mis and disinformation in its entirety, the identification of fake or bot accounts created to spread fake news or to steer debates in certain directions presents a possible entry point for combating significant percentages of terrorists who spread mis- and disinformation. In this regard, it was hypothesized that AI tools could be used to automatically identify bots.

D. Automating Content Moderation and Takedown

Social media channels and webpages that host multimedia content fight against terrorist misuse of their services in different ways. In many ways, how they do so depends on how terrorists misuse their platforms. Deplatforming is often used as a response by social media companies to repeated violations of the terms of service or the community standards of their platforms. Another approach often used is a technique known as “shadow-banning.” For countering terrorism and violent extremism, Facebook relies on different tools, including AI language models to understand text that might be advocating for terrorism, which is often language and group-type-specific.

Content moderating AI models are trained to filter out specific content that fits certain criteria. However, in their current form, they suffer from inherent limitations. For instance, a machine learning model trained to find content from one terrorist organization may not work for another because of language and stylistic differences in their propaganda. AI must be trained on data; without such data, it cannot filter out content. AI has risen to prominence in terms of how social media platforms automate content moderation; AI can also play a role in enhancing the capabilities of such Internet referral units within intelligence and counter-terrorism agencies to sift through the vast amounts of content generated.

E. Countering Terrorist and Violent Extremist Narratives

It is important to note that content removal does not contribute in any way to addressing the root causes of terrorism and leaves vulnerable individuals at risk. Beyond just identifying vulnerable individuals, NLP and machine learning algorithms can play an even more proactive role in countering terrorism online. AI can be used to analyse users' behaviour and direct them to specific content conducive to countering terrorist narratives or to trigger ad-targeting tactics.

"Moonshot, with its innovative 'Redirect Method', which was piloted in 2016 with Google's Jigsaw, uses automated risk assessment and NLP to identify vulnerable audiences based on their online search behaviour."¹⁹ The counter-narrative content is curated in cooperation with non-governmental organizations on the ground in order to tailor the messages adequately to local contexts. This includes non-ideological content and contact details to help lines and one-on-one interventions.

The potential for AI to play a role in countering terrorist narratives online is clear, especially when it comes to reaching individuals and groups at risk. Nevertheless, the AI tools in question can only be one part of the solution. AI can help to connect the dots, but truly countering terrorist narratives online requires a much more nuanced understanding of individuals' paths to radicalization that such tools can afford. Furthermore, the important role of

civil society organizations and such initiatives in these processes cannot be discounted.

F. Managing Heavy Data Analysis Demands

Whether it is for the purpose of countering terrorism online or offline, AI can undoubtedly play a significant part in enhancing the capabilities of national authorities to process large quantities of data in an effective manner and, in doing so, to optimize the necessary amount of human and financial resources allocated for any specific situation.

More specifically, AI can be used to extract relevant information, filter, and triage data to help prioritize the analysis of vast sets of data that may identify vital investigative leads and help save lives. The analysis of audio-visual content is one task that requires considerable specialized human resources. With the massive expansion of smart video recording capabilities in recent years and in law enforcement's surveillance capabilities, including through closed-circuit television (CCTV) and the use of body-worn cameras ("bodycams") and patrol drones, there has been a dramatic increase in the quantity of video footage requiring analysis.

In the context of terrorism, it is very well established that terrorist groups and individuals make extensive use of the medium of video and actively share and disseminate such content online. Moreover, when considering online counter-terrorism investigations, "it is also pertinent to consider that, according to CISCO, by 2021, an estimated 82% of consumer

Internet traffic will be video.”²⁰ In light of this, the work of digital forensics detectives is immense and growing. Tools such as facial recognition can also be particularly useful for forensic investigators analysing video evidence collected online.

CONSTRAINTS IN THE APPLICATION OF AI TO COMBAT ASYMMETRIC THREATS

Challenges abound, but the greater the opportunity, the greater the challenge. The constraints are split into two categories: (i) Legal and Political Challenges, and (ii) Technical Challenges in using AI Tools

(i) Legal and Political Challenges

A. Human Rights Concerns

The main concern around the use of AI-enabled technologies in counter-terrorism is the very real and serious potential for the deployment of these technologies to hamper human rights and fundamental freedoms. The United Nations General Assembly has long asserted that States are obliged to respect and fulfil human rights and to protect individuals against abuses by non-State actors in the counter-terrorism context. Intelligence and counter-terrorism agencies aiming to explore the development of AI capabilities, therefore, need to ensure that they do so in a human rights-compliant manner.

B. Fragmented Landscape of Definitions

It is well established that there is no universally accepted definition of terrorism, and this is a reality that is unlikely to change shortly. These realities have several serious implications in terms of using AI to counter terrorism online, hindering the use of the technology. A lack of common understanding of what defines terrorism necessarily results in a lack of clarity regarding what constitutes terrorist content online.

C. Public-Private Relations

A further potential challenge for intelligence and counter-terrorism agencies seeking to explore the development of AI capabilities concerns the role of the private sector in countering terrorist use of the Internet and social media, although it is pertinent to note that this is perhaps an issue that extends beyond the specific domain of AI. With the ever-increasing relevance of online communication, including in terms of counter-terrorism, the weight of the private sector is increasing immensely due to the extent of both their resources and competencies vis-à-vis public actors. As a result, the public sector often turns to private entities to complement and support their efforts to counter terrorism online.

(ii) Technological Challenges in Using AI Tools

A. Bias in the Data

The technology itself is a neutral statistical and mathematical process, but AI can amplify existing biases of societies when trained with biased datasets, resulting in incidents of automated solutions discriminating against individuals, groups, and communities on prohibited grounds. It is also important to note that data can be consciously manipulated. A dataset that has been tampered with is hard to detect from the outside, especially for non-technical experts. In the realm of security, especially counter-terrorism applications, this is a weak point that must be mitigated through strict regulation on the use and access to the system, as well as regular monitoring of the system and its performance.

B. The Complexity of Human-Generated Content

As already stated, a prerequisite to the development of reliable AI tools is to have access to accurate and detailed labelled datasets. In that sense, data sets must be constantly monitored and updated as necessary. For many of the less prominent languages or dialects in the regions, the likely insufficiency of required training data can present a challenge.

C. Explainability and the Black Box Problem

A further principle often underscored as essential for the responsible use of AI is the notion of explainability. Closely associated with the requirements of transparency, explainability focuses on ensuring that AI is not a so-called

“black box” and that algorithmic decisions can be understood by end-users in non-technical terms. The notion of explainability, in this regard, requires that end-users are able to interpret the information extracted from the black box and understand what elements used in the machine learning model were responsible for each specific outcome.

WAY FORWARD

In order to mitigate the aforementioned constraints in the application of AI in countering asymmetric threats, the following measures would suffice.

Massive Investment in AI Technologies by Security Agencies: This will involve the acquisition of both software and hardware components of AI technologies by relevant security and intelligence outfits. This effort will be further complemented by the establishment of a coordinating centre at the Office of the National Security Agency (ONSA)

- i. **Enactment of Legal Framework Guiding the Use of AI:** In order to ensure that the potentials of AI are not abused, and conforms with all human rights statutes, it will be necessary to enlarge the legal framework to guide its usage by security/intelligence agencies. This effort could be spearheaded by the ONSA.
- ii. **Capacity Building by Relevant Security Agencies in AI:** Given the complexities of the AI technologies, it will be expedient for the relevant intelligence and security agencies to train their operatives in order to develop usage capacity to harness the benefits of AI.
- iii. **Intuitional Framework for Use_of AI:** Given the collaborative efforts needed on the part of all the

security agencies to harness AI to fight against asymmetric threats, it becomes necessary to articulate an institutional framework. This is expected to help coordinate the various agencies in the act of collection, processing and delivery of data/information in furtherance of national security objectives.

- iv. **Establishment of National Security Data Bank:** This is perhaps a critical aspect of harnessing AI for countering asymmetric threats. This will involve the establishment of a robust data bank by the various security agencies and the networking of the respective information at the ONSA as a central collecting centre.

CONCLUSION

Considering the fluidity of asymmetric threats, this presentation serves as an introduction to the use of AI to counter terrorism and related threats online for intelligence and counter-terrorism agencies. The presentation provides a broad assessment of different use cases of AI, demonstrating the opportunities of the technology, as well as the constraints involved. The presentation is intended to serve as an initial mapping of AI, contextualizing possible use cases of the technology that could be exploited by intelligence and security agencies in countering insurgency, terrorism and other asymmetric threats in the regions, whilst juxtaposing this with the key challenges that authorities must overcome to ensure the use of AI is responsible and human rights compliant. The presentation concluded with a recommendation of setting up AI technologies as well as a legal framework guiding the use of the technology.

RECOMMENDATIONS

In recognizing that continued technological progress in the field of AI is to be expected, the following recommendations are provided for intelligence and security agencies:

- a. Massive Investments in AI technologies by Security/Intelligence Agencies.
- b. Enactment of legal Framework guiding the Use of AI (ONSA).
- c. Capacity Building by Relevant Security/Intelligence Agencies in AI.
- d. Articulation of Intuitional Framework for Use of AI (ONSA).
- e. Establishment of National Security Data Bank by ONSA and Security/Intelligence Agencies

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NIGERIA'S NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY AND THE PARADOX OF NATION BUILDING: A CRITIQUE

By Festus Uchechukwu, Okwaraji, PhD

ABSTRACT

This paper attempts to examine the acclaimed national security strategies towards security challenges in the light of the negative perception of nation building. It is widely alleged that for every nation building, there must be corresponding security strategies that back it up by the government. Nigeria as a nation, has adopted security strategies to curtail the insecurity for a better national development, yet, in the mist of all these security strategies, the nation is till plug in with backwardness in its nation-building. Insecurities in diverse forms kept erupting virtually from every region of the country. However, from holistic point of view, it seems that the national development is not achievable in the mist of all these security strategies adopted by the government. This perception of security control, present a paradox for the nation building. Are the national security strategies, in Nigeria, ineffectual for nation-building? This paper adopting critical analysis aims to answer this question in the light of the prevalence and understanding of the security strategies for the nation building of which the Nigeria's government has failed to adhered to.

INTRODUCTION

Security Strategy is one of the defining factors that determines nation-building. To have a developed Nation, there should be adequate security strategies to protect lives and properties. The National Security Strategy underscores the belief and generally acknowledged view that security is the cornerstone of development and progress in a free society, and that security is a guarantee of the well-being of citizens and stability of the state.²¹ Thus, it is the bedrock for development. If there are adequate security strategies but there are no corresponding national development, it is a paradox, i.e., a witty saying. Thus, security strategy embraces every aspect of human endeavours in the country and addresses the challenges for the betterment of the citizens.

The Nigerian government always formulate good policies on which any nation can stand to provide an enabling environment. One of the polices is the National Security Strategy, which aims at providing security outfit from all indication for national development. The previous National Security Strategy was in 2014 under President Goodluck Jonathan led administration; then the document was revisited and reviewed in 2019, under President Muhammadu Buhari led administration. In this current document, the Nigerian government engaged a lot in its security apparatus, which was not contained in the 2014 document, to maintain national development. However, all these security strategies seem not to be viable, sustainable,

and realisable for national development. A Nation can exist without adequate security strategies to maintain its sovereignty, but no nation can attain national development without adequate security strategies to maintain peaceful co-existence in its sovereignty.

How could there be viable security strategies in Nigeria and yet there is no viable National development? Should we say that there are no adequate security strategies, and there is no development that follows suit? That should be out of context, hence, there are a lot of security strategies adopted so far in the country. Should we then say that there are security strategies and there is also National Development at the same time? That is an overstatement because, from the look of things, it is obvious that no developmental impact could be seen in the economy. Things are getting worse every minute of the day. Should it be that there are security strategies, and there is no national development? that should sound very interesting and incredible. Perhaps, it is what is tagged as 'adequate security strategies' for nation-building that the Nigerian government have not put into consideration and implementation.

It is against this background; this work tends to address. This paper critically examines the National Security Strategies from their ontological perspectives for Nation-building. This will help us to know why there are national security strategies, but there is no corresponding national development. The hidden agenda of the strategies which the Nigerian government had not adhered to and applied, the

susceptibilities and imperviousness within that agenda, then the resultant actions. It is through this hidden agenda, which the Nigerian government had failed to apply, that it retarded the national development. The negligence of this strategic agenda is what this study described as the Paradox of Nation Building.

NIGERIA'S NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

Babagana Monguno²² has to state that the National Security Strategy of Nigeria outlines the major security concerns of the nation for which policies and strategies have been articulated, and how the government plans to deal with them. The National Security Strategy (NSS) 2019. It underscores the belief and generally acknowledged view that security is the cornerstone of development and progress in a free society, and that security is a guarantee of the well-being of citizens and stability of the state. The notion of security strategy adopted reflects the contemporary paradigm shift away from the state-centric focus of security to one which is comprehensive and emphasizes human security.

He further stated that Nigeria published its maiden NSS in 2014, and since then, the security environment has continued to evolve, giving rise to emergent challenges, thus necessitating a review. While significant progress has been made on multiple fronts between 2014 and 2019, Thus; the nature of security challenges facing Nigeria today is more complex than in the past. The challenges call for a robust, dynamic and proactive national security framework and

infrastructure capable of dealing with these growing threats in real time.

The NSS 2019, which is the latest edition, aims at ensuring that Nigeria's sovereignty, territorial integrity, national interests, the well-being of the people and the country's institutions are preserved, protected and enhanced. The Strategy provides a comprehensive vision of National Security, premised on the understanding that a responsible society aware of its security is better poised to address today's challenges.

Based on defending our interests and values, Nigeria's strategic projection is aimed at pursuing regional, continental and global peace, stability and security. This National Security Strategy will facilitate the short-term, medium-term, and long-term security aspirations, recognising the myriad security challenges since 2014. Chapter 3 of the 2019 NSS examines the current and future threat environment of the country. Chapters 4 to 7 consider appropriate strategies to ultimately ensure peace, prosperity and security in the country.

Thus, Chapter 4 provides profound strategies on how to protect the Nigerian people and territory. The interest is the preservation and protection of sovereignty and territorial integrity. This core national interest is to guarantee the security and welfare of the Nigerian people, which is focused broadly on all categories of security threats. These include terrorism and violent extremism; armed banditry, kidnapping and militancy; cybercrimes; transnational

organised crime; insecurity in other domains; potential threats from Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosive (CBRNE) agents; and national disasters. The national responses to these threats must be comprehensive and coordinated.

Chapter 5 emphasised how to promote Nigeria's prosperity and sustainable development. The agenda recognizes the need to harness economic opportunities arising from the human and natural resource endowments, promote Science, Technology and Innovation (STI) and invest in human development, especially education and healthcare, in furtherance of national security. It is also committed to advancing environmental sustainability as well as energy, food and labour security.

Chapter 6 stressed how to promote national unity and peaceful co-existence. Achieving peace, security and development in Nigeria requires effective management of the nation's diversity in various areas. These are the political, socio-cultural and gender related issues. Others include managing our religious diversity, traditional institutions, as well as reinforcing strategies to harness the prowess of the youth for national development.

Chapter 7 highlights how to promote regional and international interests. It sets out how the Government will deepen Nigeria's relationship with regional and global partners, strengthen regional and global institutions, support and achieve favourable outcomes in bilateral and multilateral relations and promote its regional influence.

With these strategies on board, there will be even developments in all aspects of the economy.

NATIONAL VALUES

The Federal Republic of Nigeria is committed to the ideals of freedom, equality and justice. It considers the sanctity of human life to be paramount and is committed to enhancing human dignity and ensuring that the actions are humane. The peace, security and prosperity rest upon the foundational values of democracy, the rule of law, free enterprise, respect for human rights, including women and minority rights. It recognizes the need to create an enabling environment for the full expression of the potential of the people in the form of political inclusion, economic empowerment, social integration, as well as equal opportunity and access to justice.

NATIONAL INTERESTS

The interests are the preservation of Nigeria's sovereignty, territorial integrity, security and the welfare of her people; preserve democracy, guarantee human security and combat all threats to peace in the territory.

NATIONAL OBJECTIVES

1. The National Objective are to Protect Nigerian People and Territory
2. Promote Nigeria's Prosperity and Sustainable Development
3. Promote National Unity and Peaceful Co-existence
4. Promote our Regional and International Interests

Vision: is to make Nigeria a secure, safe, just, peaceful, prosperous and strong nation.

Mission: The inherent mission is to apply all elements of national power to ensure physical and human security, a just society, peaceful co-existence, national unity, prosperity and sustainable development while promoting Nigeria's influence in regional, continental and global affairs.

THE PARADOX

Etymologically, the word paradox comes from Ancient Greek: para meaning 'distinct from' and doxa meaning 'opinion'; which means distinct from opinion. For Quine, a paradox is a successful argument having as its conclusion a statement or proposition that seems false or absurd.²³ William G. Lycan describes Paradox as an inconsistent set of propositions, each of which is very plausible."²⁴ Sainsbury gives the following description of a paradox: an unacceptable conclusion derived by apparently acceptable reasoning from apparently acceptable premises. Moreover, one can describe a paradox as an incongruity of reasoning.

However, a "paradox arises when a set of apparently incontrovertible premises gives unacceptable or contradictory conclusions."²⁵ Whereas good reasoning is thought to produce sound conclusions, paradoxes produce unsound or doubtful conclusions. With paradoxes, the reasoning may appear good, but the conclusion that follows is absurd. A paradox is found when sound reasoning leads

to absurd conclusions. For non-professionals, the paradox can be said to be a witty saying.

Javier Herrero Ruiza²⁶ divides paradox into two different types, namely verbal and situational. Verbal paradox presents two or more terms that generate input spaces whose conceptual structures stand in contrast. E.g., hear the loud sound of silence. They have ears but hear not. You must be cruel only to be kind

Situational paradox is a type of paradox based on a reference that emerges from the contrast arising between the context of the situation and our cognitive environment. In this kind of paradox, there is a mental space, which is generated by the context (i.e., Nigeria has adequate security strategies) and another one abstracted away from someone's expectations or world knowledge (i.e., if Nigeria has adequate security strategies, they should maintain national development in Nigeria). But Nigeria has adequate security strategies, yet it is unable to maintain national development. Meanwhile,

To solve a paradox will involve either showing that there is a hidden flaw in the premises, or that the reasoning is erroneous, or that the apparently unacceptable conclusion can be tolerated. Until one is solved, it shows that there is something about our reasoning and our concepts that we do not understand.²⁷

NATION BUILDING

The process of nation building "is intrinsically a picture of some kind of building with real brick and the edifice this time being the nation."²⁸ In this assertion, the most important

factors to be concerned with the edifice are the brick and the mortar, not only just brick and mortar but the real ones that is to show that for there to be a nation-building, there must be a combination of the real materials for there to be a formidable edifice. This edifice cannot be reliable and stand strong unless the materials are the real ones. Therefore, in the same light, a nation cannot stand strong and reliable without its components made whole, strong and come together for the welfare of all concerned in the nation. Most importantly, making the whole system of governance work accordingly, in so doing, has regard for human value and promotes the standard of living, where equity, justice and fairness play a major role in the structure of the nation.

Nation-building also involves "the general co-operation that is needed in a country to develop higher education on a larger scale. It also involves raising the level and standard of living... coordinate economic activities."²⁹ People need to be trained and educated for them to improve their lives and know their rights as a citizen, which demands that the people should be recognised in their rights, and the authority also recognised in its rights. By so doing, the general welfare of the people will be protected and respected. This will amount to mutual understanding between the people and the leadership of the nation.

Thus, on the leadership side, the leadership is expected to brace up its responsibilities on behalf of the people, recognise, operate within, and never seek to exceed the limits of its power over the people, which might undermine the

dignity of any individual. It must have strategic plans, both in economic, social, political, psychological and security sectors to safeguard the citizens and give them a better life. It must respect the functions of and the operatives of other agencies beyond its jurisdiction; such agencies like the family, the groups, the religions, traditions and the culture of people.

In the same manner, the people should face up to their responsibilities for national development and prosperity. Most importantly, came out with ideas, dispositions and commitments relevant for promoting national goals; thus perform their civic duties and uphold the rule of law. This will help out in maintaining a formidable nation that will promote good governance for the common good of all the people.

In pursuing this end, the leadership of the nation must stay within the boundaries of its authority, must not use inappropriate means like force and arbitrary laws, and must deny or abuse human rights.³⁰ In effect, human rights are a priority that must be considered first before any other factor. Then, there must be a progressive and rapid level of development across every level of human activities and societal development to improve the lot of the inhabitants of the nation.

However, the very possibility of being classified as a nation means that some differentiation and demarcation of boundaries must be carried out, some delineations of functions done and some coherency of activities established that would make the society possible and

distinguish the new entity from the raw, nasty state of the nation."³¹

This will consist in any meaningful effect at garnering consensus to establish and sustain a spirit of concord and mutual co-existence among all, and also any meaningful contribution, accomplishment, and positive experiences that the nation can point towards nationhood, which include, all the credentials as a co-operate social cultural and political entity, all the efforts made and are making to transform into dynamic nation and a better place for all its inhabitants.

Most importantly, the nation-building involves a meeting of minds, openness to growth and cross-pollination of constructive ideas to make life better and more meaningful to citizens. These constructive ideas will foster freedom, equality and fraternity, which every leader should make their bedrock for nation-building. Fostering these constructive or democratic ideas will answer the individual's need to reconcile the desire for a significant life with the demands that social existence makes.

The idea of freedom implies the absence of any particular external restraint or internal constraint in human thought, speech, or action. That is to say, there must be a comprehensive freedom of one's self as far as it does not dent the freedom of others. "The idea of equality implies that there is a certain amount of benefits that every citizen should expect from society as a right, such as the right to life, shelter, free primary, secondary and tertiary education, protection under the law etc."³² Hence, as a principle, "equality takes the

form of an assertion that no one ought ever to be restrained by artificial barriers- whether social, economic or political- which prevent him or her from living under his or her design¹³³ The idea of fraternity as a principle stipulate that every human being ought to adopt an attitude of responsibility for every person and for the society, which sustain human existence. This will help to guard and strengthen the other principles of freedom and equality, for each member of the society would show concern for the freedom and equality of others.

This democratic and constructive idea also implies that it is the people who rule, decide and are also sovereign. These people are individuals with certain strong convictions about their individuality, their dignity, and freedom. They are "all the citizens presumed sane, informed, adult, willing, able, available, self-governing, judging for themselves and deciding for themselves. They are to decide who rules them and under what conditions.³⁴ Therefore, the crudity of action and abuse of power that is often associated with certain classes of politicians is an aberration rather than an integral element in politics. In politics, what is utmost important is the good of the citizens and not the might of the state. Insofar as politics is for the good of humans, its end is achieved.

In order to be able to achieve its end, the activity of politics should include among its concerns an analysis of government, its structure, limits, policies and practices to see if they are conducive to human good. Any policy or practice that goes against the good of humans is discounted. The role

of politics is therefore to organise humans to live in harmony with one another in such a way as to facilitate progress for the individual and the society at large."³⁵ The politics of falsehood should be frowned at and discarded; thus, it is "unfair and misleading to conceive in vulgarise, all-negative way as though its very nature were nothing but travesty of values where practitioners quibble with words and idea...is an aberration from noble of science and practice of politics."³⁶ Hence, "the state is not ordered to mere activity of life, but to activity of life according to the highest virtues. Its end is the common good of its members, i.e., the good of the virtues, both speculative and moral, and of the arts."³⁷

Moreover, the dynamic ideals for the society are the ones that command universal appeal. "A nation that is more egalitarian in nature, in which life is safer and more worthwhile for everyone, including those who are least able to stand on their own feet."³⁸ Such will constitute respect for the individual as someone who is both responsible and answerable for his or her actions. It is a safeguard against the tyranny and oppression of the poor by the rich. Such a nation is one totally absent from religious influences, rather on the traditional socio-ethical values. Everybody works together to achieve a common ideal of temporal well-being for all citizens.

The people adopt the appropriate means to maintain an internal order and pursue their ideal, and take appropriate measures to safeguard the community from attacks by non-members. It is a continuous process that lingers from

generation to generation, never a complete process as new issues arise and get settled another spring up and be solved so that the nation continues to progress. All these will gear towards upholding and protecting the rights and dignity of the individuals in the sovereign state.

THE PARADOX OF NATION BUILDING

The assertion that “the security strategies in Nigeria cannot sustain national development” requires a deeper epistemological explanation. Hence, such an assertion can be conceived in different ways:

1. As far as the concept ‘security strategies’ is concerned in Nigeria, it cannot maintain National Development.
2. There is no interrelation between security strategies to National Development in Nigeria.
3. All the security strategies cannot maintain National development in Nigeria.

The position of the first assertion is too strong and absolute. Such a society is already in a state of anarchy and total desolation. The second assertion shows that there is no interrelation between security strategies to national development in Nigeria. This is hard to believe, hence, there are some finite interrelationships between security strategies that have yielded some impact on the national development. The third assertion sounds more like a fallacy of Hasty Generalization. How would it be possible that no security strategy will maintain national development in Nigeria?

Does it suggest that the assertion may have contextual applications? That is, from a political or social, or psychological context. Showing that either in politics or in the social or psychological dimension, the security strategies in Nigeria cannot sustain national development. That will denounce the position of the entire assertion. Hence, if the security strategic methods applied by the Nigerian government do not yield positive results for national development in Nigeria does not mean that there is no other security strategic method that can yield positive results. Therefore, it follows from the above discussions that the assertion is faulty. But how faulty it is? Let's consider it this way.

This sentence is false. (The security strategies in Nigeria cannot sustain National Development, is false)

The underlined sentence is:

- a) True
- b) False
- c) All of the above
- d) None of the above

It follows a bit logically.

If a) is the right answer, then the sentence is true. Since it says it is false, if it is true, it must really be false. This is a Contradiction. Then, a) is not the right answer.

If b) is the right answer, then the sentence is false. But it says it is false, so then it would be true. This is also a Contradiction. Then, b) is not the right answer.

If both a) and b) are wrong, surely c) is. That leaves d). The underlined sentence is neither true nor false. The conclusion of this little argument is somewhat surprising if one has taken it for granted that every grammatical declarative sentence is either true or false. But the reasoning looks solid, and the sentence is a bit peculiar anyhow, so the best advice would seem to be to accept the conclusion: some sentences are neither true nor false. This conclusion will have consequences when one tries to formulate an explicit theory of truth or an explicit semantics for a language. Therefore, if the highlighted sentence is neither true nor false, show that the proposition is a paradoxical statement. Meanwhile, the established that 'amidst the security strategies, cannot be sustained national development,' is paradoxical, identifying such is a paradox of Nation-Building.

However, the nature of the Nigerian National Security Strategy is superb and one of the best strategies any nation can work with. After revisiting and proper reviewing of the previous National Security Strategy of 2014, the current document in 2019 put into consideration all the strategic challenges the nation faces that was not captured in the previous document as it contains in the 2019 document, "On the domestic front, some previously existing security challenges have grown in intensity while other significant challenges have emerged. These include ethno-religious

conflicts which continue to prey on our historical and socio-political fault-lines, conflicts between pastoralists and farmers, banditry, kidnapping, cyber-crimes and politically motivated violence. In the circumstances, the virulence of previous and emergent security threats immediately calls for a confluence of ends, ways and means of overcoming them. This is an urgent existential imperative to meet the demands.

These are the rationales for the review of the National Security Strategy 2014. The core value is committed to the ideals of freedom, equality and justice. Put into consideration the sanctity of human life to be paramount and are committed to enhancing human dignity and ensuring that every action taken is humane. The peace, security and prosperity rest upon the foundational values of democracy, the rule of law, free enterprise, respect for human rights, including women and minority rights. The interests are to preserve Nigeria's sovereignty, territorial integrity, security and the welfare of her people, and to preserve democracy, guarantee human security and combat all threats to peace in our territory.

The objectives are to protect the Nigerian People and Territory, Promote Nigeria's Prosperity and Sustainable Development, Promote National Unity and Peaceful Co-existence, and promote our Regional and International Interests. The vision is to make Nigeria a secure, safe, just, peaceful, prosperous and strong nation. The inherent mission is to apply all elements of national power to ensure physical and human security, a just society, peaceful co-

existence, national unity, prosperity and sustainable development. All these point to a well-meaning plan for a sustainable economy.

This is the bedrock of the current Nigerian National Security Strategy of 2019. A well refined, modified and strategic measure that could sustain a nation to a grater hight on the level of peace, prosperity, and national development that anchored on the shore of rule of law, respect of human rights and dignity, and on an enabling environment for economic activities, and social interaction for all and sundry. With such a strategy, Nigeria ought to be one of the best countries in the world that has a sustainable and enabling national development, at which its standard of living and security outfit will be superb to sustain and protect the citizens in all aspects of life. But is such a case of Nigeria as a nation? This requires epistemological explanation.

Contrarily, Nigeria as a nation has not lived up to expectations in its National Security Strategy. It has failed in protecting the rights and dignity of its citizens and has worked towards the realisation of the common good. However, most people who have had the fortune or misfortune of presiding over the affairs of the nation have not lived up to the expectation in implementing the policies and strategies for national development. The experience so far shows that due to selfishness, greed, lust for power, craving for accumulation of wealth, favouritism, nepotism and tribalism, leaders do not act justly, fair and equitably in

distributing the nation's commonwealths, and implementation of the policies without fear or favour.

These inordinate acts create gaps for two nations in one (the nation of the artisan and the nation of the political elites). These were some of the issues which the National Security Strategy of 2019 stated to be tackled but yet they are still recurring every now and then. One will wonder if the National Security Strategy of 2019 is viable or has not been implemented. Because such a document can change narratives in all security challenges. Should we say then that the National Security Strategy of 2019 is viable but it has not been implemented, or it has been implemented but it is no longer viable, realisable and tenable? It can be deduced that the National Security Strategy adopted is not a reality, but rather a paradox in the Nation-Building.

THE BEDROCK FOR NATION-BUILDING

In his Inaugural address titled 'Respect for Human Dignity', Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe, addressing his fellow Nigerians on 16 November 1960, equates his oaths as Nigeria's new leader with the challenge to maintain respect for human dignity.³⁹ He observes, "The lack of respect for human dignity has led to the political bondage of man by man in Africa."⁴⁰ He continues, "Under no circumstance shall we accept the idea that the black race is inferior to any other race."⁴¹ Azikiwe pledges that Nigeria will avoid entering into relationships with any nations that "practice race prejudice... no matter how it may be legally cloaked."⁴²

Azikiwe forcefully argues,

Without respect for the rule of law permeating our political fabric, Nigeria would degenerate into a dictatorship with its twin relatives of tyranny and despotism. I hold that the arbitrary exercise of power without the restraining influence of the rule of law must be condemned as a fundamental departure from constitutional government. Any justification of such untrammelled exercise of political power is, to me, an outrage on human conscience and a gross violation of human rights.⁴³

In addition, he calls on Africans across the continent to join in liberating efforts. Quoting Langston Hughes at the end of his address, Azikiwe calls on Nigerians to "youthfully march together to a greater tomorrow for Nigeria's unity with faith."⁴⁴ From this address, Azikiwe led emphasis on the road for nation-building, thus a nation cannot stand when;

1. There is no respect for human dignity, hence leading to bondage of the citizen and the violation of human rights.
2. Some human beings are considered Inferior to others; such can lead to class distinction, and dehumanisation of human worth or values. Therefore, one should avoid entering into relationships with any nation, organisation, individual, or system that practices racial prejudice, no matter how it may be legally cloaked.
3. If there is no respect for the rule of law, such will degenerate into a dictatorship with its twin relatives of tyranny and despotism. Hence, any arbitrary exercise of power without the restraining influence of the rule of law must be condemned as a fundamental departure from constitutional government. Any justification of

such untrammelled exercise of political power is an outrage on human conscience and a gross violation of human rights.

4. Finally, the need for liberating effort and unity for the nation building, which will be anchored on National Strategic Plans for a sustainable economy.

These are the fundamental principles of any democratic nation. The principles lie in the spirit of oneness, truth and progress of any nation that seeks to advance both in moral and national development. It takes into consideration how and what a nation needs to take up its challenges for a better society, where the citizen will have their fair share of the dividend derived from the nation, and as such, march towards a greater tomorrow. The nation-building demands that the system at all levels of the government, ranging from the executive, legislature, and judiciary down to the citizen, must be working and effectively implemented. It involves the general co-operation of all by raising the level and standard of living, coordinating economic activities and social order.

SECURITY CONCERNS AND NATION BUILDING

The process of nation-building has not been a bed of roses. The rare moments of peace and tranquillity have often been shattered by deadly strokes of abuse of human rights and dignity by insecurity operators. Human beings know that a peaceful world where the rights and the dignity of every individual is respected and protected is far better than a

violence world where there is abuse of human rights and dignity, because development, which is positive change that enhances, promotes and advance his wellbeing is a direct function of nation building. While backwardness that distorts and impoverish his wellbeing is a direct product of retard nation. Yet, for the same obvious reasons, some human beings could not restrain from entertaining thoughts and engaging in activities that provoke crises, violence, conflicts and wars to the enormous cost and peril to the nation. However, the concern of every government in its national security strategy should be geared towards realising these challenges that are being created and to know how to ameliorate and sustain the society against any insecurity operation.

In every nation, there are a lot of monsters who kill joy, wreck homes, abort dreams and destroy the lives of their fellow human beings with impunity. These monsters could be individuals, groups, the government in itself, the system in operation, or some policies adopted in the nation. Through their activities, they make a paradoxical nation, where the nation is put on the shore of fire. However, the nation came into being mainly for the common good of the people. The paramount goal is the well-being of all the people in the nation. The common good constitutes the needs such as, peaceful atmosphere, access to basic needs like food, shelter, clothing, health-care, education, security, self-expression, just society, opportunities to work with adequate entitlements, and also, the recognition of the humanity of every member of the nation, the right to live and

develop oneself. In addition, a sovereign state where the territory of the nation, the borders, and the environs are well protected. The nation is charged with the responsibility of making possible the attainment of pressing needs through its National Security Strategies.

CONCLUSION

Insecurity is an ill wind of a social phenomenon, which does not blow any nation any good. In its aftermath, both the perpetrators and the victims are losers. Although the insecurity is not a natural characteristic of human beings, but rather, a consequence of human's fallen nature, the frequent transgressions against nature. It is human handwork; for this reason, a solution to that self-inflicted problem must come from him. The antidote to it is justice to all.

Therefore, the viable National Security Strategy should gear towards that by creating an enabling environment where people should allow justice to rule. In the rule of justice with its assistants: law, fairness, equity, and equality. No one lives in fear of another, no one bears ill-will against another, everyone acts as his brother's keeper, everyone thinks good of others, and everyone's joys or pains become the joys and pains of all.

In such a situation, development moves a light speed and the nation will be a place to live. The citizens will develop their individual and collective endowments to the fullest capacity possible and thus, attain both self and collective fulfilment. The nation will be a place where selfishness is replaced with

altruism, ignorance with knowledge, greed with contentment, injustice with justice, a do-or-die politics with law-governed politics, poverty with wealth and every bad thought with good thought and bad action with good action.

Therefore, in evaluating the notion of security strategies, the Nigerian government should take into consideration and implementation of the fundamental principles in that document. This will sustain and uplift the nation to a better footing in the development of the individuals and also the state in general.

First, there could be no nation without the people. Nigeria cannot stand in a vacuum. Therefore, the Nigerian government should approach the issues of security challenges through non-kinetic measures, not using force and killing citizens in any provocative action the citizens took. These citizens are hungry, frustrated and dehumanized. Set up the strategies in the document of the 2019 National Security Strategy and see the outcome of how the security challenges will ameliorate themselves without much havoc. One cannot talk and have viable national security strategies without implementing it and then come out to say he has a good plan for the nation.

Secondly, in planning security strategies for building a formidable Nigeria nation, the rule of law must be respected, and every right of an individual must be provided, protected and respected. Nations that are deprived of a better life for their citizens are subject to doom and a state of anarchy. This

is one of the factors that have hindered the National Security Strategy from achieving its aim and objective.

Thirdly, there is a call for immediate attention on the area of the rule of law, good governance, protection and respect of human rights and dignity. These areas have suffered a lot in the course of the structures and policies of Nigeria. These aspects are central to the security strategies. The importance of adequate, practical, and holistic security strategies in the process of nation-building cannot be overemphasized. It is the sustenance of every nation. No nation can maintain its sovereignty and stand as a formidable nation without a proper security measure or otherwise, any national security strategy will be a paradox.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Therefore, the way out should start from tackling ignorance. Ignorance is the evil of all evils- the mother and the incubator of all wrong. It is the nucleus of all that is wrong with man in the world. The problem of ignorance is hard to solve because the problem solver doubles as the problem creator and hence the problem to be solved. Knowledge is a confirmed antidote to ignorance; for that reason, it should be pursued with vehement zeal, through the instrumentality of education, training, workshops and every form of enlightenment. That is, a process of training the leaders and the citizens, the young as well as the old members of the society to be knowledgeable about the ethical standard of living, good governance, good leadership and followership,

for such will uphold adequate security strategies for the national development.

Morality should be enthroned in all facets of national life and strictly observed by leaders and the led. People's morality is the network of the principles of good or right behaviour. These moral principles guide the behaviour of the people and ensure that they live in peace, do their work and enjoy the fruit of their labour. The people's morality carries with it moral values to observe, like love, justice, trust, honesty, patience, integrity, hard work, altruism, brotherhood, selfless service and patriotism. This will give the leaders and the led the right ethical and moral values to see the reason to have sustainable national security strategies, as Nigeria has, and then see the moral reason why it must be implemented in full capacity.

Similarly, poverty should be frowned upon, discouraged and sentenced to death if the nation wants the National Security Strategy to be a working document and its aim and objectives achieved. Thus, poverty is both a material and a moral disease. In material poverty, the victims lack basic needs of life that make living worthwhile; needs like food, shelter, clothing, access to education and health. In moral poverty, the victims are problem creators but not solvers. They live on the other people's sweats, withhold people's rights, build their fortunes on the other people's misfortunes and feel happy to see others suffer. Moral poverty contributes a lot to material poverty in the nation. Therefore, to avoid material poverty, the nation should create job

opportunities for its citizens. Similarly, to avoid moral poverty, corruption should be abhorred by all. Leaders in particular should hand off corrupt practices to those who look up to them will not follow suit. They should rule by example and not by instructions.

Politics should be rid of a do-or-die syndrome. Many people have a wrong notion of governance, especially politicians. They see governance as an avenue to amass wealth with ease. This notion makes them see politics, which is a process to produce those who will govern the state, as a matter of life and death. In a civilized world, governance is a call for selfless service, a call to join the think-tank to think out ideas, make policies and draw a programme and implement the same to build a formidable nation state for the common good of all.

When these measures are put in place and policies and strategies being implemented, the leaders being knowledgeable about the implications of not implementing the national policies in rightful ways, and have the ethical moral conduct in good governance and following the principle of democracy, and respect bestowed on the rights and dignity of the citizens, then, there will be a corresponding nation-building. It is the lack of these intrinsic processes in the implementation of the National Security Strategy that has made the Nation-Building assumed paradoxical nature in its value, interest, mission, vision, aim and objectives.

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FRAMEWORKS FOR PREDICTING DECISIONS IN SECURITY ISSUES

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INTRODUCTION

Oftentimes, the general assumption is that, because of the nature of the security dynamics, decisions on security matters are usually spontaneous. This conclusion is further reinforced by the secrecy underpinning the planning and execution of such decisions. The truth is, this assumption is not entirely correct. Like most human actions, decisions on security matters are deliberately planned and arrived at, taking into account several variables. In this chapter, we hope to analyse the frameworks for predicting decisions in Nigeria.

CONCEPTUAL ISSUES

Framework

By framework, we mean a set of assumptions, concepts, values, and practices that constitute a way of viewing reality.

In other words, it is a real or conceptual structure designed to serve as a support guide for the building of something that expands the structure into something useful. It could be a model or a theory. A set of rules, a group of programmes, a defined approach, a logical structure that provides a comprehensive representation of methods for a particular engagement.”⁴⁵

For this work, we take the framework as a basic conceptual structure (as of ideas) “a system of rules, ideas, or beliefs that is used to plan or decide something, the ideas, information, and principles that form the structure of an organization or plan.”⁴⁶

National Security

Trager and Kronenberg defined it as “that part of government policy having its objective as the creation of relevant national and international political conditions favourable to the protection or extension of vital national values against existing and potential adversaries.”⁴⁷ Okodolor conceives it as “the capability of a nation to contain and ward off such threats and vulnerabilities that are acute enough to cripple or weaken its national values, boundaries and institutions as well as the overall well-being of its inhabitants.”⁴⁸ Sandy Berger gives a broad-based criterion for understanding national security as follows: National security⁴⁹ is about more than defence against bitter enemies and deadly weapons.

For example, how can we say we are defending America’s shores if, sometime in this century, climate change submerges our shorelines under rising oceans? And how can we say we are protecting our people if we fail to stop the spread of diseases like AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis, which account for 25% of all deaths in the world? Flat Earth proponents may not see disease as a national security priority. But a problem that kills massively, crosses borders,

and threatens to destabilize whole regions is to me the very definition of a national security threat. To dismiss it as a “soft” issue is to be blind to hard realities

The Covid-19 Threat

COVID-19 is a pandemic that has spread across the world. Managing it led to a massive lockdown with enormous implications, especially for the third world. The COVID-19 pandemic raises important issues related to food and food security, and living conditions in different countries. Poverty and food insecurity (FI) affect people in all regions of the world to different extents according to the availability of and access to tools that guarantee the survival of the population. The relationship between inequality and health is a field that has always been present in the daily life of marginalised populations around the world, even before the occurrence of COVID-19. However, with the occurrence of the pandemic, in Nigeria, the decision to impose lockdown provoked immense stress, hunger and mass protests. Thus, people suffered a lot in the case of the outbreak.

An expressive portion of the population was plunged into a state of extreme poverty, a result of the interaction between a history of structural, social and economic inequality and the expressive contingent of informal or unemployed workers, enhanced by the precarious conditions of the food production and commercialisation system, which involves agribusiness, a complex system of economic interests of large global groups⁵⁰

These conditions were intensified by “the impact of the fight for land, restricted access to drinking water and natural

disasters with effects on the climate and the scarcity or lack of rain in many geographical regions of the planet”⁵¹

*Within these contexts, the inadequacy of the infrastructure of society was associated with that of the life conditions of families, such as unemployment and little power to purchase goods needed for survival, including food, the lack of access to which increases in times of pandemic, plunging a large number of adults, children and the elderly around the world into poverty.*⁵²

As a result of the pandemic, around 49 million people on the planet entered into poverty conditions in 2020”⁵³ Also, the most recent estimates indicated that by the end of 2020, 820 million people suffered from hunger globally”⁵⁴ and more than 130 million people in the world entered into the category of extreme hunger”⁵⁵

Nigeria’s National Security Interest

At the core of the country’s national interest are the following central goals:

1. The preservation of its sovereignty, territorial integrity and constitutional order. As well as the practice of full democracy, political pluralism, the rule of law, freedom of enterprise, human rights and fundamental freedoms;
2. The country’s stability and its economic, social and cultural development, the unfolding of its economic, technological and human resources; its advancement comparable to the level of the security and prosperity of its citizens and the development of a secure environment

facilitating the fulfilment of these goals in a multi-fold manner

3. The preservation and generation of jobs through the enactment of legislations and prosecution of policies that engender and sustain agricultural and industrial activities, extraction/exploitation of natural resources and any other wealth-generating activity.
4. The promotion of social and the enactment and promotion of laws and policies that protect the poor, the vulnerable, the unemployed, as well as ensure fair, just and equitable redistribution of wealth.
5. The maintenance of international peace and security, and the prevention and resolution of regional, interstate and intra-state conflicts by the Charter of the United Nations and the norms and standards of international law.
6. The observance of democratic norms and values and their promotion beyond
7. Cooperation between all international actor states, international organizations, further enhancement of cooperation in bilateral, regional and multi-lateral economic spheres; and
8. Constructive and functional engagement with both national and international non-state actors

Nigeria's National Security Threats

The NSS 2019 categorized Nigeria's national security threats as follows; Terrorism and Violent Extremism, Armed Banditry, Kidnapping, Militancy and Separatist Agitations, Pastoralist-Farmers Conflicts, Transnational Organized Crimes, Piracy and Sea Robbery, Porous Borders, Cybercrimes and Technology Challenges, Socio-Political

Threats, Fake News and Hate Speeches, Environmental Threats, Public Health Challenges, Economic Challenges, and Regional and Global Security Challenges.

BASIC FRAMEWORKS DEFINING NIGERIA'S SECURITY DECISION PROCESSES

1. The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended)
2. Acts of the National Assembly
3. Nigeria National Defence Policy 2017
4. National Security Strategy 2019
5. National Counterterrorism Strategy 2014
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7. Policy Framework and National Action Plan for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (PFNAP) as one of the approaches to foster safer and resilient communities in August 2017.

UNDERSTANDING BASIC FRAMEWORKS FOR SECURITY DECISION MAKING IN NIGERIA

Drawing from the Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy as spelt out in Section 14, subsection (2) b&c of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria as amended as follows:

The security and welfare of the people shall be the primary purpose of government, and the participation of the people in their government shall be ensured by the provisions of this Constitution. The overarching vision of the National Security Strategy 2019 is to make Nigeria a

secure, safe, just, peaceful, prosperous and strong nation. To this effect, it provides that all military efforts should be geared to detect, deter, degrade or decisively defeat threats to national defence and provide stability within the shortest possible time and the NNDP 2017 sets guidelines for the deployment of the AFN.⁵⁶

The NNDP 2019 is aimed at providing a compact, flexible, cost-efficient, and above all, an effective Armed Forces and Security Agencies that are people-oriented, well-trained, adequately manned, equipped and supported by the citizens. The document, as drafted, is people-centric and emphasizes a new ideology called Total Defence relying upon a whole-of-government and a whole-of-society approach.

The Implementation Strategy, otherwise described as the implementation manual for the revised 2017 NNDP, carefully detailed the guidelines on the implementation of the implied and express tasks. The Role of Stakeholders highlighted the roles of each Ministry, Department and Agency in the actualization of the objectives of the policy. It also apportions roles to Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), Civil Society, traditional rulers, religious bodies, market women, captains of industries, etc. The NNDP is a modification of the National Defence Policy 2006. It derives its essence from National Security Policy and focuses on the preservation of the safety of Nigerians at home and abroad, and the protection of the sovereignty of the country and the integrity of its territory and assets. The policy document outlines the general guidelines for the employment of the

Armed Forces of Nigeria in particular and resources in general, to maintain Nigeria's territorial integrity and protect the country from external aggression.

DEMOCRATIC CONTROL

Sections 218 to 220 of the Constitution define the relationships between the President and the National Assembly in the direction of Nigeria's national defence. The fundamental framework of this relationship lies in the democratic control, oversight and accountability of the Armed Forces forms the crux of the higher defence organization in Nigeria. It is categorized within the under-listed tiers of control:

1. First Tier: The President and the National Assembly.
2. Second Tier: The Minister of Defence (MoD).
3. Third Tier: The Chief of Defence Staff and the Service Chiefs.

THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE COMPRISES CIVILIAN AND MILITARY COMPONENTS

The Permanent Secretary heads the civilian component. He is the Chief Accounting Officer of the Ministry and is responsible for policy initiation and managerial support in the Ministry. In addition to the oversight of the National Assembly of the Ministry of Defence, there still exists financial scrutiny from the Office of the Auditor General for the Ministry. Financial dealings, within each service, division and unit are also scrutinized by internal and external auditors.

EXPLAINING DECISION-MAKING MODELS

If you know that you are in a position of responsibility to make decisions relating to security, the concern here is to stimulate curiosity with the extant model of decision making.

WHAT IS DECISION MAKING?

Samuel Eilon, in his paper, “What is Decision”, described decision making as:

A series of steps, starting with information output and analysis and culminating in resolution, namely a selection from several available alternatives. Various aspects of rationality in decision making are reviewed, and the concept of personalistic versus impersonalistic choice is discussed. It is suggested that with time management, control tends to involve an increasing number of formal procedures and thereby to become more impersonalistic in character.⁵⁷

It is a series of steps, starting with information out and analysis culminating in resolution, namely a selection from several available alternatives. Decision making refers to the thought process of selecting a logical choice from available options. In any act of decision making, the following variables come into play: knowledge, options, alternatives, assessment, forecast, rationality, choice and decision.

STEPS IN DECISION MAKING

When trying to make a good decision, the following steps are important in guiding the choice of option to be adopted as a

decision: A person must identify the various options or courses of action available, assess or weigh the merits and demerits of each option. Forecast the utility and outcomes of the option.

It is important to note that while the decision maker strives to make the most beneficial choice among the available options, the rationality of the outcome and decision may be subject to varying interpretations.

DECISION-MAKING FRAMEWORKS

Three (3) models of decision-making theories have been identified by scholars of public administration as: Rational-comprehensive theory, Incremental theory, and Mixed Scanning. Of the 3 models, the Rational-comprehensive and Incremental models are two polar extremes, while the Mixed Scanning model evolved as an attempt to balance the extremes.

1. Rational-Comprehensive Model

The objective of the Rational-comprehensive model is that Herbert Simon remains the foremost scholar identified with the Rational-comprehensive model of decision making. In his book *Administrative Behaviour* (1945), he outlined the steps any decision maker must follow to arrive at a rational-comprehensive decision to include:

- a. Clear definition of goals with levels of achievement for the goals

- b. Identification of contending alternatives for goal attainment
Consequences for each of the alternatives
Comparison of the consequences for each alternative
- c. Selection of an alternative that will achieve the goal at the least cost.

Shortcomings of the Rational-Comprehensive Model

- a. The decision maker does not have all the time and information at his disposal to make a rational-comprehensive decision.
- b. Decision making involves conflicts of values, not value consensus. In this case, the choice of alternative depicts the ascendancy of a set of values, and this could be considered as not being rational by other groups in the contest.
- c. The decision maker could extol personal values over organizational values.
- d. Rational-comprehensive model is considered not workable for complex policy questions like the release of Mazi Nnamdi Kanu.

2. Incremental Model

Charles Lindblom proffered the successive limited comparison or Incremental Model of decision making as a useful alternative to the Rational-Comprehensive Model. In the views of Lindblom, decision makers are more predisposed to accept existing decisions as satisficing and legitimate and only make small, incremental and marginal adjustments in their current behaviour. Put slightly differently, decision makers prefer by step-by-step approach to decision making. In other words, decision makers do not

bother to make a formidable number of far-reaching changes, nor do they spend inordinate time defining their goals; rather, they make small and manageable adjustments between the current state and desired behaviour.

Thomas Dye shares Lindblom's views and posits that under the incremental model, decision makers are mindful of sunk costs in existing programmes, which prevents abandoning existing decisions for radically new ones. He further contends that instrumentalism is important in reducing conflicts, maintaining stability and preserving the political system. Dye concludes that the Incremental model is therefore politically more expedient because it involves incremental changes in existing decisions rather than fundamental redistribution of social values.

Criticisms of the Incremental Model

- a. The model is considered too conservative and therefore tends to reflect the values and preferences of dominant interests in society while neglecting the interests of the underclass.
- b. Since the model is considered suited for decision making under conditions of social stability and continuity, and since instability is a feature of many societies, the incremental model automatically sustains instability in these societies since new decisions are based on existing ones.
- c. In the light of the above, scholars like Yehezkel Dror, therefore, contend that the incremental model is, at best, an ideological reinforcement of the pro-inertia and anti-innovation forces.

3. Mixed Scanning Model

Amitai Etzioni prescribed the Mixed Scanning Model in a bid to overcome the limitations of the Rational-comprehensive and the Incremental models of decision making. He contends that fundamental decisions of the Rational-comprehensive set the tone and direction within which the Incremental model is made. "Mixed Scanning, therefore, seeks to provide the linkage between these fundamental decisions and the step-by-step decisions of the Incremental Model."⁵⁸ Etzioni describes the 3 models using cameras in viewing the sky; the rational comprehensive depicts a broad camera that would cover all parts of the sky but not give great details; the incremental model will zero in on those areas revealed by the first camera that require a more in-depth examination. The Mixed Scanning model employs both cameras, but while it might miss those areas in which only a detailed camera could reveal trouble, it is less likely than instrumentalism to miss obvious trouble spots in unfamiliar areas.

Democratic Governance and Citizens' Participation in Decision Making

Attempts at explaining socio-economic decay in Africa have been variously attributed to the history of political authoritarianism that characterized politics in post-colonial Africa. Ake identifies 4 ways through which totalitarianism undermines development in Africa:

- a. Political repression turns politics to warfare, thereby inflicting leaders with a siege mentality and attaching low priorities to development issues.
- b. Reliance on repression by leaders has disconnected them from the people, thereby dissociating public policy from social needs.
- c. Governance by coercion has alienated the citizens from the state.
- d. Political repression has also occasioned enormous waste of human resources, which is the engine of development.

Benefits of Citizens' Participation in the Decision Process

When citizens participate in the decision process, the following advantages accrue: It ensures that popular aspirations are integrated into the policy outcomes. It also strengthens the feeling of ownership and thereby encourages popular participation in the policy process.

- i. It strengthens public accountability
- ii. It strengthens the governance pact between the citizens and the state.

Conclusion

Decision-making is not a spontaneous endeavour. Usually deliberate, it is framed in pre-existing models and anchored on prevailing realities. Decision-making on security matters is more complex than generally assumed. The makers of security decisions choose from a wide rife of options at their disposal. We must bear in mind that those who make

decisions on our security are also human beings. Thus, they are bound to make mistakes, which must be corrected in the general interest of society. Generally, however, good decisions are made when they reflect the general interest of the public, who are actually the owners of such decisions.

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OPERATIONS SECURITY AND ADVERSARIAL DECEPTION AWARENESS

By J. N. Dashwep, FSI

*I make the enemy see my strengths as weaknesses and my weaknesses as strengths while I cause his strengths to become weaknesses and discover where he is not strong.
Sun Tzu, on the Art of War*

INTRODUCTION

The dynamics of modern society have continued to pose serious challenges to security managers worldwide. Crimes are further exacerbated by the reduction of the whole world into a global village. The manifestations of these threats challenge the capacity of government and security agencies. The challenges require that security managers and administrators adopt effective measures in anticipating the enemy's intentions and actions. To this effect, OPSEC must be undertaken by security agencies to be ahead by analysing and deploying appropriate containment measures to all threats to National security.

CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATIONS

Operation

This can be categorized into two, namely, Intelligence Operation and Security Operation.

Intelligence Operation

An intelligence operation is usually defined as a “complex and unique project which is undertaken in the future to achieve goals within the provided time and given resources.”⁵⁹ This includes all measures designed to detect threats by gathering and collecting useful information that provides warnings about activities and groups that will harm us. They are Proactive, Offensive, or Detective Measures.

Security Operation

SecOps is a “collaboration between an organization’s security (Sec) and operations (Ops) teams. The goal of SecOps is to improve an organization’s resiliency against cyber threats by removing silos and more efficiently preventing and responding to potential attacks.”⁶⁰ Security Operation involves procedures/actions taken to prevent and contain identified security threats. They are: investigative activities such as searches, arrests, seizures and prosecution; as well as defensive actions comprising physical security measures, etc. It is also the process of protecting individual pieces of data that could be grouped to give the bigger picture. It is the protection of critical information deemed mission-essential from military commanders, senior leaders, management or other decision-making bodies.

Adversary

An adversary is a person, group, or force that opposes and/or attacks or fights against something or someone.”⁶¹ It

also speaks to an individual, group, organization, or government that conducts or has the intent to conduct detrimental activities

Deception

Information designed to manipulate the behaviour of others by inducing them to accept a false or distorted presentation of their environment. In the context of terrorism, we would expect deception to include, for example, concealment, or creating an impression of being in a place for another purpose other than the true intention.

Operations Security

Operations security (OPSEC) is a formal process for looking at the protection of critical information from the viewpoint of an adversary and then denying that adversary the information it needs. It is a counter-intelligence approach developed by the U.S. forces for information security during the Vietnam War, when it was discovered that lives were being lost, not only from espionage, but also from unclassified information that was being analysed by the enemy. OPSEC seeks to deny or reduce the possibility of the enemy uncovering sensitive information from public activities by restricting public activities or through deceptive actions. It does not replace other security disciplines emplaced to protect classified information, such as physical security or personnel security.

OPSEC is applied by promoting measures which deny adversaries publicly available indicators of sensitive or classified activities, capabilities, or even intentions. OPSEC simply denies the adversary information that could harm you or benefit them. Personnel must be aware of the OPSEC concerns and implement countermeasures whenever needed. They should be wary of potential collection activities by adversaries directed at their organization or the country.

OPSEC Indicators

OPSEC indicators are those friendly detectable actions and open-source information that can be interpreted or pieced together by an adversary to derive critical information. The indicators have characteristics, which are those elements of an action or piece of information that are potentially useful to an adversary. The characteristics are; Signature; Association; Profile; Contrast and Exposure

Signature: A signature is something that causes an indicator to be identifiable and stand out. If the signature is unique and stable, it makes it more interesting and useful to the observer. When something is constant and repeated, someone noticing it might be able to predict future actions. For example, visiting a particular address at the same time every week might be something that would draw attention and should be looked into. For example, visiting a particular address at the same time every week might be something that would draw attention and should be looked into. As a

countermeasure, varying your patterns can interrupt the stability and increase the ambiguity.

Association: A relationship between an indicator and other information or activities. Humans are wired to look for patterns, so when something new is associated with another we already know, the brain tends to key in on it. E.g., if you greet Mr Musa in public, saying “it was great to see you the other day,” and an observer knows that Mr Musa is a travel agent, it may be reasonable to infer that you are planning to travel. Another example is, if you always service your car right before a long trip, someone might assume you are about to take a long trip if they see you servicing your car. This can be countered by knowing the patterns you set, then varying the associations wherever possible and appropriate.

Profile: A profile is what you get when you match multiple signatures together. It is when you see more than one thing put together which gives you a good idea of what is going on. Sometimes when driving within the Central Area in Abuja, you may reach areas where vehicles, particularly taxis, for some reason begin to slow down, and others make abrupt turns and drive away against the run of traffic. It is usually because they saw yellow and black or white and blue striped vehicles parked by the side of the road, near a junction. Whenever you see such happening, you know VIO or FRSC officers are up ahead. People have noticed that profile and they know what it means.

Contrast: A contrast is what you have when there is a change. A difference between an established pattern and

what is present. These are considered to be very reliable indicators because they are reliable signs that something is going on or has changed. An example of a contrast is leaving for work or getting home at different times, or the presence of vehicles that were not previously there. When noticing a difference, the observer will start to wonder what it might mean and to see if it is a one-time or repeated change. When you are planning a change or an operation, it is important to keep your contrasts to a minimum. Whenever possible, this also includes changes in mood, deployment and outlook.

Exposure: The length of time and the timeframe in which an indicator can be observed. The longer it can be observed, the more likely it is to be noticed and built into the profile. If it can only be observed for a short period of time, it is less likely to attract attention (unless it is repeated often). Whenever you have to make a change or do something that can be observed, try to keep the exposure as short as possible. For example, if you intend to add security reinforcements to Military Garrisons in the North-East, the work should be done at the quickest possible time. Unnecessary delay in implementing the change would give more time for Boko Haram/ISWAP insurgents to observe and note the changes.

Steps in OPSEC

In conducting OPSEC and determining its measures, the following relevant steps are essential components to be taken into consideration:

1. **Analysis of the Threat:** Involves the research and analysis of intelligence, counterintelligence, and open-source information to identify the likely adversaries in the planned operation
2. **Identification of Critical Information:** This focuses on prioritizing the OPSEC process for protecting vital information rather than attempting to protect all classified or sensitive unclassified information.
3. **Analysis of vulnerabilities:** This aims at identifying vulnerabilities by examining each aspect of the operation to identify any OPSEC indicators that could reveal critical information. Those indicators are then compared with the adversary's intelligence collection capabilities identified in the previous action
4. **Assessment of Risk:** This action has two components. First, planners analyse the vulnerabilities indicated in the previous action and identify possible OPSEC measures for each vulnerability. Second, specific OPSEC measures are selected for execution based on a risk assessment done by the staff
5. **Apply Appropriate OPSEC Measures:** Adopt measures proportionate to the threat

Common Personnel OPSEC Rules

- a. Never post exact deployment or redeployment dates;
- b. Never discuss convoy routes (e.g. "we travelled through Gombe on our way to Borno);
- c. Never publish detailed information on the mission, capabilities or morale of a unit;
- d. Never publish details concerning security procedures, response times, or tactics.
- e. Do not discuss equipment availability or lack of with anyone who does not have need-to-know;

- f. Do not speculate about future operations;
- g. If posting pictures, do not post anything that could be misconstrued or used for propaganda purposes;
- h. Never reveal camp locations, including nearby cities. Be careful when posting pictures of your loved ones.
- i. Avoid images that show significant landmarks near the base of operations. If posting names, black out last names and unit affiliations; and
- j. Do not, ever, post information about casualties (coalition or enemy) before the official release of the information.

Organisational OPSEC Measures

1. Physical Security
2. Document Security
3. Personnel Security/Vetting/Re-vetting
4. Cover
5. Source Protection
6. Concealment: Issuance of orders, movement of specially qualified personnel to units, transportation of supplies and personnel to locations, etc.
7. Deception
8. Intentional deviations from normal patterns and direct strikes against the Adversaries' Intelligence System
9. Insulating personnel from political and other corruptive influence
10. Randomize the performance of functions and operational missions. Avoid repetitive tactics and procedures for operations or activities
11. Ensure that personnel discreetly prepare for their families' welfare in their absence, and their families are sensitized to a potentially abrupt departure
12. Limit non-secure computer e-mail messages

13. Do not provide operational information in e-mail messages
14. Limit use of light frequency radios and directional Super-high frequency transmitters.

Other Measures That Impact OPSEC

1. **Communications Security (COMSEC):** Preventing unauthorized interceptors from accessing telecommunications in an intelligible form, while still delivering content to the intended recipients.
2. **Counter-Intelligence (CI):** Organized activity of an intelligence service designed to block an enemy's sources of information, to deceive the enemy, to prevent sabotage, and to gather political and military information.
3. **Information Security (INFOSEC):** The practice of preventing unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, inspection, recording or destruction of information.
4. **Transmission Security (TRANSEC):** It is the component of communications security (COMSEC) that results from the application of measures designed to protect transmissions from interception and exploitation by means other than cryptanalysis.
5. **Cybersecurity:** Measures taken to keep electronic information private and safe from damage or theft. It is also used to make sure electronic devices and data are not misused. Cybersecurity applies to both software and hardware, as well as information on the internet, and can be used to protect everything from personal information to complex government systems.

Deception

According to Vrij, deception may be defined as “a false communication that tends to benefit the communicator.”⁶² To this, he adds that for something to be classified as a deception, it must also be a deliberate attempt to mislead on the part of the deceiver. Therefore, deception can be said to be a tactic applied to causing an adversary to believe something that is not true. To believe a ‘cover story’ rather than the truth, to lead him to react in a way that serves one’s interests, rather than his.

Deception must include aspects of denial. This is because for an adversary to believe the falsities presented to him or her, it is necessary to also deny the truth to him or her; It is characterized as tricking the opponent into misapplying his strengths and revealing his weaknesses; It is a deliberate act and not the result of chance; It is an operational information art that targets the human decision-making process. The ultimate aim of deception by the adversary is to produce an inaccurate assessment, or misperception, in the mind of the target that the deceiver can then exploit for tactical, operational or strategic advantages;

Principles of Deception

Seven (7) principles of deception drawn from the study of animal biology and behavioural analysis by Scott and Russell (2000)⁶³ are:

1. Species of all types (living) use deception;

2. Many types of deception are employed in nature (camouflage, concealment, diversion, conditioning/exploit, mimicry);
3. Every environment supports deception in at least one inhabitant of its ecosystem, and usually by many.
4. Deception is used by both predators (offensively) and prey (defensively);
5. A single species can use deception in both ways. The same methods a given species uses to facilitate predation are equally applied to escape predation.;
6. Even minor applications of deception can confer selective advantage;
7. Deception is more effective in some environments than others.

Adversarial Deception Strategies

They are tools in the deceiver's toolbox. They are methods, resources, and techniques that can be used to convey information to the target of deception. They include:

1. Camouflage/Concealment;
2. Feint/Diversion;
3. Display/Decoy/Dummy: The placement of a natural or artificial construct away from a deceiver to portray an entity or object of significance to the target.
4. Mimicry/Spoofing: Disguising communication or an act from an unknown source as being from a known, trusted source. It is often the way to gain access in order to execute a larger attack.
5. Disinformation/Ruse: The doctoring of media (printed, electronic, photographic, etc.) passed to the target, and
6. Conditioning/Exploit: Either exploiting a target's preexisting bias, belief, or habit, or generating and then

exploiting such a bias, belief, or habit. “No matter how security-conscious someone is, there is almost always some aspect of their behaviour which becomes habitual.”

Safeguards Against Deception

As security and intelligence managers, to safeguard against deception, we must distinguish when we are faced with:

1. **Mal-information:** Deliberate use of genuine, embarrassing information acquired covertly and revealing it publicly to serve as a ‘weapon’ against certain targets of interest.
2. **Misinformation:** Information in circulation which are genuinely untrue, and as such can be referred to as ‘innocent mistakes and the error is pointed out thereafter. A recent example was the Russian circulation of a Deep Fake video of the Ukrainian President, calling his soldiers to surrender to Russia.
3. **Disinformation:** The deliberate use of false information to deceive by using carefully crafted materials to be deployed to the public through trusted channels. This is conducted as part of subversive operations or ‘black propaganda’, or as commonly referred to in the New Media era as “fake news”.

Changing Nature of the Intelligence Collection Threat: Implications on OPSEC and Deception

The evolving environment challenges security managers’ ability to protect critical information; These are due to adversaries’ abilities to obtain intelligence on sensitive activities; There is a proliferation of intelligence collection equipment and advanced information systems; The

adversaries also compete for information on national security and military capabilities, national economic interest among others through emplacement of agents; Open source collection features prominently in the collection methods used by adversaries particularly Foreign Intelligence Services (FIS). Criminal groups use deception in their operations by purposefully employing tactical tricks with the goal of achieving strategic results. The Criminals require access to information on their targets and security forces for planning and executing their operation.

It is instructive that the current intelligence collection threat is influenced by the following factors:

1. Information has Value;
2. Information is More Readily Available;
3. Availability of Collection Assets
4. Worldwide Media Access; and
5. Interconnected Communications Systems: (Mostly Unprotected)

Conclusion

The awareness by security managers of the imperative of OPSEC is vital to minimize the risk of operational failure, loss of personnel and assets. It should be noted that adversaries continue to deploy deception techniques to obtain critical information to serve their interests. A worrisome trend is the digital era, with ever-evolving crimes and security issues that continue to challenge us as security/intelligence managers. It has become necessary for security personnel/ agencies to safeguard all critical

information through personal and institutionalized OPSEC measures that will deny the adversary knowledge of sensitive or classified activities, capabilities or intentions; and Security personnel and agencies must also be circumspect and wary of deceptive manipulation from our adversaries.

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OPEN-SOURCE INTELLIGENCE, FACT CHECKING AND ANALYSIS OF DISINFORMATION IN RELATION WITH CRYPTO CURRENCY TRACKING

By Muhammad Jiya

INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, we will analyse open-source intelligence and its intersections with Open Security and the fact-checking of disinformation and cryptocurrency tracking in relation to current security challenges of our time. The idea is to show how intelligence gathering and usage are critical in addressing cybercrimes in the age of globalization

CLARIFICATION OF CONCEPTS

Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT)

OSINT is defined by both the U.S. Director of National Intelligence and the U.S. Department of Defence (DoD) as intelligence "produced from publicly available information that is collected, exploited, and disseminated promptly to an appropriate audience to address a specific intelligence requirement."⁶⁴ OSINT can facilitate research, competitive intelligence gathering and general information. As more data becomes increasingly available online, OSINT becomes invaluable to organizations.

Financial Intelligence (FININT) and Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs)


Financial Intelligence (FININT) is “the gathering of information about the financial affairs of entities of interest, to understand their nature and capabilities, and predict their intentions.”⁶⁵ It involves the examination of financial information and data to identify criminal abuse. Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) is a central, national agency responsible for receiving, (and as permitted, requesting), analysing and disseminating to the competent authorities, disclosures of financial information to combat money laundering and terrorism financing. Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit is the central body in Nigeria responsible for receiving, requesting, analysing and disseminating financial intelligence reports on money laundering, terrorist financing and other relevant information to law enforcement, security and intelligence agencies, and other relevant authorities.

NIGERIAN FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE UNIT (NFIU) IN BRIEF

The establishment of the NFIU⁶⁶ is based on global standards that promote effective implementation of legal, regulatory, and operational measures to combat money laundering, terrorist and proliferation financing as outlined in the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) 40 Recommendations.

CORE MANDATE

The core mandate of the NFIU, as outlined in the Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit Act 2018, the Money Laundering (Prevention and Prohibition) Act 2022, and the Terrorism (Prevention and Prohibition) Act 2022, includes:



1. Receiving suspicious transaction reports from reporting entities, including financial institutions and designated non-financial businesses and professions.
2. Receiving threshold-based transaction reports from reporting entities.
3. Analysing the received information using data pulled from relevant local and international databases.
4. Disseminating the resulting intelligence reports to law enforcement, anti-corruption, security, intelligence agencies, as well as regulatory and supervisory bodies for further investigation and prosecution.

DOMESTIC REMIT

The NFIU⁶⁷ was formally established in 2004 and became operational in 2005 as a unit of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC). In 2018, the NFIU Act

transformed the Unit into an autonomous and independent agency domiciled in the Central Bank of Nigeria. The NFIU, an administrative type of FIU, serves as the Secretariat of the Inter-Ministerial Committee on Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing (IMC), the national coordination body for the country's strategy to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. The Unit is also the Secretariat of the National Sanctions Committee (NSC), chaired by the Honourable Attorney-General of the Federation/Minister of Justice, responsible for implementing United Nations Security Council Resolutions to combat global crime.

International Remit

Since 2007, the NFIU has been a member of the Egmont Group, an informal network of 165 Financial Intelligence Units. This network provides a platform for the secure exchange of expertise and financial intelligence to combat money laundering and terrorist financing.

OTHER FUNCTIONS OF THE NFIU

The NFIU is also empowered to:

1. Advise law enforcement, regulatory and supervisory agencies on the prevention and combating of money laundering, terrorist financing and predicate offences.
2. Exchange information with other FIUs and designated international organisations to combat and prevent global crimes

3. Conduct research into emerging threats of money laundering, terrorist financing and other predicate offences.
4. Strengthen compliance with domestic and international anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing standards of reporting entities

NFIU STRUCTURE

- a. Independent and Operationally Autonomous in the discharge of its duties
- b. Secretariat to the Inter-Ministerial Committee (IMC) on AML / CFT
- c. Secretariat to the Nigerian Sanctions Committee of AML/CFT.
- d. Headquarters of West African Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) Forum.
- e. Member of the 167 Egmont Group of FIUs since 2007, and mentoring others.

NFIU POWERS

- a. Collaborate with other RAs, LEAs, ACAs, Security Agencies, and others in combating ML/TF
- b. Review AML and CFT measures in consultation with relevant Regulatory Authorities.
- c. Direct the prompt monitoring or immediate stop of financial transactions in any financial institution Request and collect such other information as the Unit deems necessary in fulfilling its functions
- d. To request additional information from Institutions and Reporting Entities
- e. To enter into an MOU or such other arrangements as will enable it to carry out its functions effectively in Nigeria

FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE (FININT) AND FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE UNITS (FIUS)

NFIU is currently serving as Co-Lead with FIU Guatemala for the Egmont Group Information Exchange Working Group (IEWG) new Project on "Use of Open-Source intelligence in FIU Operational and Strategic Analyses.

Objective and impact: What are the objective(s) of this project?



Understand the techniques being used, their gains, and challenges

- a. To demonstrate that the use of new technologies can improve the effectiveness of the FIUs.
- b. Identify the key points to verify the reliability of public information.
- c. Periodic updating of the list on the different public sources of information



Develop a framework/standard or best practices for OSINT use by FIUs

- a. Create opportunities for development of Solutions and strategies to strengthen use of Opensource for FIU analysis
- b. Establish how NFIUs can use opensource intelligence to improve the quality of IRs generated

The Project was initiated and designed to examine how Open-Source Information (OSINT), media analyses, sentiment analyses or other open source-related analysis affects the operations of the Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs).

The Project is intended to assess to open-source intelligence affects or influences operational and strategic analyses, as well as the best practices used by all the FIUs (Egmont members)

OPERATIONS SECURITY (OPSEC)

Operations Security (OPSEC) is the protection of critical information deemed mission-essential from commanders in Law Enforcement Agencies, senior leaders, management or other decision-making bodies. The process results in the development of countermeasures, which include technical and non-technical measures such as the use of encryption techniques/solutions, among others.

OPERATIONS SECURITY (OPSEC)

OPSEC is a five-step iterative process that assists an organization in identifying specific pieces of information requiring protection and employing measures to protect them:

Analysis of Threats - A threat is what you're trying to protect against. It is any type of danger.

Identification of Critical information: Critical information may include, but is not limited to, military deployment schedules, internal organizational information, details of security measures, etc.

Analysis of Vulnerabilities - A vulnerability is a weakness or gap in our protection efforts. It is a weakness in the system which may be exploited.

Assessment of Risks- The potential for loss, damage or destruction of an asset as a result of a threat exploiting a vulnerability.

Threat + Vulnerability = Risk.

Application of Appropriate OPSEC Measures:
Implementation of OPSEC measures and continued monitoring of Countermeasures to ensure that they continue to protect current information against relevant threats.

OPERATIONS SECURITY (OPSEC) FOR OPEN-SOURCE INTELLIGENCE (OSINT)

For Authentication:

1. Use a long, strong, and unique password for each of your accounts and use a secure password manager to encrypt, store and fill credentials
2. Enable 2-Factor authentication (2FA); an Extra layer of protection used to ensure the security of online accounts beyond just a username and password.

For Browsing:

1. Use a Privacy-Oriented Browser such as Brave or Firefox. Set your default search to a non-tracking engine and don't enter any information on a non-HTTPS website
2. Don't allow your browser to save your passwords or auto-fill personal details

For Emails:

1. Use a long, strong, and unique password and enable 2FA. Consider switching to a secure and encrypted mail provider

2. Disable automatic loading of remote content, as it is often used for detailed tracking, but can also be malicious

For Networks:

1. Use a reputable VPN to keep your IP protected and reduce the amount of browsing data your ISP can log, but understand their limitations.
2. Change your router's default password

Fact Checking and Analysis of Disinformation

1. **Misinformation:** Information that is false, but not created to cause harm.
2. **Disinformation:** Information that is false and deliberately created to harm a person, group, etc.
3. **Mal-information:** Information that is based on reality, used to inflict harm on a person, group, etc.

Fact Checking and Analysis of Disinformation

In this digital age, almost anyone with a smartphone or basic photography and audio-video skills can become a Newscaster, Reporter, Analyst or Investigator. False information spreads like wildfire on social media platforms and other websites, but investigators can serve as a powerful force in the promotion of accuracy and credibility. To achieve this, we need to focus on the process of fact-checking and, most importantly, on nurturing what may be called a fact-checker's mindset. Fact-checking is the process by which someone verifies whether a piece of information is true or not, or, better said, whether a piece of information is backed

by verifiable facts or not. Fortunately, with fact-checking, there are easy-to-learn methods, processes and tools to expose and push back against false information in all its forms.

Fact-checking starts with healthy scepticism and curiosity, and a lot of questions: who, what, how, where, when, and why? But at its heart, fact-checking starts with one basic, foundational question: Is this claim true? Verification is at the heart of fact-checking. A fact-checker should verify the material in context and avoid making general assumptions. Always looking at the greater picture. How the misinformation is spreading and why, and who is behind it - not only the people, but also the wider interests and the trends. Digging deeper into the background of people spreading false claims could reveal their associations and motives behind spreading them.

Three 'versions' of the Internet that exist today

1. The **clear or surface web** is the most popular among internet users as it is all the pages that are indexed and searchable. Popular services that offer this are Google, Bing, Wikipedia, and Yahoo.
2. **Deep web** refers to the pages that are not indexed by search engines and often contain academic information, legal records, scientific reports, government databases, and libraries.
3. **The dark web** refers to the pages that are not indexed by the search engines, are only accessible through specific browsers, and are often home to illicit activities.

CRYPTO CURRENCY

Cryptocurrency, sometimes called crypto-currency or crypto, is any form of currency that exists digitally or virtually and uses cryptography to secure transactions. It is a digital currency designed to work as a medium of exchange through a computer network that is not reliant on any central authority, such as a government or bank. Cryptocurrency does not exist in physical form (like paper money) and is typically not issued by a central authority. Cryptocurrencies typically use decentralized control as opposed to a central bank digital currency (CBDC) such as e-Naira.

Cryptocurrency Tracking

Cryptocurrency gives criminals new ways to evade detection. Tools like Chainalysis - a leading investigation tool allow government agencies to understand the real-world entities behind every transaction and combat serious crimes such as money laundering, terrorism financing, and human trafficking. It allows easy Visualization of the flow of funds: Chainalysis makes it easy to see where cryptocurrency funds are going. Follow the money, chart it on an intuitive visual graph, and share your findings in multiple formats.

Chainalysis Reactor: Investigation software that connects cryptocurrency transactions to real-world entities, enabling you to combat criminal activity on the blockchain.

Chainalysis Kryptos: For navigating the cryptocurrency landscape and provides in-depth on-chain metrics of cryptocurrency businesses based on the industry's most trusted blockchain data.

CONCLUSION

Open-source intelligence and its intersections with Open Security and the fact-checking of disinformation and cryptocurrency tracking, with current security challenges of our time, show how intelligence gathering and usage are critical in addressing cybercrimes in the age of globalization.

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INTELLIGENCES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE USE OF STATECRAFT, DIPLOMACY, INDUSTRIAL AND COOPERATIVE ESPIONAGE

By Prof. Efem N. Ubi

INTRODUCTION

Intelligence has become a vast industry. Cybercrime and espionage cost \$445 billion annually. A conservative estimate of the annual cost to the U.S. economy from China's economic espionage is \$320 billion. The Intellectual Property Commission Report provided an estimate of the cost of IP theft for the United States in three categories: counterfeit and pirated tangible goods, software piracy, and trade theft. That estimate is somewhere between \$225 billion and \$600 billion. The Office of the Director of National Intelligence⁶⁹ estimates the cost as \$400 billion. Independent statistics from the European Union, Canada, and the United States show China is responsible for more than 80 percent of this number (for the U.S specifically, the figure varies annually between 71 and 87 percent). For instance, at the beginning of the 21st century, it was estimated that the U.S. government spent some US\$30 billion annually on intelligence-related activities, employing perhaps 200,000 people in the United States and many thousands more U.S. citizens overseas in both clandestine and overt capacities. The intelligence operations of the Soviet Union were likely of even greater dimensions before the dissolution of the country in 1991. All

other major countries maintain large intelligence bureaucracies.

CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATIONS

Statecraft

The art of conducting state affairs and/or conducting public affairs is called statecraft. The purpose of the state's creation is to check the selfish ends of human nature and build a strong nation that protects the possessions of its people. By their very nature, "diplomacy and military force are means to the ends of statecraft as well as channels by which governments press their agendas onto others. Neither is inherently more or less useful than the other."⁷⁰

Intelligence

Intelligence, "in government and military operations: evaluated information concerning the strength, activities, and probable courses of action of foreign countries or non-state actors that are usually, though not always, enemies or opponents."⁷¹ The term is also used to refer to the collection, analysis, and distribution of such information and to secret intervention in the political or economic affairs of other countries, an activity commonly known as "covert action." Intelligence is an important component of national power and a fundamental element in decision-making regarding national security, defence, and foreign policies. The types of intelligence a country may require

Military Intelligence

Military intelligence is “information that is gathered by the government or the army about their country’s enemies”⁷². The country’s armed services need military intelligence: Much military intelligence is gathered by military attachés, who have formal diplomatic status but are known to be mainly concerned with intelligence. Space satellites produce reliable information about the composition of military units and weapons and can track their movements; satellites are especially important for monitoring a country’s production of strategic ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction (i.e., biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons). The most valuable kinds of military intelligence concern military organization and equipment, procedures and formations, and the number of units and total personnel.

Political Intelligence

Political intelligence refers to “the acquisition or availability of information regarding local political trends and patterns.”⁷³ Nation's foreign offices need political and biographical intelligence. Political intelligence is at once the most sought-after and the least reliable of the various types of intelligence. Because no one can predict with absolute certainty the effects of the political forces in a foreign country, analysts are reduced to making forecasts of alternatives based on what is known about political trends and patterns. Concrete data that are helpful in this regard include voting trends, details of party organization and leadership, and information derived from analyses of

political documents. A chief source of political intelligence has long been the reports of diplomats, who normally gather data from "open," or legally accessible, sources in the country where they are stationed (see diplomacy). Their work is supplemented by that of the professional intelligence apparatus. Its space and Earth-satellite programs need scientific intelligence. Its premier or president needs a combination of these types and many others.

Intelligence is conducted on three levels, which should be noted: (i) strategic (sometimes called national); (ii) tactical; and (iii) Counterintelligence. The broadest of these levels is strategic intelligence, which includes information about the capabilities and intentions of foreign countries. Tactical intelligence, sometimes called operational or combat intelligence, is information required by military field commanders to effectively and accurately act during operations. Because of the enormous destructive power of modern weaponry, the decision-making of political leaders often must take into account information derived from tactical as well as strategic intelligence; major field commanders may often also need multiple levels of intelligence. Thus, the distinction between these two levels of intelligence may be vanishing.

Counterintelligence aimed at protecting and maintaining the secrecy of a country's intelligence operations. Its purpose is to prevent spies or other agents of a foreign power from penetrating the country's government, armed services, or intelligence agencies. Counterintelligence is also concerned

with protecting advanced technology, deterring terrorism, and combating international narcotics trafficking. Counterintelligence operations sometimes involve the manipulation of an adversary's intelligence services through the placement of "moles," or double agents, in sensitive areas.

Arising from the continuous advances in technology, there has been a constant race between new methods of collecting intelligence and new techniques of protecting secret information. In order to guard against scientific or technological breakthroughs that may give other countries a decisive advantage, intelligence organizations keep abreast of foreign advances in nuclear technology, in the electronic, chemical, and computer sciences, and many other scientific fields.

METHODS OF INTELLIGENCE GATHERING AND ANALYSIS

Good intelligence management begins with the proper determination of what needs to be known. Unless precise requirements are set, data will be collected unsystematically, and the decision maker will ultimately be left without pertinent information on which to act. Collected data must be evaluated and transformed into a usable form (and sometimes stored for future use). Evaluation is essential because many of the wide variety of sources are of doubtful reliability. A standardized system is used to rate the reliability of sources and the likely accuracy of the

information they provide (e.g., information may be classified as confirmed, probably true, possibly true, or unlikely to be true). Information obtained from open sources probably constitutes more than four-fifths of the input to most intelligence systems, though this proportion varies with the number of state secrets a country may have.

Clandestine collection methods from covert sources provide the basis for much of the drama and romance attributed to intelligence work in fiction. Although the classic espionage agent will never be completely obsolete, some observers have suggested that the role has largely been taken over by machines, including orbiting reconnaissance satellites, long-range cameras, and a variety of sensing, detecting, and acoustical instruments. With this kind of technology, it is now possible to see in the dark, to hear from great distances, and to take detailed photographs from altitudes of hundreds of miles. Nevertheless, only spies can produce information about the attitudes and intentions of foreign leaders or international terrorists and other criminals.

Espionage

It is a process of obtaining military, political, commercial, or other secret information employing spies, secret agents, or illegal monitoring devices. "Espionage is sometimes distinguished from the broader category of intelligence gathering by its aggressive nature and its illegality"⁷⁴ However, there could be 1. Industrial espionage, 2. economic espionage, 3. corporate spying or corporate espionage is a

form of espionage conducted for commercial purposes instead of purely national security.

Economic Espionage

Economic espionage is foreign power-sponsored or coordinated intelligence activity directed at any government or corporations, establishments, or persons, designed to unlawfully or clandestinely influence sensitive economic policy decisions or to unlawfully obtain sensitive financial, trade, or economic policy information; proprietary economic information; or critical technologies (FBI, 2022)⁷⁵. This theft, through open and clandestine methods, can provide foreign entities with vital proprietary economic information at a fraction of the true cost of its research and development, causing significant economic losses.

The full repercussions of an incident of economic espionage are never known. A stolen trade secret, over many years, could be used in different products and in different industries. The loss of a trade secret is an immeasurable value.

The term “trade secret” means all forms and types of financial, business, scientific, technical, economic, or engineering information, including patterns, plans, compilations, program devices, formulas, designs, prototypes, methods, techniques, processes, procedures, programs, or codes, whether tangible or intangible, and whether or how stored, compiled, or memorialized physically, electronically, graphically, photographically, or in writing (Leighton Johnson, 2016)⁷⁶.

It therefore remains that a trade secret is any form of information in which its value is derived from the information remaining secret. Economic and industrial espionage is most commonly associated with: technology-heavy industries, including computer software and hardware, biotechnology, aerospace, telecommunications, transportation and engine technology, automobiles, machine tools, energy, materials and coatings etc...

Industrial Espionage

Spying is directed towards discovering the secrets of a rival manufacturer or other industrial company. It could also be defined as an individual or private business entity sponsorship or coordination of intelligence activity conducted to enhance a competitor's advantage in the marketplace. It is also seen as "an illegal and unethical theft of business trade secrets for use by a competitor to achieve a competitive advantage. It is often done by an insider or an employee who gains employment for the express purpose of spying and stealing information for a competitor."⁷⁷ Industrial espionage is the selling of trade secrets, intellectual property, or other classified information to competitors. If the wrong person has access to such information, it could be detrimental to the organization, as releasing it to the public or competitors could undermine confidence in the organization and even jeopardize its ability to remain solvent.

The Difference between Economic and Industrial or Corporate Espionage

Economic espionage is orchestrated by governments and is international in scope, while industrial or corporate espionage generally occurs between organizations. In a way, Industrial espionage is the same as economic espionage, except that rather than benefiting a foreign government, it benefits another private entity. Corporate and commercial espionage is essentially another term for industrial espionage.

Conduct of Industrial Espionage

Industrial espionage occurs in either of these two ways.

1. A dissatisfied employee appropriates information to advance interests or to damage the company.
2. A competitor or foreign government seeks information to advance its own technological or financial interests.

"Moles", or trusted insiders, are generally considered the best sources for economic or industrial espionage. Examples of Industrial Espionage include:

1. Breaking into company files or trespassing onto property without proper authorization.
2. Posing as a worker to learn company trade secrets or other confidential information.
3. Placing a wiretap on a competitor's phone
4. More so, it is important to note that having to source code for programs, secret recipes, and other knowledge that is often limited to the most trusted insiders could be devastating if released.

5. E.g., *The Cola Wars and Industrial Espionage in 2006*

History and Case Studies of Industrial Espionage

Industrial espionage has a long history. "The Father Francois Xavier d'Entrecolles, who visited Jingdezhen, China in 1712 and later used this visit to reveal the manufacturing methods of Chinese porcelain to Europe, is sometimes considered to have conducted an early case of industrial espionage"⁷⁸. There are also other historical accounts of industrial espionage between Britain and France. Seeing Britain's emergence as an "industrial creditor", the second decade of the 18th century saw the emergence of a large-scale state-sponsored effort to surreptitiously take British industrial technology to France. In order to catch up with the technological advances of European powers, the US government in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries actively encouraged intellectual piracy.

The Spies Who Launched America's Industrial Revolution

Do we have such spies in Nigeria? Long before the United States began accusing other countries of stealing ideas, the U.S. government encouraged intellectual piracy to catch up with England's technological advances. According to historian Doron Ben-Atar, in his book, *Trade Secrets*, "the United States emerged as the world's industrial leader by illicitly appropriating mechanical and scientific innovations from Europe."⁷⁹

CASES

Beginning in 2006, 70 companies, governments, and non-profit organizations were hacked, and spies continued to take information for two years. This was nicknamed “Operation Shady RAT.”⁸⁰ In 2009, hackers stole proprietary information from U.S. and European Energy Companies. Exxon Mobil, Royal Dutch Shell, and BP had their topographical maps hacked. These computerized maps locate potential oil reserves, and according to investigators, the attack resulted in the loss of “project financing information with regard to oil and gas field bids and operations.” The hack was dubbed “Night Dragon.” Both Operation Shady Rat and Night Dragon are said to have originated “primarily” in China.⁸¹

Steven Louis Davis Thieves Gillette’s Razor Design

Steven Louis Davis⁸² was an engineer at Wright Industries, a company Gillette contracted to assist with the development of its next-generation shaver system. In 1997, Davis faxed and emailed drawings of Gillette’s new razor to rival companies –Warner Lambert, Bic, and American Safety Razor. Volkswagen Patches General Motors’ Secrets, Britain Pinches China’s Tea Secrets.

Who are these Intelligence Officers or Spies?

Some countries hire Individuals to do spying rather than the use of their intelligence agencies. Academics, Business

delegates, and Students are often thought to be used by governments too in gathering information. E.g., countries, such as Japan, have been reported to debrief students on returning home. A spy may follow a guided tour of a factory and then get "lost". A spy could be an engineer, a maintenance man, a cleaner, an insurance salesman, or an inspector: anyone who has legitimate access to the premises.

Diplomacy: To understand diplomacy, first, we have to create a synergy between the concepts of (a) international system, (b) international relations and (c) the subject of diplomacy, our focus. To begin with, the international system is an abstract concept that encompasses global actors, the interactions (especially patterns of interactions) among those actors, and factors that cause those interactions.

International Relations: Goldstein defined international relations as the relationship among world governments, which are member states of the United Nations (UN).⁸³ These relationships cannot be understood in isolation, but are closely connected with other actors (e.g. international organizations, multinational corporations, and individuals), with other social structures (including economics, culture, and domestic politics), and with geographic and historical influences.

From the above definitions of the phrases international system and international relations, certain key words can be deduced. These words are: (a) interactions, (b) relationships, (c) states, (d) non-state actors.

Diplomacy

Diplomacy has been defined by Morgenthau (1967)⁸⁴ as an element of national power, the technique for accommodating such conflicts of interest. Diplomacy attempts to make the best of a bad situation by attempting to reconcile one's national interests with those of the other side; that is, it first attempts to define the differences of those interests and then tries to delimit, codify, and emphasize common and complementary interests. At the same time, it separates commonly held interests from conflicting interests and manipulates conditions to minimize the danger stemming from those conflicts. The essence of Intelligence is for economic growth, development, all of which impact National Security.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter, we discussed how intelligence provides the context for diplomacy in the relations between nation-states in the international system. We focused on the relationship between intelligence, espionage and statesmanship and the conduct of diplomacy in international relations. Using the experiences of some advanced countries in the world, we have suggested ways Nigeria and its political leaders can use intelligence to conduct and realize the nation's foreign policy objectives in an increasingly competitive world.

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INTELLIGENCE AND COMPLEX OPERATIONS IN NIGERIA: AN ANALYSIS OF INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO SECURITY AGENCIES

By Dr. Godwin Bassey Eteng

INTRODUCTION

Politics of nationalism, economic interests revolving around resource control, and ideologies based on political conviction defined global conflicts. This is age-old. Religious ideologies also define the nature, dimension of the crisis. World War 2 (1939 - 1945) was a watershed. It changed the concept of intelligence and defined the supremacy of intelligence in planning, execution and follow-up operations. Technology also changed the nature of security operations. This work is set to examine the analysis of the intelligence support to security agencies. The objective is to examine X-rays in the critical role of intelligence in today's global scene, but with emphasis on complex security operations in Nigeria. It would discuss how human elements, technology, and socio-economic variables have shaped contemporary intelligence in Nigeria against the backdrop of the role of intelligence in a global crisis. It would outline the type of support needed to provide for effective containment of security threats in Nigeria, and what we have to do differently.

Conceptual Clarifications

Operation

Operation refers to a coordinated effort to achieve a specific military objective. One can say that it is an authorized activity by the leadership of a security agency recognized by law, with the sole intent to ensure the protection of the territorial space of Nigeria, her people, customs and well-being at any given time. Operations can be kinetic or non-kinetic, as this usually involves proactive and reactive measures.

Complex Operations

This refers to high-level activity conducted by agents of security or agencies recognized by law. This involves activity which has multiple or various objectives that require different agencies, or a single agency but with various skills and competencies, often intended to deal with threats to national safety that have more than tactical implications. It requires dealing with high levels of uncertainty based on information available, on factors, trends and projections that are often beyond a single or simple projection. Most of the time's complex operations are strategic but require tactical and operational steps.

Intelligence

Intelligence is an act. It is as old as mankind. It is the act of trying to know beforehand the activities or intentions of

friends or adversaries, even if they don't want you to. Intelligence is used by nations to protect their sovereignty, culture and economy. Countries rely on intelligence to make political, economic or military decisions in the interest of their nationals. Intelligence can be tactical (field intelligence), operational and strategic. It can be human (i.e., human assets) or technical or technological.

Security Operation

This refers to all authorized proactive and reactive activities by security practitioners to ensure peace and forestall any threat to law and order at any given time, as the need may require.

Intelligence Support

This refers to a series of activities by the government security intelligence agencies that provide the mass of proactive and other distilled warnings and projections to ensure the safety of persons, culture and infrastructure at all times.

The Role of Intelligence Support in Security and Military Operations

Intelligence support is critical to operational success. Intelligence support entails that extensive collection processing and analytical capabilities are fused in the entire intelligence process, which would ensure accurate and timely dissemination of intelligence. Intelligence support thus ensures that the intelligence requirement is met through

the visualization of the operational area, as well as providing knowledge of the current disposition and activities of an adversary security operation. On the other hand, helps in identifying and defeating imminent threats within the area of operations through countermeasures.

Intelligence support and security operations feed each other. This is because all operations have an intelligence component in that they also report information. Effective security operations produce information, which generates more intelligence. Similarly, ineffective or inaccurate intelligence produces ineffective security operations, which produce opposite results. For instance, if intelligence is not provided on the location, strength and capabilities of an adversary, such as experienced in the Niger Delta, the success of the operation may be at higher cost to both human and equipment. Therefore, intelligence support and security operations have a mutual but cause-and-effect relationship

Emerging Security Challenges

Some the identified challenges include; terrorism/insurgency as in North-East/North-West, and parts of central Nigeria, armed banditry/kidnapping, herders' farmers crisis, separatist agitations (South West, South East), electioneering and politicking violence, ethnic/religious crisis as seen parts of Kaduna, Plateau, Taraba, Niger, Benue and Taraba, rise of non-state actors (human rights groups; externally funded groups), economic saboteurs, cultism, Internet fraud (yahoo yahoo), food crisis,

oil theft and vandalism, piracy in Nigerian waters, corruption, and drug trafficking.

Anatomy of Complex Security Ops

1. Objective of the mission
2. Timing (time frame of commencement of action and exit)
3. Agencies or debts to be involved, number required and cadre/specialization required
4. Political considerations
5. Command and control; who leads and who supports
6. Task allocation; training - skills required for the operation
7. Information management; Info requirement, who needs to know and when (media, public service, and general public), Means of communication, deception tools, cyber security tools, electronic warfare systems, jamming, etc., psychological ops/ public perception management
8. Logistics: communication gear, transportation gear, welfare of operations/assets, and medical support
9. Terrain and meteorological factors
10. Intelligence assets; human assets, including locals, and technology assets, /including/electronic/assets/digital/assets/surveillance/drones/aerial photography/digital maps
11. Legal Aspects; legal considerations for the conduct of operation, humanitarian/ICRC considerations, and correctional services and local custody centres
12. Community engagement/support
13. Inter-service liaison; the local government service liaison, the State inter-service liaison, the National inter-service liaison, and the International/diplomatic liaison
14. Arms/ammunition and other intelligence tools required

Some Negative Indices Associated with Operating Security Agencies

Although in several ways across different security agencies, some officers and their agencies have distinguished themselves positively, the following negative indices prevail in some of the critical security agencies.

1. Absence or near absence of National threat focus.
2. Politicization and sentimentalism of the recruitment process are counter to the National objectives.
3. Failure to upgrade our training and doctrines to match current and anticipated threats.
4. Lack of effective synergy at the planning, simulation, and execution, as well as intelligence sharing.
5. Lack of adequate background intelligence of the operational environment.
6. Lack of adequate knowledge about the criminal gangs, their modus operandi, motivation and sources of funding.
7. Increasing cases of indiscipline, corrupt and unethical conduct by some unscrupulous officers and men.
8. Poor budgetary provisions, as well as delayed and insufficient releases, to address prevalent and anticipated security challenges.
9. Low morale arising from poor service conditions for serving officers and men.
10. Lack of adequate and functional fighting gear, insufficient platforms and logistic supplies required to effectively police the flash points.
11. Sketchy intelligence to operational Forces.

12. Sour relationship between operating agencies and local communities resulting in unnecessary rivalry, infighting and consequent failed operations.
13. Inadequate training sessions, simulation exercises with participating operatives getting rusty over time
14. Absence of standard operational guidelines for joint operations, leading to services operating at cross purposes in some situations.

Intelligence Support Should Include the Following Components

For successful security operations nationwide, intelligence agencies should provide the following critical human and technological support.

1. Human Intelligence (Humint)

This involves community relations- especially exploiting liaison with community stakeholders; criminal networks- that is mapping out the different criminal groups, how they relate and where they operate from; logistics capability of criminal gangs- this would include their means of transportation, types of transportation, tools/items that facilitate their operations like food items, communication infrastructure, torch light, master/universal keys; Arms and ammunition, sanctuaries of the criminal gangs- identifying the calibre/types/quantity of weapons/ammunition in their possession, location(s) of armouries and armorers; and drug couriers and network- identifying key drug barons, their couriers, supply and demand chain, partners, sponsors with their financial trail.

2. Technology Support

This involves deployment of modern advanced equipment for local tactical/operational and strategic intelligence gathering, e.g. high-resolution cameras, sensors, special listening/spy devices, recorders, night vision goggles, special combat gear, marine fighting gear, etc. It also includes deployment of drones and balloons for surveillance on movements, hideouts, safe havens and points of convergence of criminal gangs. And then digital communication intercepts (legal) of communications between members of criminal syndicates, as well as their collaborators

3. Early Warning Support

This provides early warning signals on plans of attack, planned criminal operations and efforts to sabotage economic targets, amongst others. This may come in the form of high alert messages often dispatched in very secure forms and channels, using human contacts or highly coded networks to transmit messages.

4. Capacity Building Support

This entails training officers and men with the required awareness skills and other capabilities. Intelligence appreciation of the terrain and criminal gangs. Surveillance skills as well as tactical geo-location know-how. This requires patience and many months of study of terrain, which will include defined physical features of the maritime

area with data on possible choke points, camps and hideouts of criminal elements.

5. Database

A data base is very critical for any intelligence support programme to achieve set goals; provide data on current and past criminal gangs that will include; activities of gangs, their specialty, motivation, income and vulnerabilities, network of gangs, recent and past antecedents, and incident guide, planning and possible counter action. Incidents- all incidents stored in the database are useful for reference, comparison and analysis. Organizations in collaboration with the criminal network, such data will guide operational agencies against losing track. Politicians and other elites/influential persons are known to be working in tandem or benefiting from the criminal gangs.

6. Intelligence on Activities of Neighbouring States

Intelligence on the plans, intentions, and activities of neighbouring states in the Sahel and the Gulf of Guinea. Intelligence on activities of foreign diplomats in Nigeria and in our neighbouring countries. Identify criminal gangs in neighbouring countries operating in concert with criminal networks in Nigeria. Security networks (officials) collaborating with criminals (this includes unveiling officials of foreign countries, either defence or security or diplomats) collaborating with Nigeria-based criminal groups. Identify modes of operations like illegal routes used by criminal gangs, and identify persons, organizations in Nigeria

working in concert with groups in neighbouring countries to operate against national interest.

7. Intelligence Projections

Provide the strategic, operational and tactical picture. Show how past and current political and economic dynamics shape the coverage and enforcement actions in the Nigerian maritime domain, and the Gulf of Guinea and the Sahel countries.

8. Provision of Maps/Sketches

Provide updated maps, sketches of forest routes, waterways, creeks and hideouts/key joints, based on technical intelligence updates and Humint.

9. Financial Networks

The success of criminal gangs depends a lot on their logistics and finances; therefore, provide data on persons, organizations and groups of interest with their sponsors/financiers/benefactors in the country and beyond. Establish linkage with existing financial institutions, including banks/and insurance firms, mortgage facilities, foreign and neighbouring banks, which are recipients of proceeds of the criminality. Then identify serving security officers who facilitate the crime and their motivations, their sponsors, as well as the beneficiaries

10. Vetting

This is the most critical support intelligence can provide: recruitment vetting (pre-recruitment of security personnel),

on-the-job vetting of officers (usually conducted annually or biennially). Vetting of prospective officers to be engaged in sensitive operations, **and** vetting of associates of officers and their relatives. All these helped to check recruiting or allowing bad eggs to grow in the system.

11. Build Non-Kinetic Support in Local Communities

The intelligence should map out strategies to create employment opportunities, construct local hospitals/clinics, sponsor local youths on entrepreneurship ventures and other empowerment skills, local vigilantes and neighbourhood watch, local maritime unions, establish training schools for diving, boatmanship, and navigation skills and referencing

12. Establish Think Tanks

Intelligence Services should establish think tanks to serve as an open avenue for critical thinking by professionals and stakeholders on the current and past national developments and provide a guide for future action. Thus, the historical studies into inter-ethnic group relations, Rise of religious fundamentalism and the socio-economic factors responsible, regional neighbours' ambitions, aspirations, expectations and expected Nigeria role, challenges for Nigeria and her economy, State of innovation in Nigeria security and intelligence, and budgeting for security and defence, and the need for realistic budgeting

Institutional Challenges

In spite of current institutional intelligence support to the security agencies, the country is faced with some challenges that sometimes hinder the appreciation and utilization of critical tactical and operational intelligence. Although these challenges are not new, they have, however, remained unattended to for several years. These include:

1. Lack of Capacity

The capacity of Nigerian intelligence and other operating agencies to adequately police and dominate the various flashpoints is very limited. These critical agencies lack the necessary platforms to meet current security threats. This is mostly so because economic realities often affect the ability to invest in necessary platforms that could be the game changer.

2. Poor Human Liaison

Poor human relations, inadequate and sometimes neglected behind-the-scenes diplomatic channels, affect the capacity of the various operating security forces to handle critical emergencies like abduction or kidnapping incidents. Relations between Nigeria's security agencies and its Gulf of Guinea counterparts, and those of some Western countries and their diplomatic back channels, remain in some cases fragile and unreliable.

3. Corrupt and Unprofessional Attitude by Security Personnel

Institutions saddled with checkmating illegal oil bunkering, sale and diversion of petroleum products have, in many instances, been found to be in active connivance with the criminal elements perpetrating oil theft. Some security agencies have been identified as major culprits. Such corrupt officials facilitate the sale of stolen crude, amongst other ignoble acts.

4. Lack of Total Radar Coverage

The nation's domain is yet to be fully covered with modern, sophisticated and integrated radar. To achieve this goal, Nigeria needs a comprehensive radar structure. If properly installed, such an integrated radar system can provide timely intelligence and early warning signals on intrusion as well as possible compromise on the Nigerian territory and beyond.

5. Shift of Mentality and Focus by Security Personnel

There is an observed shift in mentality amongst some operating security personnel, who readily compromise their duties for illegitimate monetary benefits from criminality and economic sabotage in the maritime domain. This development is fast eating into the very fabric of some of the agencies, and is believed to have negatively influenced deployments, promotions, demotions in some cases, as well as awards of professional honour.

Recommendations

Embark on the Transformation of the intelligence services to provide the strategic, operational and tactical intelligence required for complex security operations.

- a. Review recruitment to reflect technological and technical demands. Ensure recruitment is in the region of a 70:30 ratio in favour of science/technology skills
- b. Redesign the military and intelligence security academies, especially the Faculty of Engineering, towards producing students who are innovative and forward-looking. In many countries, Cadet officers design technology weapon systems that later become standard fighting weapons. A good example is the Russian MiG-25 Foxbat, which was designed by a Cadet officer; this is a supersonic interception and reconnaissance aircraft, with all-weather capabilities
- c. Institute forces readiness/contingency planning culture in the country. This should involve simulation training of units to meet eventualities within 24 hours, one week and one month, etc., as the situation may require. This culture is gradually eroded because the Military is currently involved in several internal security operations in almost all the States of the federation. Recall that in the mid-1980s and early 1990s, it was the forces' readiness of some units of the Nigerian Armed Forces that facilitated Nigeria's outstanding performance in Liberia and Sierra Leone; the Nigerian Army 23 Armoured Brigade, Yola and 72 Special Forces Battalion based in Makurdi are deserving of mention.
- d. Invest in innovations and technologies to facilitate operational action in our volatile environment

- e. Review the budgeting process to prioritize the provision of funds for innovation on new defence components and strategies
- f. Upgrade the Intelligence, Police and Special Forces Air wings to have capacity for air recon and surveillance
- g. Ensure that Defence Industry Corporation of Nigeria (DICON) becomes our primary research base in arms manufacture, and ensure that more materials are sourced locally instead of preference for importation.

We can produce special intelligence gadgets, electronic and eavesdropping components and cyber materials as well as drones. Ensure a comprehensive radar coverage of our territorial domain- thus, liaise with friendly countries, including western nations; liaise with AFRICOM; and Liaise with West African neighbours in the Gulf of Guinea.

Build human assets to provide early advanced intelligence on criminal gangs not only in our domain, but also in other countries within the Sahel, Lake Chad region and Gulf of Guinea.

1. Ensure we have assets that can also help in case of kidnap incidents, piracy actions and sundry threats
2. Ensure behind-the-scenes assets within official administrative echelons of friendly sister intelligence agencies, diplomatic missions and multi-national companies within the Gulf of Guinea and other parts of the world.
3. Invest in mapping of our regional neighbours.
4. Work in concert with the office of the Surveyor General of the Federation, the Department of State Services, and State Governments to ensure updated operational maps.

5. The Air Force, Navy and Police to embark on a periodic aerial survey of the Nigerian land and maritime borders
6. Honour brave security operatives with badges of honour for distinguished services, just as you punish those who err
7. Provide intelligence officers involved in operations with a maximum level of comfort and welfare, and ensure their families are well catered for, even if they suffer life-threatening injuries, or get kidnapped or pay the supreme price
8. Return troops to purely Military duties, while equipping and training the Police and other security agencies to live up to their statutory roles and expectations, as the Armed Forces are simply overstretched at the moment
9. Ensure vetting before recruitment and on-the-job vetting to determine the continuous suitability of the security operatives for sensitive assignments
10. Investigate and punish any form of professional misconduct, especially corruption, highhandedness, nepotism, etc
11. Improve relationships between security agencies and civilians
12. Rebrand intelligence security agencies' relationship with the civilian populace through social and economic interventions in communities, building hospitals, clinics, providing jobs/youth empowerment platforms, recruitment of qualified locals into security forces and arbitrating in local disputes, with non-kinetic measures as a first resort
13. Exemplary leadership by officers and men based on sound professional judgment

14. Use Armed Forces media channels and independent media, and other organs to present narratives which respect the cultural and social values of Nigerians.

Sensitize the legislature (Senate, House of Representatives and Houses of Assembly of Riverine States) on the strategic threats facing Nigeria and the need to maintain realistic budgeting-

- i. All, security service to periodically appraise National Assembly on the prevalent and anticipated threats in the country;
- ii. NSA to request for review of funding to intelligence agencies and other relevant security agencies operating in the maritime domain; and
- iii. Ensure periodic oversight of state of facilities, equipment and personnel deployment to maritime domain threat areas.

THE IMPACT OF INTELLIGENCE COLLABORATION AMONG SECURITY AGENCIES ON WAR AGAINST TERROR

By AIR VICE Marshal KK Obidake (Rtd)

INTRODUCTION

Terror is an overwhelming feeling of fear and anxiety, the use of extreme fear to coerce people (especially for political reasons)⁸⁵. A terrorist is generally “a person who inspires fear or dread. Terrorism is the calculated use of violence to create a general climate of fear in a population and thereby to achieve a particular political objective.⁸⁶ Terror has been practiced by political organizations with both rightist and leftist objectives, by nationalistic and religious groups, by revolutionaries, and even by state institutions such as armies, intelligence services, and police. It can be implied as an act of posing a violent threat by a state against its domestic enemies. The term can be applied as violence aimed, either directly or indirectly, at governments to influence policy or topple an existing regime. It involves the use or threat of violence and seeks to create fear, not just within the direct victims but among a wide audience. The degree to which it relies on fear distinguishes it from both conventional and guerrilla warfare.

Terror proper is thus the calculated use of violence to generate fear, and thereby to achieve political goals, when direct military victory is not possible. This has led some

social scientists to refer to guerrilla warfare as the “weapon of the weak” and terror as the “weapon of the weakest.” To attract and maintain the publicity necessary to generate widespread fear, terrorists must engage in increasingly dramatic, violent, and high-profile attacks. These have included hijackings, hostage takings, kidnappings, mass shootings, car bombings, and, frequently, suicide bombings. Although random, the victims and locations of terrorist attacks are often carefully selected for their shock value. Schools, shopping centres, bus and train stations, and restaurants and nightclubs have been targeted both because they attract large crowds and because they are places with which members of the civilian population are familiar and in which they feel at ease.

The goal of terrorism generally is to destroy the public’s sense of security in the places most familiar to them. Major targets sometimes also include buildings or other locations that are important economic or political symbols, such as embassies or military installations. The terrorist hopes that the sense of terror these acts engender will induce the population to pressure political leaders toward a specific political end.

In Nigeria today, a lot of issues pose challenges to Nigeria’s populace in terms of fear and threat, which has bewildered the economic, social, political and psychological disposition of the citizens that requiring intelligence interventions of the security agencies to curb the situation. This study seeks to assess the impact of intelligence collaboration among

security agencies on the war against terror with a view to profound solutions.

Conceptual Clarifications

Intelligence

The term Intelligence describes the practice of collecting, standardizing and analysing data that is generated by networks, applications, and other IT infrastructure in real-time, and the use of that information to access and improve an organization's security picture. "Intelligence gathering or intelligence collection is the process of collecting information on a threat to people, building or using that information to protect them."⁸⁷ In the context of private security, intelligence gathering drives risk assessment and security strategies. Intelligence gathering plays a major role in today's warfare, as intelligence provides us with knowledge about what the enemy may be doing or is going to do in the future. Intelligence can be about enemy weapons, troop strengths, troop movement activity, and future operational plans.

Terror

This refers to the calculated use of violence to create a general climate of fear in a population and thereby to bring about a particular political objective. Violence or the threat of violence used as a weapon of intimidation or coercion especially: "a state of intense or overwhelming fear; violent or destructive acts (such as bombing) committed by groups

to intimidate a population or government into granting their demands sometimes used before another noun a very frightening or terrifying aspect.”⁸⁸ Terrorism has been practiced by political organizations with both rightist and leftist objectives, nationalistic groups, by revolutionaries, and even the state institutions such as armies, intelligence services, and police.

The Role of Intelligence in the War against Terror

- i. Intelligence enables the security forces to have an idea of the location and hideouts of the perpetrators.
- ii. Intelligence provides early warning about the plans and activities of the terrorists
- iii. Intelligence also enables the government and its agencies to gain insight as to the strength (number), capabilities, support system, sponsors, logistics network, informants, etc., of the terrorists.

US Congress Report of National Commission on Terrorism stressed that “good intelligence is the best weapon against international terrorism”⁸⁹ Without the involvement of a comprehensive and firm policy from the government, relevant stakeholders and political leaders, terrorism will continue to present a real threat to future generations. The threat of large-scale acts of terror and the potential of non-conventional terrorism has informed the need to prevent terrorist schemes and give early warning, to ensure that potential perpetrators can be destroyed before the act

Intelligence Collaboration in the War against Terror

For intelligence to be useful in the war against terror, it must not just be produced and used by a single agency, the intelligence must be shared by different agencies for operational use. This is because each of the security agencies has a unique capability and operational skills that can complement the other. Intelligence is the first line of defence against terrorism. It can guide law-enforcement activities, focus covert action, and define the scope of military operations. The globalization of the war on terror strengthens warning capabilities by uniting a multinational network of intelligence agencies. Through various political, economic, and military means, the United States has assembled a global coalition to confront terrorism.

It also collaborates with a network of relationships and how these are managed. Managing these relationships is all the more problematic because each intelligence agency has its own foreign relationships directorate, its own intelligence-sharing and exchange arrangements with its foreign counterparts, and its own intelligence specialty, which may or may not line up with the organizational structures of foreign intelligence services. And each may interact differently with its co-members in the intelligence community.

In support of national authorities, nations ensure shared awareness of the security issues through consultations, enhanced intelligence-sharing and continuous strategic

analysis and assessment. Intelligence reporting is based on contributions from Allies' intelligence services, internal and external, civilian and military. The way nations handle sensitive information has evolved based on successive summit decisions and continuing reform of intelligence structures. The Joint Intelligence and Security collaboration benefits and increased sharing of intelligence between member services and the alliance produce strategic analytical reports relating to terrorism and its links with other transnational threats.

Principles of Intelligence Collaboration

Intelligence collaboration creates an avenue for shared values where agencies exchange values among themselves for some effective counter terrorism operations in Nigeria. At times, Intelligence gathering, production and action can be quite murky when placed in the context of objectives. To reduce the tendency for this, agencies need intelligence collaboration to gather all the data they require for a more informed objective against terror in Nigeria. There has to be a presence of mutual respect among agencies. Each agency tends to produce vital intelligence to counter terror, and as such, no agency should be viewed in a derogatory manner. According to theorists Don Tapscott and Anthony Williams, "collective intelligence is an outcome of group behaviour they categorize as mass collaboration that is founded upon four distinct principles: Openness, Peering, Sharing, and Acting Globally."⁹⁰

Openness

Simply put, this condition implies that all participants will be approaching the project without thinking that this idea is mine. Intellectual property must take a back seat to the open sharing and proliferation of ideas within the group. The purpose of creating this type of environment is to encourage a great depth of scrutiny and also to generate a greater number of auxiliary benefits. On one hand, more expert minds reviewing an idea will help in the identification of bugs or flaws in the current design, thus making the project better through critique. On the other hand, leveraging the creative capacities of other minds helps to think of new offshoot designs, new use cases, and allows for the ecology of complementary products to expand.

Peering

Peering implies that projects will be opened up “horizontally”, creating a foundation of equality from which people are able to champion ideas and grow a project out in that direction on their own, without the need for approval from a hierarchy. This is generally fortified by the peering principle that such horizontal projects will also be open for peer contributions and review. The resulting self-organization can be much more effective and efficient at producing the desired results as it allows all contributors equal footing and freedom in regard to accomplishing the goals of the project.

Sharing

While this is somewhat implied in the Openness principle, the principle of Sharing clarifies the need for intellectual property to be shared with others in the group. The share-and-share-alike concept is at work in the practice of peering as well, in that peers are encouraged to share all of their developments back to the group (both the original project members and any new members that have become a part of the offshoot development team). Sharing is essential as it allows for the fluid exchange of ideas and critiques around which productivity is enhanced.

Acting Globally

This principle is founded on the advancement of communications technologies that allow organizations to reach out across their entire network of collaborators and to engage everyone. This concept overcomes barriers like department and branch borders in an effort to capture and utilize new ideas, new talents, and new markets.

Reciprocity

Intelligence collaboration is “an accord among three or more agencies or national governments working together to collect, protect and analyse information to reduce decision makers' uncertainty about a foreign policy.”⁹¹ Intelligence collaboration can bring a new light to these global problems by “bringing diverse perspectives together.”⁹² This gives the nations involved in this type of collaboration the ‘wisdom of the crowd’ to deal with complex issues.”⁹³ Another benefit of multilateral intelligence collaboration is the possibility of developing more common vocabularies for thinking about

problems with fewer intercultural and international misunderstandings.”⁹⁴

No one country can effectively cover all the areas of interest that their intelligence collection requirements demand. By dividing up areas of responsibility amongst partner nations, more ground can be covered in more depth than by working in isolation. It is also a fact of the current economic climate that no one nation can afford to pay the bill for comprehensive global intelligence collection.

All agencies share the same value mandate against countering terror in Nigeria. Consequently, when an agency shares intelligence with other agencies, the receiving agency should reciprocate. Intelligence-sharing is not a new phenomenon: “The maxim, ‘the enemy of my enemy is my friend,’ has guided countries to share intelligence throughout history.”⁹⁵ These few unclassified examples illustrate that Nigeria continues to pursue intelligence from all available sources and enlarge the intelligence community beyond Nigeria's borders.

Conclusion and Recommendations

1. The Office of the National Security Adviser should initiate sporting activities and retreats for intelligence agencies to stimulate interactions between personnel of the various agencies.
2. The Federal Government should harmonize the welfare of the personnel in various agencies to reduce feelings of superiority and foster mutual respect among intelligence agencies.

3. Heads of Intelligence Agencies should encourage and emphasize joint training, cross-training and exchange programmes at all levels.
4. Heads of intelligence agencies should sustain and strengthen the existing intelligence collaboration efforts.

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ROBOTICS, MACHINE LEARNING AND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: IMPERATIVES FOR NIGERIA'S INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

By Tim Avelle

Artificial Intelligence is the future ... of all mankind. Whoever becomes the leader in this sphere will become the ruler of the World. Vladimir Putin, Russian President, Sept. 1, 2017

INTRODUCTION

Imagine for a moment that with just a few clicks from your phone you could get the records of all planes that landed and took off from Nigeria or any other country last year or that you could access official email addresses of various intelligence agencies, militaries and governments of the world within minutes or even shutdown telecom services in targeted areas without shutting down entire city, local government or State. What if intelligent machines could monitor, report or even act on their own to prevent attacks on our cities, military bases and other critical national infrastructures while we sleep? These are but a few of what Artificial Intelligence (AI) robots and Software programs can do, and even more.

No wonder, in many countries of the world, AI enable Robots and software programs are been deployed virtually in all human fields such as in: healthcare, finance, education, agriculture, aviation, transportation, energy, manufacturing,

communication, space, cyber, logistics, public service and above all defence, including intelligence operations. It is quite common for newbies or even experienced technology professionals to have curious questions in their minds around the difference between these terms, artificial intelligence, robotics, machine learning, deep learning, data science and more. But because this is a large subject matter in computer science and engineering, we are only going to talk briefly on robotics, machine learning and artificial intelligence and see the vital importance of it to national defence, but especially to our intelligence community and how it could be used to solve current and future security and terrorisms challenges.

UNDERSTANDING ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, ROBOTICS AND MACHINE LEARNING

You may want to ask: Are Artificial Intelligence and Robotics the Same? Answer: Not. Artificial intelligence is a branch of computer science and is genuinely based on software, whereas Robotics is a branch of technology that mainly deals with hardware and physical robots. The main idea of robotics is to develop machines that can substitute humans and replicate humans' tasks. Now said above could be achieved with or without human intelligence. if this requires context-specific and generalized decision-making, we can say Robots are based on artificial intelligence; otherwise, they are not.

The main reason behind this confusion is that there is no single textbook definition of these terms, and all the authors and experts have their own interpretation of them. What further adds to the confusion is when popular media like Hollywood movies portray artificial intelligence and machine learning with Terminator-like threatening robots all the time. The idea of mechanical machines and humanoids having the capabilities to function on their own can be found throughout recorded history. Even in early science fiction literature and movies, you will find characters of non-living humanoid robots with intelligent abilities. "In 1956, the term 'Artificial Intelligence' was coined by John McCarthy at the Dartmouth conference that formally laid the foundation of AI as a discipline."⁹⁶ Artificial Intelligence is regarded as a field of study to provide intelligent capabilities to machines to the extent that it either mimics human intelligence or betters it. Examples of Intelligent Robots (Autonomous or semi-autonomous)

- i. Tesla and Atlas are excellent examples of intelligent robots that make dynamic decisions based on cognitive power and leverage the learning and experience infused by a software program. (See Atlas Video)
- ii. DJI Dock Matrices 30 Series and Harpy Drones – are autonomous and AI-based robots. They can mimic human intelligence in navigating their way to the target. They can also do all kinds of things without ever being programmed to do specific static actions. Simply say, they could learn on their own (See Video)
- iii. Bunker – is another unmanned ground vehicle UGV (robot) that performs specific actions that humans

- normally do. Bunker provides an API & SDK (Application Programming Interface/Software Development Kits) based platform to integrate with any other pluggable interface and payloads. (See video)
- iv. Wave Glider - Autonomous, unscrewed Water Surface Vehicle (Robot) Liquid Robot

Question 2: Do Intelligent Robots use Machine Learning as well?

Our Answer is Yes. Intelligent Robots (like the ones mentioned above) do. From the Atlas robot video, we just watched we saw how it was been trained.

Question 3: What is the difference between Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning?

Answer: There are many different definitions and explanations of the differences between these two terms, but there is no such hard and fast boundary between these two. The best and simplest statement, especially for a non-expert, is that: Machine learning is a process in which the trained model (after learning from the historical data) starts making human-like decisions. In comparison, AI is the final state when your software mimics human intelligence, including the reasoning behind those decisions.

HOW IS MACHINE LEARNING ACHIEVED?

The easiest way to understand how a machine becomes intelligent with AI is to compare it to how humans learn. For example, consider a child learning how to ride a bicycle. The child mounts the bicycle, grips the handlebars, and hopes to

stay upright and in control. The child does not learn how to ride a bike by understanding the physics of biking, but rather through trial and error. Over time, the child becomes instinctively adept at perceiving factors that can make him lose control of the bicycle. Just as a child learns the unwritten rules of riding a bicycle through practice, AI is developed through repeated simulation.

Question 4: Now, what is the difference between Machine Learning & Deep Learning?

Answer: Deep Learning (DL) is a specialized branch of Machine Learning (ML), where we use a concept called “Neural Networks or Artificial Neural Networks ANN.” Both are the same if we talk about the objective; ML is traditional, and DL is based on the latest research, and it’s more modern. Robotics and AI for the Nigerian Defence & Intelligence Community, Nigeria Defence Community

Defence is the backbone of every country. Every country’s state in the international domain is assessed by its military operations. For example, the Nigerian military is one of the largest uniformed combat services in Africa. According to Global Firepower, the Nigerian Armed Forces are the fourth-most powerful military in Africa, and ranked 35th on its list internationally. But leveraging robotics and AI could catapult the Nigerian military to NO.1 in Africa and 20th in the world, especially if we harness the abundant natural and human resources. (Nigeria has some of the best thinkers, programmers, engineers and hackers in the world). Already,

Robotics and AI technologies are on the brink of reshaping defence. Some of the areas include:

1. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (Drones) Let's begin with API & SDK
2. Human-Machine Teaming COBOTS (Begin with Reverse Engineering Techniques)
3. Robotic Ground Systems (UGV) Let's begin with API & SDK
4. AI Augmentation (Begin with Reverse Engineering Techniques)
5. Autonomous Payload (begin with API & SDK)
6. Autonomous Surface and Undersea Vehicles. Ecuador did it (begin with API & SDK)
7. Squad Technologies (Begin with Reverse Engineering Techniques)

AI Cyber Defence and Offense Technologies (Begin with Reverse Engineering Techniques) Nigeria Intelligence Community To help our fighting forces and the country at large to win the many irregular warfare now and in the future, the intelligence community must proffer urgent and workable AI and Robotic solutions on how to dominate in long-range penetration and ability to Observe, Orient, Decide and Act (OODA Loop) more quickly than one's foes. Doing so with Stealth, Surprise & Speed (SSS), the key elements needed to win any irregular warfare that now confronts us.

1. Gather Intelligence Information (especially on current developments in robotics, AI, machine learning, etc.) on both friendly & hostile foreign Governments, Military and intelligence agencies. Also detect and protect our military

- and other national key institutions' secrets from leaks:
www.phonebook.cz, www.intelx.io
2. Gather all vital data on both local & foreign aircraft:
www.flightradar24.com
 3. To check if email and password are compromised:
<https://sec.hpi.de/ilc/>
 4. <https://haveibeenpwned.com/>
 5. Get immediate alert on your leak data:
<https://intelx.io/account?tab=alerts>
 6. Get instant alerts and released malware intelligence:
<https://otx.alienvault.com>
 7. Use AI drones and ground robots to gather secret intelligence information of bandits, terrorists and criminal hideouts, plans and movement.

Threats to National Security and Weaponisation of AI with the proliferation of security risks, such as unconventional war, banditry, terrorism, Cyber-crime in Nigeria and regional conflicts like the on-going Ukraine-Russia war, we are immersed in a global arms race that has developed a demand for new weapons powered by AI, such as autonomous drones and missiles, as well as virtual bots and malicious software aimed at sophisticated espionage. This could lead to the possibility of an unprecedented war escalation. The danger of AI robotics and software programs in the hands of terrorists could be catastrophic to national security. Recent examples of train bombing, airport, and military post attacks, all in Kaduna, are a pointer to this fear. (All security agencies and the military headquarters, including key national institutions, e.g. CBN, NNPC, etc., should be equipped with cheap but high-quality AI drone jammer systems)

CONCLUSION

Many lessons can be learnt about Robotics and AI's speedy development in all human fields, but especially in defence in many countries of the world. To sustain the progress of Robotics and AI in Nigeria, a rational and harmonic interaction is required between application-specific projects, especially in combating emerging and future security challenges and visionary research ideas. A clear strategy is required to consider the associated ethical and legal challenges to ensure that society as a whole will benefit from the evolution of AI and its potential adverse effects are mitigated from early on. With sustained funding and responsible investment, AI is set to transform the future of our society - our life, our living environment, our economy, defence and intelligence.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations are relevant to the Nigerian research community, industry, government/intelligence agencies, defence and policy makers:

1. Robotics and AI will play an important role in the Nigerian economy and its future growth. We need to be open and fully prepared for the changes that they bring to our society and their impact on the workforce structure and a shift in the skills base.
2. The Defence and Intelligence community should urgently create and set up Cyber Commands and Special Robotic & Artificial Intelligence Technologies Centres (Could start by using available free tools:

www.tensorflow.org & cheap API/SDK models, e.g Agile X for unmanned ground robots, DJI/ Jouav for drones)

3. Engage the ministry of science and technology to recruit talented Nigerians in the subject matter field wherever they may be found (schools, private organizations, prisons, etc) and encourage/equip/support them to engage in robotics and AI technologies reverse engineering.
4. 4 Setup or scale up national cyber defence and offense awareness and capabilities by mass training intelligence and ICT officers on AI and robotic technologies. Lecture Presenter: Mr Timothy O. Avelo, MIALEIA, MIACA, MD/CEO Agent-X Security Group, Lagos

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DEVELOPING A SECURITY INTELLIGENCE FUSION CENTER

By AIG Garba Baba Umar

INTRODUCTION

Criminals and terrorist activities threaten the safety of our nation and citizens, and the ability to quickly exchange relevant information and intelligence becomes increasingly critical. The longstanding information sharing among law enforcement agencies, public safety agencies is slowly disappearing, and yet, the need to identify, prevent, monitor, and respond to acts of terrorism and criminal activities remains an important need for the law enforcement, intelligence, public safety, and private sector communities. Based on these needs, developing a Security Intelligence Fusion Centre in any country becomes a child of necessity and a panacea in tackling the security challenges any country is facing.

HISTORY OF THE FUSION CENTRE CONCEPT

Fusion Centre was originally called Terrorism Early Warning Group (TEWG). It began in 1997. The author was a Los Angeles County Deputy Sheriff, Sergeant John Sullivan.⁹⁷ The concept was to bring together law enforcement, Los Angeles County Health Services, and the Fire Service to acquire and share intelligence related to domestic and international terrorism. The TEWG expanded to include representatives from state and federal agencies

who staffed, contributed and shared intelligence collected from their agencies. The TEWG eventually evolved into Fusion Centres throughout the nation. The fusion centre concept was created as a result of the September 11 report, in an attempt by the Department of Homeland Security to create better communication and cooperation between state, local, and territorial law enforcement with federal law enforcement entities including the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Homeland Security and several others.

With domestic and foreign threats constantly changing, the strategies used by each fusion centre have to be defined and altered, which calls for specific plans and guidelines as to how best to protect the homeland. The National Strategy for Information Sharing and Safeguarding, as well as The National Strategy for Information Sharing, are two documents that influenced the workings of the Fusion Centre network and defined a broad strategy for a more proactive information sharing network. The National Fusion Centre Association alongside several other federal and local law enforcement associations formulated the "Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Fusion Centres"⁹⁸ as well as the "National Strategy for the National Network of Fusion Centres"⁹⁹ are documents that defined a clear understanding of the role of Fusion Centres as well as time sensitive goals they should achieve. The National Strategy is constantly being developed as time passes to meet the needs of the changing environment of national security. Additionally, a "Cyber Appendix" was added to the Baseline Capabilities

document that defines the roles and operational capabilities of Fusion Centres to fight cybercrime that affects their areas of responsibility

UNDERSTANDING SECURITY INTELLIGENCE FUSION CENTRE

A security intelligence fusion centre can be defined as a “collaborative effort of two or more agencies that provide resources, expertise, and information to the centre intending to maximize their ability to detect, prevent, investigate, and respond to criminal and terrorist activities.”¹⁰⁰ The goal is to integrate the information each agency has to prevent security gaps due to a lack of communication. Among the primary focuses of fusion centres are the intelligence and fusion processes, through which information is collected, integrated, evaluated, analysed, and disseminated.

Fusion Centres are “state-owned and operated centres that serve as focal points in states and major urban areas for the receipt, analysis, gathering and sharing of threat-related information between State, Local, Tribal and Territorial (SLTT), federal and private sector partners.”¹⁰¹ The National Network of Fusion Centres (National Network) brings critical context and value to Homeland Security and Law Enforcement that no other federal or local organization can replicate. Fusion Centres accomplish this through sharing information, providing partners with a unique perspective on threats to their state or locality and being the primary

contact between frontline personnel, state and local leadership and the rest of the Homeland Security Enterprise.

The National Network of Fusion Centres is the hub of much of the two-way intelligence and information flow between the federal government and our State, Local, Tribal and Territorial (SLTT) and private sector partners. The fusion centres represent a shared commitment between the federal government and the state and local governments that own and operate them. Individually, each is a vital resource for integrating information from national and local sources to prevent and respond to all threats and hazards. The enhanced collaboration between the federal government, SLTT and private sector partners represents the new standard through which we view homeland security.

WHY DEVELOP/ESTABLISH A FUSION CENTRE?

In the USA, the Fusion Centre was established after the September 11 attacks to allow collaboration across jurisdictions to respond to criminal and terrorist activities. It is a decentralized, distributed, self-organizing network of individual fusion centres and their respective partners within each centre's area of responsibility. The process is a method of managing the flow of information and intelligence across levels and sectors of government to integrate information for analysis. Fusion centres rely on the active involvement of state, local, tribal, and federal law enforcement agencies and sometimes on non-law

enforcement agencies to provide intelligence for their analysis. The intent is that, as the diversity of information sources increases, there will be more accurate and robust analyses that can be disseminated as intelligence

THE FUSION CENTRE PROCESS

The following steps are the fusion centre process: Planning and Requirements Development; Information Gathering/Collection and Recognition of Indicators and Warnings; Processing and Collation of Information; Intelligence Analysis and Production; Intelligence/Information Dissemination; and Re-evaluation.

Fusion centres engage in this process, regardless of their mission (all-crimes, terrorism or all-hazards), the disciplines or stakeholders they support (law enforcement, fire services, public health, etc.) or the types of information they receive. This process is how raw information becomes a finished intelligence product for use in decision making and formulating policies/actions. Fusion centres compile, analyse and disseminate criminal, internal security and terrorist information and intelligence, as well as information regarding public safety, law enforcement, fire, public health, social services, public works, etc. This intelligence and information are both strategic (i.e., designed to provide guidance on general trends) as well as tactical (i.e., intended for a specific event) and are collected on an ongoing basis. The missions of fusion centres vary based on the environment in which the centre operates—some have

adopted the all-crimes approach, whereas others have also included an all-hazards approach.

GUIDELINES FOR DEVELOPING A FUSION CENTRE

After the tragic events of September 11, 2001, law enforcement executives and intelligence experts in the USA agreed that “law enforcement agencies must work together to develop the capability to gather information, produce intelligence, and share that intelligence with other law enforcement and public safety agencies.”¹⁰² They come up with the following guidelines in developing fusion centre these guidelines include the following:

1. Adhere to the tenets contained in the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan (NCISP) and other sector-specific information sharing plans, and perform all steps of the intelligence and fusion processes.
2. Collaboratively develop and embrace a mission statement, and identify goals for the fusion centre.
3. Create a representative governance structure that includes law enforcement, public safety, and the private sector
4. Create a collaborative environment for the sharing of intelligence and information among local, state, tribal, and federal law enforcement agencies, public safety agencies, and the private sector.
5. Utilize Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs), Non-Disclosure Agreements (NDAs), or other types of agency agreements, as appropriate. Educate and consult legal advisors early in the fusion centre development process.

6. Leverage the databases, systems, and networks available via participating entities to maximize information sharing.
7. Create an environment in which participants seamlessly communicate by leveraging existing systems and those currently under development, and allow for future connectivity to other local, state, tribal, and federal systems.
8. Develop, publish, and adhere to a privacy and civil liberties policy.
9. Ensure appropriate security measures are in place for the facility, data, and personnel.
10. Integrate technology, systems, and people.
11. Achieve a diversified representation of personnel based on the needs and functions of the centre.
12. Ensure personnel are properly trained.
13. Provide a multitier awareness and educational program to implement intelligence-led policing and the development and sharing of information.
14. Offer a variety of intelligence services and products to customers.
15. Develop, publish, and adhere to the policy and procedures manual.
16. Define expectations, measure performance, and determine effectiveness.
17. Establish and maintain the centre based on funding availability and sustainability
18. Develop and implement a communications plan among fusion centre personnel; all law enforcement, public safety, and private sector agencies and entities involved; and the general public

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, fusion centres embody the core of collaboration, and as demands increase and resources decrease, fusion centres will become an effective tool to maximize available resources and build trusted relationships. It is recommended that when developing fusion centres, adherence to the laid down guidelines and integration of the key elements of each guideline to the fullest extent, to enhance information and intelligence sharing. The primary products of a fusion centre are situational awareness and warnings that are supported by law enforcement intelligence, derived from the application of the intelligence process, where requirements for actionable information are generated and information is collected, integrated, evaluated, analysed and disseminated to the relevant authorities which our beloved country Nigeria is in dear need.

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98 <https://www.dhs.gov/2010-baseline-capabilities-assessment-fusion-centers> accessed September 2024

99 <https://www.dhs.gov/topic/fusion-centers-support-national-strategies-and-guidance> accessed September, 2024

100 <https://www.dhs.gov/topic/fusion-centers-support-national-strategies-and-guidance> retrieved September 2024

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102 The Importance of Interagency Collaboration in National Security, April 27, 2023, <https://onlinewilder.vcu.edu/blog/importance-of-interagency-collaboration-in-national-security/>

EMERGING ISSUES IN INTELLIGENCE AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR INTELLIGENCE DOCTRINE

By Dr. Solomon E. Arase

INTRODUCTION

Human capacity in appropriate knowledge of the environment, situation, determining capability and coordination, employing applicable strategy are critical elements in strategic relations, law enforcement and national security management. Nigeria has been experiencing insurgency, terrorism, and persistent violent crimes since 2009, amidst worsening indices of poverty, unemployment, and inequality. The Federal Government of Nigeria has affirmed that kidnappings, armed banditry, insurgency, armed robberies, assassinations, attacks on oil installations, farmers-herdsmen menace, poverty, hunger, unemployment, infrastructural decay, ignorance, and disease are still rife in the country. Nigeria is rated the third most terrorized country in the world since 2014. Though the current Global Terrorism Index scored Nigeria as sixth, which seems an improved rating, the intensity of violent crime and fear of crime amongst the people in Nigeria is escalating as the days go by.

The Nigerian National Security Strategy (2014), in response to security challenges in the country, upholds, among other principles, that the nation's intelligence services must be prioritized as the single most important tool that the

government has for detecting and dismantling threats to peace in Nigeria. There is a need for the security apparatus to realign its relationship with society, and training for threats that are likely but have not yet materialized. Scholars and public commentators have assumed that the national security services and law enforcement agencies could more effectively manage crime and criminality through intelligence-led policing if the national security apparatus is supported and enabled with the requisite technology and human capabilities.

The worsening state of insecurity in the country is negatively impinging on the national economy, and citizens are losing confidence in the national security architecture amidst the emerging trends of transnational crimes, proliferation of centres of development, access and use of law enforcement and military technology because of globalization the information revolution and revolution in military affairs. The National Security Strategy (2019)¹⁰³ reiterates that Nigeria is still faced with multifaceted and less predictable threats that cut across national and international boundaries. The threats of concern in the next five years are terrorism and violent extremism, armed banditry, kidnapping, militancy and separatism, agitations, pastoralists-farmers conflicts, fake news and hate speech, environmental threats, socio-political threats, piracy and sea robbery, public health challenges, regional and global security challenges. These indices underscore the fact that violent crime is still highly prevalent and that the national security architecture may

have fallen short of the security objectives in Nigeria, then this study.

CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATIONS

Intelligence Doctrine

By intelligence, we mean every sort of information about the enemy and his country – the basis, in short, of our plans and actions. Fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. Doctrine means a body of teachings, or principles; accepted beliefs; tenets, or dogma; a principle that is accepted as valid and authoritative. In this sense, a doctrine could be seen as an accepted body of principles or the guiding rules for performing a particular task. Doctrine defines the general principles of national strategy in defence of its interests, objectives, aspirations and core values, and lays in broad terms, procedures for achieving them.

National security doctrine implies the body of rules, conventions, guiding principles, standard operational procedures which have evolved over the years from experience and have come to be accepted as valid and compelling as much as the occasion may allow in the determination of national security requirements, and accepted operational orientation and standard procedures, for preventing, managing and evaluating the entire process towards achievement of national security objectives and goals. The National Security Strategy of Nigeria (2014) embodies broad-based guidelines and principles for

managing the identified security requirements and threats that may emanate from there.

*Doctrine for national security refers to the articulated fundamental principles governing the management of national security. Such principles should flow from the national ideology or the basic philosophy of public affairs management –Imobighe. Doctrine in this sense should seek to answer not only the why and how of internal security management but also the question of the basic nature of the national security goals desired.*¹⁰⁴

Intelligence doctrines refer to

the body of rules, conventions, guiding principles, standard operational procedures which have evolved over the years from experience and have come to be accepted as valid and compelling as much as the occasion may allow in the determination of national security requirements, and accepted operational orientation and standard procedures, strategies, and guidelines for collection, analysis, dissemination, security of information and management of the intelligence architecture."¹⁰⁵

Intelligence doctrines derive from the national security strategy and doctrines in furtherance of national security objectives. These fundamental principles involve rules and guidelines of practice in the collection of information, utilization and security of the process, sources and products in intelligence practice, which have been reflected over the years from the basic principles and functions of intelligence. Command-led/ centralized control. An inherent command responsibility implies that commanders provide the direction, resource the capability and create the right command climate and manage the intelligence architecture

Intelligence Objectivity

Intelligence must be unbiased, undistorted, intellectually honest and free of prejudice

Systematic Exploitation/Perspective

This would involve many interrelated issues, including the fact that the collection and analysis processes of intelligence have to be organized and systematically carried out according to set plans.

Intelligence Agility/ Responsiveness

In intelligence gathering, we are expected to oak ahead, identify threats and opportunities, develop the flexibility to react to changing situations and be ready to exploit opportunities as they arise

The Fundamental Principles of Intelligence

1. **Timeliness:** Providing intelligence on time, even if incomplete, to enable commanders to make decisions at a pace that maintains the initiative
2. **Collaboration/Accessibility:** A duty to share as well as to protect. Intelligence should be made available to those who have a need to know, share and utilize
3. **Continuity/Continuous Review:** Review ongoing efforts in terms of emerging trends and project future estimates
4. **Security/Source Security:** Security must permeate the entire intelligence enterprise, but should balance the need to share with the need to protect people and plans

Main Operational Functions of Intelligence

1. The ultimate purpose of intelligence is to support informed plans, decisions, and actions of the decision makers and those implementing the decisions at all levels
2. Intelligence supports the formulation and subsequent modification of the commander's estimate of the situation by providing as accurate an image of the operational area or battle space and the threat as possible
3. Intelligence is expected to crime-map the operational environment with the features of the area, interfacing the spectrum, character and dimensions of the threat actors and factors
4. In military operations, one of the basic tools used in this function is intelligence preparation of the battle space
5. IPB is a systematic, continuous process of analysing the threat and environment in a specific geographic area
6. IPB helps to provide an appreciation for the characteristics of the area of operations and the enemy capabilities, weaknesses, and course of action
7. This knowledge affords the commander an understanding of the battle space and the opportunity to exploit enemy critical vulnerabilities

Develop the Situation

1. Intelligence provides analysis of trends of crime, criminal behaviour, and threats to security, which offer inductive images and probable scenarios within the threat environment
2. Situation development provides continuing knowledge of unfolding events to help update the estimate of the situation

3. It is a dynamic process that assesses the current situation and confirms or denies the adoption of specific COAs by the enemy
4. It helps refine our understanding of the battle space and reduces uncertainty and risk
5. Situation development occurs during execution and provides the basis for adapting plans or exploiting opportunities

Provide Indications and Warning

1. The intelligence products and projections provide indications and early warning on probable or possible occurrences
2. Indications and warning (I&W) serve a protective purpose, providing early warning of potential hostile action
3. They help prevent surprise and reduce risk from enemy actions that run counter to planning assumptions

Support Force Protection

1. Counterintelligence and operations security activities avail systems for the security and protection of own and friendly forces
2. Force protection is the set of comprehensive security measures, collection activities, and operations that are undertaken to guard the force against the effects of enemy action
3. Intelligence supports force protection by identifying, locating, and countering foreign intelligence collection, sabotage, subversion, and terrorism capabilities
4. Support to force protection requires detailed and accurate assessments of threat force capabilities and

intentions, and facilitates efforts to deny the enemy the opportunity to take offensive action against our forces

Support Targeting

Intelligence supports targeting by identifying target systems, critical nodes, and high-value and high-payoff targets as well as by providing the intelligence required to most effectively engage these targets

Support Combat Assessment

1. Combat assessment is the process used to determine the overall effectiveness of military operations and identify requirements for future actions
2. Intelligence supports the entire combat assessment process and is directly responsible for battle damage assessment, which is one of the principal components of combat assessment
3. BDA is the timely and accurate estimate of the damage resulting from the application of military force
4. BDA estimates physical damage to a particular target, functional damage to that target, and the capability of the entire target system to continue its operations

Key Emerging Issues in Intelligence

Widening and deepening of the National Security Intelligence requirements:

1. The dictates of human security and the consequent widening conception of national security underscore a corresponding expansion of national security intelligence requirements

2. The National Security Strategy (2019) reiterates that Nigeria is still faced with multifaceted and less predictable threats that cut across national and international boundaries
3. The threats of concern in the next five years are terrorism and violent extremism; armed banditry; kidnapping; militancy and separatist agitations; pastoralists-farmers conflicts; fake news and hate speech; environmental threats; socio-political threats; piracy and sea robbery; public health challenges; regional and global security challenges
4. The implication is a consequent commensurate upscaling of applicable intelligence operations with applicable intelligence management architecture

The Revolution in Military Affairs

The world has undergone different stages of transformation, drastic changes and innovation in the technology of war and civil utility. Technological development and innovation require adoption and adaptation to serve a relevant utility in war. Over the years, there are some technological advancements that would drastically impact and change the art of war and strategic thinking on war. These technological innovations that activate major changes in the art of war and strategic thinking are conceptualized as Revolution in Military Affairs. Great advances were recorded in computational power, which has led to a decrease in the physical size of computer components, and lower costs have led to dramatic progress in military technologies. Several military historians have pointed out the fairly obvious observation that progress in military technologies is usually

tied to progress in the technological and economic base of countries fielding a military.

Phrases such as information superiority, situational awareness, network-centric warfare, precision-strike, deployability, flexibility, and jointness were given increasing credence in Rumsfeld's Defence Department. These have added much impetus to the revolution in military affairs. The use of Global Positioning System (GPS) -or laser-guided weapons delivered by stealth fighters dominated the TV coverage of the war and created the perception that the operation was a "surgical and clean war". RMA has brought about the use of modern joint service aerospace forces that offers the most responsive, flexible, lethal, and devastating form of power projection across the spectrum of conflict, employing a range of aerospace weaponry such as maritime patrol aircraft, attack and troop-lift helicopters, land-based long-range aircraft, and battlefield rocket artillery systems.

The development of nuclear weapons has contributed significantly in advancements in RMA. Nuclear weapons were also relied upon at the tactical level. Indeed, it is startling to contemplate it today, but in that period, both NATO and the Warsaw Pact planned for the large-scale employment of nuclear weapons even at the lower levels of conflict; hence the introduction of atomic landmines, depth charges, and field artillery. Nuclear weapons gave higher assurance of a kill even if a commander did not know exactly where the enemy was or had confidence in the accuracy or reliability of his weapons systems. The level of destruction

of nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction is catastrophic

Precision Guidance

Developments in weapons technology not only promise greater firepower, mobility and protection, but they could also introduce more control and flexibility into combat operations. The most significant developments are taking place in the areas of precision guidance, remote guidance and control, munitions improvements, target identification and acquisition, command, control and communications, and electronic warfare. The most striking impact of weapons technology on 21st-century warfare is the increased accuracy obtainable from new and refined guidance techniques. The term 'Precision Guided Munitions' (PGM) is now used to describe a growing class of bombs, missiles and artillery projectiles with single-shot kill probabilities from ten to a hundred times greater than unguided munitions. PGMs have been nicknamed 'smart bombs' to distinguish them from their less intelligent unguided predecessors

Improved Munitions

Though overshadowed by increased accuracy and improvements in remote guidance, continued refinements in conventional munitions offer enhanced destruction capability combined with the reduction of unwanted blast effects

Target Identification and Acquisition

Detector, location and targeting are essential to highly accurate systems, and target acquisition functions are integral to many PGM systems. Anti-radiation missiles seek out emitting targets; infra-red guided systems locate targets giving off heat; and with simpler systems, like infantry anti-tank guided weapons (ATGW) and portable surface-to-air missiles, the operator acquires and tracks targets visually

Command, Control and Communications

Several related improvements in information collection and transmission promise commanders a more comprehensive view of the theatre of operations, while advances in miniaturization will enable small units to receive and transmit urgent information. The effort is being made to enable commanders to make strike decisions on the basis of real-time intelligence. This has been facilitated by computer technology that allows rapid synthesis of reconnaissance information. For the ground forces, computerized battlefield command and control systems are being designed to give field commanders rapid access to information on enemy movements, aircraft and artillery availability, weather conditions and logistics support. At the global level, a major effort is being made in the U.S. to upgrade the Worldwide Military Command and Control Systems

Electronic Warfare

Efforts to control the electromagnetic spectrum for military purposes have been one of the defining features of the

military technological revolution of the 21st Century. The widespread use of electronic warfare in the 1973 Middle East conflicts has spurred numerous developments, particularly in the United States and the defunct Soviet Union. In the United States, four schools of thought have been advanced to support the information revolution and the attendant revolution in military affairs. These include the systems of system, dominant battle space knowledge, global reach, global power, and the vulnerability paradigm

Effects of Technology on Intelligence

1. The utility of technology is fundamental within the spectrum of elements of national power because technology plays critical roles in determining strategic power relations as much as it provides political, economic, and prestige benefits
2. Technology guarantees and enhances tactical victories; optimizes warriors and soldiers; provides allies with strategic and tactical assistance and support; reduces surprises and the fog of war; and yields payoffs and spin-off use
3. Technology leverages political and prestige benefits
4. Technology guarantees 'strategic awareness and dominance of the spectrum of war and battle space; and facilitates speed, precision, mobility, real-time intelligence logistics, lethality, organizational cohesion, command, and control

Security and Law Enforcement Requirements

1. Major operational requirements in policing, such as information collection, storage, management, analysis

and dissemination; crime mapping; crime analysis; resource deployment; surveillance; crime investigation; and case management, are areas technology could enhance

2. Technology is also critical in other crime prevention strategies such as predictive policing, evidence-based policing, hotspot policing, risk-based policing, geographic information analysis, and crime prevention through environmental designs
3. It is apt to reason in tandem with Weisberg and Braga that the use of technology supports identifiable policing and crime prevention strategies
4. It is critical to report that the available literature and current realities do not affirm the existence of a standard modern policing strategy in Nigeria, as policing has been response-to-incidents oriented

The Changing Nature of Crime and Criminality

1. The nature of crime is also changing in form, structure, speed, space, linkages, risks, and environment, resulting in a transformation in the total loosening of criminal groups' structures from massive and low-level crimes into hybrids of high-level crimes
2. There is increasing strengthening and international commitments to human rights requirements in the same vein, making the investigators' tasks more difficult, thereby rendering the judicial process less effective
3. Policing becomes more challenging in Nigeria because while the nature of crime is changing in terms of the globalization of information and communication technologies, the Nigerian Police is lagging in the acquisition and use of the required technology

innovations necessary for contending with the changing character of crime and criminals

4. Whereas the Nigerian Police is under the watch and scrutiny of human rights organizations, the policing method often predisposes the police to cases of abuse of human rights, which further worsens its public image problems

The Dynamics of Targets of Intelligence Interest

1. The targets of intelligence collection have also changed from the dominant concentration of military hardware, capabilities, intentions, and locations to other threat vectors as troublesome global personalities, warlords, illicit arms traffickers, human traffickers, dealers on prohibited substances and drugs, illicit business organizations, hotels, supermarkets, extremist ideologues, terrorists, and terrorist financing systems, transnational criminal networks, cybercriminals, and threats
2. The Application of technological systems and platforms in launching precisely guided and targeted collection and assault has made a shift in the function of intelligence from information collection and analysis to the integration of information and kinetic operations with collateral intrusion and assault on targets with attendant human rights questions
3. Intelligence collection has also moved from a dominant reliance on human spies to dependence on various technical collection and analysis platforms and systems
4. There is an apparent tendency that intelligence is shifting from dominant state activity towards dominance by corporations and individuals that create technology and have proprietary rights to such products

5. Nigeria's situation is that intelligence collection targets are still mainly suspected criminals in respect of recorded crimes; a process aptly described by Arase (2019) as 'response-intelligence' collection
6. Intelligence and kinetic operations are far from being integrated in the Nigerian police because of the cultural and institutional limitations to the use of technology and the dominant reactionary policing and national security architecture in the country

Socialisation and Deregulation of Intelligence Collection

1. Intelligence is no longer a state-based activity because of the growing involvement of corporate bodies and individuals in collecting and consuming information and intelligence
2. The proliferation of technology has generated the need for increased cooperation between and among actors because of the implied global security risks
3. Regional and international organizations are also getting involved in intelligence development and consumption, and there is increased cooperation among intelligence services in national and global relations
4. Based on the circumstances of the developed countries, the use of technology has influenced the socialization of intelligence practice beyond the hitherto restrictive use by states
5. The state-centred security practice, with its secretive use of intelligence organizations for state security clandestine operations, is still rife in Nigeria

Intelligence Operations Capability

There is no emphasis on intelligence-led governance and intelligence-led operations within and amongst the security and intelligence elements in the national security architecture in Nigeria. In a recent study, the International Intelligence Evaluation Checklist was administered to tactical managers across agencies in Nigeria. The assessment is the extant international checklist for assessment on the structural, administrative and process operating procedures, standards and requirements for information collection, collation, processing, analysis, intelligence production, dissemination, feedback, coordination and management. The result shows that the Nigeria Police Force Intelligence Bureau was 90%, 92%, 87%, 86% deficit with 10%, 8%, 13%, 14% compliance, respectively in required standards of operational procedures, collection, collation and processing, dissemination, action and feedback for intelligence-led policing. This translates to a cumulative aggregate of 88% deficit and 12% compliance with effective intelligence-led policing within the period under study

Asymmetric Warfare, Guerrilla Tactics and Terrorism

The capabilities of the criminal elements and the national security architecture are relatively asymmetric. The criminal elements have the advantages of guerrilla tactics, surprise terror attacks on soft and hard unsuspecting targets, employment of terrorism as an instrument of information operations, suicidal level of morale of troops, and support

and supplies from external allies. The recoveries made from insurgents and criminals by national security forces confirm that the criminal elements have the complements of ordnance, support weapons and logistics that have sustained insurgency since 2009 and have shown capabilities to achieve violent objectives. The available data of casualties of troops and criminals within the period under study shows that Nigeria is in a state of security dilemma wherein the acquisition of more and higher calibre of weapons is not producing any considerable advantage in the management of insurgency, terrorism and violent criminality in the country

Collaboration and Coordination of Security

1. There are vestiges of collaboration amongst the security agencies in Nigeria and between the security community and the Nigerian Public
2. The Nigerian Armed Forces, the Police Force and other security agencies have strings of relationships among themselves and with the Nigerian public
3. There are constitutional and statutory obligations for inter-agency collaboration among security agencies and between security agencies and the public
4. There are Joint Internal Security Operations, the Joint Intelligence Board, and the Intelligence Community Committee are operational structures and processes of inter-agency collaboration in Nigeria
5. There are also operational Joint training courses administered at the National Institute of Policy and Strategic Studies, the National Defence College, the Institute for Security Studies, the Nigerian Army War

College, the Nigeria Police Staff College, and the Institute of Intelligence, in other organizational academies, Seminars, workshops and training programmes

6. There are inter-agency sports fiestas; common access to Officers Mess and Messing programmes
7. The Police Community Relations Committee, Committee of Eminent Personalities, Neighbourhood Watch, and Vigilant Groups relations are veritable avenues for Police community relations. Effective inter-agency collaboration and partnership is operationally limited

Limitations to Intelligence Generation and Sharing

Among the glaring challenges faced by security agencies in the area of intelligence gathering, sharing and utilization include- Statutory limitations; low national intelligence development capacity/capability; inadequate structures for joint intelligence development and sharing; inadequate information flow among security agencies; inadequate structures for inter-agency collaboration and weak inter-agency relations; inadequate mainstreaming and lack of institutional structures of community policing; inadequate and inequitable funding of intelligence agencies; inadequate welfare and motivation for intelligence operatives; lack of professional standards and indiscriminate posting of intelligence personnel; poor public image of the police and decay of security agencies-community relations; inadequate training and retraining of intelligence operatives, analysts

and managers; politics of membership and elements of the intelligence community in Nigeria. The overall effect of all the foregoing challenges is that inter-agency intelligence gathering and sharing have always been fraught with barriers

Apparent Security Dilemma

More so, there is an apparent security dilemma in Nigeria as the militarization of security and law enforcement as a dominant national security strategy has triggered a 'dialectics of acquisition and employment of arms' by the state apparatus and the criminals. The state security apparatus and the criminals are systematically contending and competing on the acquisition and employment of more superior calibres of weapons in a systematic arms race. The acquisition of more weapons and the deployment of higher support weapons in internal security operations have not yielded any significant positive effect; hence, the security dilemma

Evolution of Intelligence Praxis

The early man employed traces of intelligence in the form of spying and observation of trends within his environment in order to survive the vagaries of life and the environment. The need to know and use knowledge for survival is innate in humans. Information collection in the form of spying and espionage is said to be the second oldest profession. With the evolution of organized polities having rulers such as kings, emperors and states with the apparatus of government

intelligence is institutionalized as a tool for administration and societal control and conflict management.

Since the gods knew what was going to happen ahead of time, it was logical to seek out the divine intention in the inspiration of holy men, in the riddles of oracles, in the stars and often in dreams. When Joseph accused his brothers of being spies from Canaan in Egypt, it could imply that the activities of spies and the employment of espionage by hostile agents and adversaries were known in Ancient Egypt. The account of the spies sent by Moses to spy the land of Canaan and Joshua, who sent spies to Jericho before launching a military campaign to conquer the city, is also reported among early records of intelligence operations.

Thus, the earliest recorded instances of 'intelligence gathering' can be traced when Saul, on the eve of his last battle against the Philistines, being afraid and without a source from prophets or dreams, summoned the spirit of Samuel through the witch of Endor and learned from him that he would lose the battle. David also directly inquired of God for military advice and got the needed intelligence 'Shall I pursue after this troop? Shall I overtake them? And he (the Lord) answered him, pursue, for thou shalt surely overtake them, and without fail recover all'

In Numbers, chapter 13, it is reported that 'the Lord suggested that man himself seek information on the spot'. This context of intelligence operation indicates the requirement of timeliness and supports Sun Tzu's emphasis on the 'newness' in intelligence operations. The account of

how the two men Joshua sent to ‘secretly spy’ Jericho were ‘received in the house of Rahab the harlot’ (Joshua chapter 2) is reported as one of the earliest instances of what is now called a ‘safe house’ within the intelligence tradecraft. Rahab hid the spies and got them safely out of the city with the intelligence they obtained. Jericho was utterly destroyed, with all her people, but Rahab and her family were saved. ‘Thus, it was established that those who help the intelligence process should be recompensed.

The works of the classical Strategic Thinkers Thucydides, Sun Tzu, Niccolo Machiavelli, and Von Clausewitz underscore the development of intelligence, spies and secret agents through the early and medieval ages. The establishment and operation of formal policing organizations were founded on the fundamental principles of community ownership, support and employment of intelligence in preventing crime and community disorder. However, policing turned out to be dominantly reactive. The primary role of police officers as enunciated by the 1829 London Metropolitan Police was the prevention of crime by ‘inhibiting’ the offender, and ‘reassuring’ potential victims of crime.”¹⁰⁶

This preventative system remained the focus of policing, at least until the 1960s. Since the 1960s, the police have adjusted in response to transformations in society, entailing changes in the policing environment, criminals developing new methods to commit crime, and changes in public expectations of the police. ‘Radio-directed rapid response, criminal investigations and crime fighting became the dominant model of law enforcement. The public attitudes to the police changed, as did their attitude to the role of the

police. Reactive, investigative policing became the order of the day in the United Kingdom. This was the model bequeathed to Nigeria at independence in 1960 by the colonial overlords, and it is still seen as the traditional dominant policing model in Nigeria and some parts of the world

By the 1970s, there was an upsurge in crime rates in the United Kingdom and the United States. This resulted in erosion of public confidence in the police, and many in policing began to realize that the reactive investigative policing was not a satisfactory response. The efforts at reimagining the police brought about the emergence of 'Community Policing', 'Problem Oriented Policing', and 'Compstat', as background ideas and approaches leading to the emergence of Intelligence-Led Policing by the early 1990s. The reports of the Audit Commission and Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary, 1993 and 1997 respectively, advocated increased use of intelligence, surveillance and informants to target recidivist offenders, so that police could be more effective in controlling crime. The Kent Constabulary was among the first to adopt the intelligence-led policing initiative.

By 2006, the Centre for Policing Terrorism published a doctrine on intelligence-led policing which leverages on Israeli counter terrorism tactics and NYPD's Broken Windows policing systems, blending problem-solving, environmental design, community policing and public/private partnerships in the management of crime and

terrorism. The events of September 11, 2001, in the United States, the globalization of crime and trans-national organized crime, and the expansion of the security concept and theory stimulated a further urge to mainstream Intelligence-Led Policing in contemporary security praxis. 'Intelligence-Led Policing has become a significant movement in policing in the twenty-first century'

In its current conceptualization, intelligence-led policing is envisioned as a tool for information sharing both within law enforcement agencies and between all participants in the community, private sector, intelligence community, and public government. In the contemporary gusto of the Revolution in Military Affairs, intelligence capability is assessed among professionals and scholars in the context of the "Systems of Systems' paradigm.

The phrase describes a comprehensive hierarchy of command structures and technologies across all services and including civilian command authorities, as well as an integration of force delivery systems on all platforms among all military units. The organizational reforms leading to this goal have been accompanied by dramatic progress in the technologies of Command, Computers, Control, Communication, and Intelligence processing (C4I)¹⁰⁷

The reactive, investigative policing, which was the order of the day in the United Kingdom, was the model bequeathed to Nigeria at independence in 1960 by the colonial overlords, and it is still seen as the traditional dominant policing model in Nigeria and some parts of the world. Precepts and

indications of community policing were introduced to Nigeria from the United Kingdom in 2003 and 2004. Intelligence-led policing concepts filtered into the Nigerian Policing system in about 2010, when the NPF had to send a set of officers and rank and file to the Nigerian Army Intelligence School, for basic intelligence training to operationalize intelligence-led policing

Implications of the Emerging Issues for Intelligence Doctrine

1. Intelligence functions to reduce uncertainty in support of making informed decisions, plans, and actions at strategic, operational and tactical levels
2. The evolution of intelligence praxis underscores the fact that the guiding principles of intelligence practice accordingly derive from the dominant national security strategy and doctrines of the state
3. In Nigeria, the National Security Strategy and doctrine are response-oriented
4. Over the years, the operational intelligence doctrine in the country has also been reactionary, otherwise referred to as response intelligence, incident-driven intelligence, operations-led intelligence, or police-led intelligence, rather than proactive intelligence-led operations
5. In this circumstance, intelligence effort is a paradox as it endeavours to sustain a security dilemma, as is the case in Nigeria
6. There is a need for a deliberate national strategy to mainstream good governance to reduce the often-cited factors predisposing the country to security threats, crime and criminality as a basis to enthrone a human

- security strategy with an attendant proactive intelligence regime
7. The emerging human security requirements and the dynamics of crime with the ubiquity of technology access and use imply that national security intelligence practice should be an integration of all diverse but relevant expertise in an all-source information collection and analysis, with emphasis on the need to share information and intelligence and fusion-intelligence
 8. In the circumstance, the national security intelligence community needs to be expanded to integrate all law enforcement, security, human security and other MDAs that are relevant to emerging national security threats
 9. Moreover, applicable structures and processes need to be established to operationalize effective collaboration and partnerships among national security agencies and organizations
 10. More importantly, intelligence practice would only meet the desirable objective if it is high-technology-driven in tune with the dynamics of the revolution in military affairs and globalization of security threats, crime and criminality
 11. There is a need for deliberate development of requisite human capabilities, technical experts and a domestic Military Industrial Complex. In essence, intelligence practice needs to be professionalized in knowledge content, skills, process and oversight.

Conclusion

Challenges are daily emerging, requiring constant recalibration of the intelligence architecture of all modern states. Regular deployment of the most current security technological gadgets has consequently become the norm rather than the exception. To effectively deal with the challenges associated with worsening insecurity in Nigeria, we be very conscious and receptive to changes and innovations in the security sector. This must be benchmarked by actionable policies by the government. The capacity of intelligence officers must be regularly up-scaled in line with global expectations and practices.

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THE FUTURE OF NIGERIA'S INTELLIGENCE: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

By Maj. Gen C. M Abraham (Rtd)

INTRODUCTION

Due to the need for the future of Nigeria's intelligence, challenges and opportunities that in June 1986, the former president, Gen Ibrahim Babangida issued Decree No. 19 that dissolved the national security organisation (NSO) and restructured Nigeria's Security Services into 3 separate entities. The goal of this chapter is to suggest ways through which Nigeria's Intelligence could be improved to meet the current trend of technological advancement of Artificial Intelligence (AI), to effectively face the challenges and opportunities on the security issues.

CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATIONS

Intelligence

The Latin word *Intelligere* means "understand". Intelligence as a term has various definitions depending on who is defining it and for what purpose. Capacity for logic, understanding, self-awareness, learning, emotional language, reasoning, planning, creativity, critical thinking and problem solving. It also refers to "the ability to acquire and apply knowledge and skills" as well as the "collection of information of military or political value"¹⁰⁸. In addition, it

means “A condition achieved, whereby espionage (attack on information) is prevented, subversion (attack on personnel) does not exist, and sabotage (attack on materials and facilities) is prevented”. Intelligence as a critical tool of statecraft provides the necessary early warning or foreknowledge about imminent threats to policymakers in order to protect a nation from being subjected to surprise attack, either through military action, subversion, espionage or sabotage activities, terrorism, insurgency and other asymmetric challenges.

Intelligence provides the capacity to avert imminent threats to a country by providing timely, processed and analysed intelligence, in the form of courses of action, to decision makers for the enhancement of national security. Intelligence operations are usually conducted in support of kinetic military operations. However, in some cases, Intelligence operations are conducted as stand-alone operations if the End State can be achieved. But in most cases, information is gathered, processed into Intelligence, shared and disseminated by a wide range of Intelligence agencies to the military and other action security agencies for kinetic action

Intelligence Community

The Intelligence Community (IC) is a “federation of executive branch agencies and organizations that work separately and together to conduct intelligence activities necessary for the conduct of foreign relations and the protection of the national security”¹⁰⁹. These activities include: collection of information needed by the President,

the National Security Council, the Secretaries of State and Defence, and other Executive Branch officials for the performance of their duties and responsibilities; Production and dissemination of intelligence. Collection of information concerning, and the conduct of activities to protect against, intelligence activities directed against the nation, international terrorist and international narcotics activities, and other hostile activities directed against the nation by foreign powers, organizations, persons, and their agents; Special activities; Administrative and support activities within the nation and abroad necessary for the performance of authorized activities; and Such other intelligence activities as the President may direct from time to time.

National Security

National security is the security and defence of a sovereign state, including its citizens, economy, and institutions, which is regarded as a duty of government.

Originally conceived as protection against military attack, national security is widely understood to include also non-military dimensions, such as the security from terrorism, minimization of crime, economic security, energy security, environmental security, food security, and cybersecurity. Similarly, national security risks include, in addition to the actions of other states, action by violent non-state actors, by narcotic cartels, organized crime, by multinational corporations, and also the effects of natural disasters.”¹¹⁰

Governments rely on a range of measures, including political, economic, and military power, as well as

diplomacy, to safeguard the security of a state. They may also act to build the conditions of security regionally and internationally by reducing transnational causes of insecurity, such as climate change, economic inequality, political exclusion, and nuclear proliferation.

However, the concept of national security remains ambiguous, having evolved from simpler definitions which emphasised freedom from military threat and political coercion. Among the many definitions proposed to date are the following, which show how the concept has evolved to encompass non-military concerns: "A nation has security when it does not have to sacrifice its legitimate interests to avoid war, and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by war"¹¹¹ Top of Form

The distinctive meaning of national security is freedom from foreign dictation. Objectively, it means the absence of threats to acquired values and subjectively, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked. The ability to preserve the nation's physical integrity and territory; to maintain its economic relations with the rest of the world on reasonable terms; to preserve its nature, institutions, and governance from disruption from outside; and to control its borders. It can best be described as a capacity to control those domestic and foreign conditions that the public opinion of a given community believes necessary to enjoy its self-determination or autonomy, prosperity, and well-being. Thus, National security is an appropriate and aggressive blend of political resilience and maturity, human resources, economic

structure and capacity, technological competence, industrial base and availability of natural resources and finally, the military might. That is the measurable state of the capability of a nation to overcome the multi-dimensional threats to the apparent well-being of its people and its survival as a nation-state at any given time, by balancing all instruments of state policy through governance, and is extendable to global security by variables external to it.

Elements of National Security

Potential causes of national insecurity include actions by other states (e.g. military or cyber-attack), violent non-state actors (e.g. terrorist attack), organised criminal groups such as narcotic cartels, and also the effects of natural disasters (e.g. flooding, earthquakes). Systemic drivers of insecurity, which may be transnational, include climate change, economic inequality and marginalisation, political exclusion, and nuclear proliferation. Given the wide range of risks, the security of a state has several dimensions, including economic security, energy security, physical security, environmental security, food security, border security, and cyber security. These dimensions correlate closely with elements of national power.

Increasingly, governments organise their security policies into a National Security Strategy (NSS). Some states also appoint a National Security Council and/or a National Security Advisor, which is an executive government agency; it advises the head of state on topics concerning national security and strategic interests. The national security

council/advisor strategies long-term, short-term, and contingency national security plans. Although states differ in their approach, various forms of coercive power predominate, particularly military capabilities. The scope of these capabilities has developed. Traditionally, military capabilities were mainly land - or sea-based, and in smaller countries, they still are. Elsewhere, the domains of potential warfare now include the air, space, cyberspace, and psychological operations. Military capabilities designed for these domains may be used for national security, or equally for offensive purposes, for example, to conquer and annex territory and resources. Nonetheless, some of the elements of National Security are:

Physical or Military Security

In practice, national security is associated primarily with managing physical threats and with the military capabilities used for doing so. That is, national security is often understood as the capacity of a nation to mobilise military forces to guarantee its borders and to deter or successfully defend against physical threats, including military aggression and attacks by non-state actors, such as terrorism. Most states configure their military forces mainly for territorial defence, while others invest in higher-cost expeditionary capabilities, which allow their armed forces to project power and sustain military operations abroad.

Infrastructural Security

Infrastructure security is the security provided to protect infrastructure, especially critical infrastructure, such as airports, highways, rail transport, hospitals, bridges, transport hubs, network communications, media, the electricity grid, dams, power plants, seaports, oil refineries, and water systems. Infrastructure security seeks to limit the vulnerability of these structures and systems to sabotage, terrorism, and contamination. Many countries have established government agencies to directly manage the security of critical infrastructure, usually through the Ministry of Interior/Home Affairs, dedicated security agencies to protect facilities, and also dedicated transport police. There is also commercial transportation security. Critical infrastructure is vital for the essential functioning of a country. Incidental or deliberate damage can have a serious impact on the economy and essential services. Some of the threats to infrastructure include:

1. Terrorism: a person or group deliberately targeting critical infrastructure for political gain. In the November 2008 Mumbai attacks, the Mumbai Central Station and hospital were deliberately targeted.
2. Sabotage: persons or groups such as ex-employees, anti-government groups, and environmental groups. Refer to Bangkok's International Airport Seized by Protestors.
3. Information warfare: private persons hacking for private gain or countries initiating attacks to glean information and damage a country's cyberinfrastructure.

4. Natural disaster: hurricanes or other natural events that damage critical infrastructures such as oil pipelines, water, and power grids. See Hurricane Ike and the Economic effects of Hurricane Katrina for examples.

Virtual or Computer Security

Computer security, also known as cybersecurity or IT security, refers to the security of computing devices such as computers and smartphones, as well as computer networks such as private and public networks, and the Internet. It concerns the protection of hardware, software, data, people, and also the procedures by which systems are accessed, and the field has growing importance due to the increasing reliance on computer systems in most societies. Since unauthorized access to critical civil and military infrastructure is now considered a major threat, cyberspace is now recognised as a domain of warfare. One such example is the use of Stuxnet by the US and Israel against the Iranian nuclear programme

Political Security

The national security depends mainly on political security: the stability of the social order. Hence, political security depends on the rule of international law (including the laws of war), the effectiveness of international political institutions, as well as diplomacy and negotiation between nations and other security actors. It also depends on, among other factors, effective political inclusion of disaffected groups and the human security of the citizenry.

Economic Security

Economic security, in the context of international relations, is the ability of a nation state to maintain and develop the national economy, without which other dimensions of national security cannot be managed. Economic capability largely determines the defence capability of a nation, and thus, a sound economic security directly influences the national security of a nation. That is why we see countries with a sound economy happen to have a sound security setup too. In larger countries, strategies for economic security expect to access resources and markets in other countries and to protect their markets at home. Developing countries may be less secure than economically advanced states due to high rates of unemployment and underpaid work.

Environmental Security

Environmental security, also known as ecological security, refers to the integrity of ecosystems and the biosphere, particularly with their capacity to sustain a diversity of life-forms (including human life). The security of ecosystems has attracted greater attention as the impact of ecological damage by humans has grown. The degradation of ecosystems, including topsoil erosion, deforestation, biodiversity loss, and climate change, affects economic security and can precipitate mass migration, leading to increased pressure on resources elsewhere. Ecological security is also important since most of the countries in the world are developing and dependent on agriculture, and

agriculture gets affected largely due to climate change. This effect affects the economy of the nation, which in turn affects national security.

The scope and nature of environmental threats to national security and strategies to engage them are a subject of debate, however, environmental security can be classified into the major impacts of ecological changes on national security, as:

1. Transnational environmental problems. These include global environmental problems such as climate change due to global warming, deforestation, and loss of biodiversity.
2. Local environmental or resource pressures. These include resource scarcities leading to local conflict, such as scarcity of water, migration into another nation caused by the failure of agriculture, and the impact of erosion on the conflict of erosion of productive land. Environmental insecurity arises due to population and the dwindling availability of farmland.
3. Environmentally threatening outcomes of warfare. These include acts of war that degrade or destroy ecosystems.

Energy Security

Resources include water, sources of energy, land, and minerals. Availability of adequate natural resources is important for a nation to develop its industry and economic power. For example, in the Persian Gulf War of 1991, Iraq captured Kuwait partly in order to secure access to its oil

wells, and one reason for the US counter-invasion was the value of the same wells to its economy. Water resources are subject to disputes between many nations, including India and Pakistan, and in the Middle East.

However, the interrelations between security, energy, natural resources, and their sustainability are increasingly acknowledged in national security strategies, and resource security is now included among the UN Sustainable Development Goals. In the US, for example, the military has installed solar photovoltaic microgrids on its bases in case of a power outage.

CONSISTENCY OF APPROACH

The dimensions of national security outlined above are frequently in tension with one another. For example:

1. The high cost of maintaining large military forces can place a burden on the economic security of a nation, and annual defence spending as a percentage of GDP varies significantly by country. Conversely, economic constraints can limit the scale of expenditure on military capabilities.
2. Unilateral security action by states can undermine political security at an international level if it erodes the rule of law and undermines the authority of international institutions. The invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the annexation of Crimea in 2014 have been cited as examples.

3. The pursuit of economic security in competition with other nation states can undermine the ecological security of all when the impact includes widespread topsoil erosion, biodiversity loss, and climate change. Conversely, expenditure on mitigating or adapting to ecological change places a burden on the national economy.

If tensions such as these are mismanaged, national security policies and actions may be ineffective or counterproductive.

VERSUS TRANSNATIONAL SECURITY

Increasingly, national security strategies have begun to recognise that nations cannot provide for their security without also developing the security of their regional and international context. Thus, wider security measures must also now encompass protection against epidemics and infectious diseases, combating terrorism and organised crime, ensuring safe transport and reliable food supplies, protecting against energy supply interruptions, countering devastating climate change, initiatives for peace and global development, and much more.

CIVIL LIBERTIES AND HUMAN RIGHTS

Approaches to national security can have a complex impact on human rights and civil liberties. For example, the rights and liberties of citizens are affected by the use of military personnel and militarised police forces to control public behaviour; the use of surveillance, including mass surveillance in cyberspace, which has implications for

privacy; military recruitment and conscription practices; and the effects of warfare on civilians and civil infrastructure. This has led to a dialectical struggle, particularly in liberal democracies, between government authority and the rights and freedoms of the general public.

OVERVIEW OF NIGERIA'S INTELLIGENCE ARCHITECTURE

- a. To produce comprehensive, contextual and timely intelligence support to defence planners and decision makers to effectively enhance national security. Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) also exist "to provide timely, objective and accurate defence related intelligence to enhance the formulation of policies and strategies by the Appropriate Superior Authority (ASA) on national security for the defence of Nigeria's territorial integrity"¹¹² - DIA's Mission. Detection and Prevention of crimes of military nature against the security of Nigeria. Protection and Preservation of all military classified matters concerning the security of Nigeria, both within and outside the country. Such other responsibilities as may be assigned by the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces or the Chief of the Defence Staff are deemed necessary. It is important to note that this third responsibility is omnibus in nature.
- b. The NIA's mission stipulates that it derives further powers from Instrument No. NIA 1 to ensure the principal objective of protection, promotion and enhancement of

Nigeria's policy objectives outside Nigeria. Its functions are:

- i. Obtaining by covert sources or other means, external intelligence on the activities of Nigerians or any person, organization or country outside Nigeria whose conduct (or activities) is aimed at bringing disrespect to Nigeria and her leaders or undermining the security of Nigeria.
- ii. Obtaining by covert sources or other means, external intelligence that is capable of advancing Nigeria's vital interests.
- iii. Identifying and assisting in the apprehension of persons outside Nigeria believed to have committed any crime against the security of Nigeria.
- iv. Monitoring the intentions, activities and policies of foreign countries/governments towards Nigeria and Nigerians.
- v. Monitoring any external plans or acts of subversion, sabotage or terrorism against Nigeria, its economy or people.
- vi. Conducting espionage, covert operations and counterintelligence activities outside Nigeria.
- vii. Collection, collation, analysis, projections/estimations and research on external intelligence with political, socio-economic, technological and security matters.
- viii. Provision of protection in liaison with host security services for the President and other VIPs in the Nigerian government who are on visit overseas.
- ix. Performing such other functions as may be given by the President, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Nigeria.

- c. The DSS is saddled with the following responsibilities:
- i. The prevention and detection within Nigeria of any crime against the internal security of Nigeria.
 - ii. The protection and preservation of all non-military classified matters concerning the internal security of Nigeria.
 - iii. Such other responsibilities affecting internal security within Nigeria as the National Assembly or the President, Commander-In-Chief of the Armed Forces, as the case may be, may deem necessary.
 - iv. The DSS is further empowered with additional responsibility under the Legal Instrument No. SSS 1 of 1999, which states that “Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions relating to the general duties of the DSS set out in Sections 2-3 of the Act, the objectives of the Service shall be the preservation of Nigeria’s internal security and economy against acts of subversion, sabotage and other threats to the stability of Nigeria.

In summary, the DSS is responsible for the protection and preservation of Nigeria’s internal security and economy against HIS. Consequently, it provides security intelligence, thereby contributing to the needs of the decision makers in ensuring national security. These 3 agencies form the basic foundation of the intelligence architecture of Nigeria.

THE FUTURE OF NIGERIA’S INTELLIGENCE

The effect of the preponderance of contemporary security challenges facing the Nigerian state requires that the security apparatus be reinvigorated and re-positioned to effectively

mitigate the consequences. This throws up the task of remodelling Nigeria's intelligence community to be more proactive, rather than reactive. There will be a need to look at how to adequately shape the future of Nigeria's intelligence. Therefore, the future of Intelligence shall be shaped by developments in Artificial Intelligence (AI), Cyber Operations, Communications Technology and the use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles for information systems and telecommunication attacks. Others include full exchange of intelligence, open-source intelligence capability, psychological operations, sustained acquisition of technical equipment and effective intelligence sharing:

- a. **Artificial Intelligence:** The use of AI for Intelligence Operations would be pronounced especially in Robotics Engineering. Robotics would replace human beings in future espionage, surveillance and other intelligence gathering operations. Thus, cyber operations would serve as the hardware for conducting dangerous missions.
- b. **Cyber Operations:** Recent cyber warfare attacks worldwide, for instance, the *Trojan Horse*, *Wanna Cry*, etc, malware have proven to be effective in 2 ways; First, denial of services by corrupting target systems and secondly, espionage capacity. Thus, cyber operations would shape future intelligence in 2 aspects:
 - i. Capacity to attack at a relatively low cost, for instance, instead of a full-scale military attack, just eliminate the electronic and communication capability of the adversary.

- ii. Battlefield view will be monitored from Space Domain. The need to invest in and develop Artificial Intelligence and Cyber Operations is very imminent and necessary. It will hasten the intelligent security outfit and make the operations very viable. Thus, Nigeria's Intelligence could have the capacity to attack at a relatively low cost, for instance, instead of a full-scale military attack, just eliminate the electronic and communication capability of the adversary. The battlefield view will be monitored from Space Domain. Thus, these surveillances will be in place to assist:
- c. Communications Technology:** Intelligence in the future will be shaped by effective use of either satellite communications or terrestrial networks, which are discussed as follows:
- Satellite Communications:** If large bandwidth capacity is achieved, it will greatly influence the future of intelligence. However, the KA and the KU bands are susceptible to atmospheric scintillation, ie the adverse effects of weather.
- Terrestrial Networks:** These are run on fiber optics and can give huge bandwidths. However, it requires encryption or other protective measures.
- d. **Use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles:** The UAV will shape the future of Intelligence in kinetic and non-kinetic operations. For non-kinetic operations, UAVs, especially drones, will increasingly be used for surveillance and espionage operations over the battlefield. For kinetic

operations, UAVs will be the hardware that will enter the battlefield, the software that will locate, identify, fix and strike the adversary.

e. **Sustained Acquisition of Technical Equipment:** The need to attract, develop, and retain a diverse, result-focused and high-performing workforce capable of providing the technical expertise and exceptional leadership necessary to address Nigeria's security challenges becomes imperative. In this regard, there would be a need for sustenance of technical acquisition by individual agencies in the intelligence community. It is necessary to improve cost, schedule, performance, planning, execution and transparency in major system acquisitions, while promoting innovation and agility depending on the mission and priority. This would be complemented by the capacity development of personnel who would man such technical equipment. Furthermore, the need for Space and Geospatial technology capabilities becomes expedient. ONSA could consider a direct partnership with relevant agencies such as the Nigerian Nuclear Regulatory Authority (NNRA) and Nigerian Communications Satellite (NIGCOMSAT) to tackle this challenge. Other elements that would shape intelligence in the future include:

i. **Full Exchange of Intelligence:** All internal security activities are underpinned by robust information management to ensure the effective use of resources and data assets. The proximity of analysts and customers is expected to improve communication and

trust between security agencies for effective intelligence sharing. Also, as the world becomes dependent on each other to fight evolving complex threats, especially as terrorists collaborate and become a franchise, there shall be a move towards more effective intelligence sharing between countries.

- ii. **Open-Source Intelligence Capability:** The Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) capability is a vital tool of intelligence organizations. It is a platform for collecting from the print and electronic media, such as journals, newspapers and social media, among others, to establish trends of particular threats to serve as an early warning system. Although the use of OSINT for wider intelligence processes and CT is complex and resource-intensive, the use of OSINT in the intelligence process will continue to shape intelligence in the future, particularly where lawful intercept is not permitted or feasible.
- iii. **Psychological Operations:** PSYOPS are planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to a selected audience to influence their motives, beliefs, emotions, reasoning and behaviour of governments, organizations, individuals, etc, ultimately to make them behave in a desired manner in the achievement of national objectives. PSYOPS will continue to shape intelligence in the future. The future of PSYOPS would be dramatically enhanced by the use of technology to reach multiple target audiences in a short time, with discreet messages intended to create the desired impact.
- iv. **Effective Intelligence Sharing:** All internal security activities are underpinned by robust information management to ensure the effective use of resources

and data assets. The proximity of analysts and customers improves communication and trust between them, but having so many specialized intelligence units also creates problems, as “too many cooks spoil the broth”. Notable among the problems are bureaucratic divisions that can isolate intelligence in “stovepipes” and lead to inconsistent standards, practices and even terminologies, which could complicate inter-agency liaison. This notwithstanding, effective information sharing requires openness to sharing information and willingness to break down traditional information silos. Thus, a robust and automated information management culture would need to be developed.

CHALLENGES TO THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IN NIGERIA

There are myriad challenges facing the intelligence community in Nigeria. These have grossly limited the productivity of information gathering and intelligence production in support of security operations both within and outside the country. Some of the challenges are stated below:

- i. **Politicization of Intelligence:** Intelligence is also shared with the government with a view to making national policy or taking immediate action in the early warning of impending danger. Owing to the bureaucratic nature of governance, certain issues that pertain to intelligence cannot be acted upon with the required urgency. This bottleneck often opens debate and even allows for distortion of intelligence, especially as it does not conform to vested interests, previous

knowledge, assessment, beliefs and judgment. Therefore, such intelligence could be jettisoned overboard.

- ii. **Uncooperative Attitude:** One of the cogent factors that impedes intelligence sharing among our security agencies is that individuals prefer to do it alone syndrome, which does not help intelligence coordination. This is the reason why terrorism has refused to yield to national intelligence operation due to uncoordinated and uncooperative attitude by some individuals.
- iii. **Lack of Motivation and Poor Morale:** Motivation being one of the cardinal factors that increase efficiency and productivity, needs to be improved in the Nigerian intelligence community and agencies, like their counterparts in foreign countries. Poor and decaying infrastructures, poor salary package, lack of life insurance in case of unexpected death, poor or absence of reward for productive intelligence are some of the factors that contribute to a lack of motivation and poor morale within the personnel of these intelligence agencies.
- iv. **Mistrust among Agencies:** Some Nigerian security agencies believe that an individual agency needs to keep intelligence secret within itself without sharing not to suffer leakage to the public or adversaries, which can be detrimental to security. The hoarding of intelligence by agencies has created gaps which terrorists have exploited as it happened before September 11 attack in the USA.
- v. **Inter-Agency Rivalry:** Inter-agency rivalry continues to pose a serious challenge to the success of security forces. The agencies were established to complement

each other but they compete instead. Sometimes information/intelligence is delayed or not shared on time. For example, one of the lessons learnt from the 9/11 attacks was the failure of intelligence agencies to share information and intelligence timely. Intelligence is often like a big jigsaw that could only be put together (meaningfully) if every component laid out its piece(s). The unhealthy rivalry plays a critical role in intelligence. Where there ought to be a symbiotic and complementary relationship, what exists is a competitive environment where individual agencies try to outperform one another and want to be seen as the best in the country. Thus, each prefers to provide intelligence regardless of purview in order to score political points from the government and the public. There is therefore a need for increased cooperation through joint training exercises as well as policy formulation in order to strengthen cooperation and enhance the synergy between the different agencies.

- vi. **Overlapping Functions between the Agencies:** The various acts that established agencies and their function in Nigeria did not draw a distinctive line between the functions of the agencies, thereby giving room for overlapping functions among them. For instance, the police will sometimes claim responsibility for certain functions, and the Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps will claim the same functions, backed by its Act. This oftentimes generates disagreement, leading to hatred, which may affect intelligence production and sharing.
- vii. **Obsolete Technology:** In the modern sphere of terrorism, in which information is a pivotal issue, good functioning and sophisticated technologies are

paramount in intelligence gathering and production. The Nigerian intelligence agencies, without doubt, are not on par with their international counterparts in the application of intelligence technology. It is worth stating here, though, that some agencies like DIA, DSS, ONSA, etc, have tried to acquire modern equipment for intelligence gathering, but they remain inadequate. There is therefore a need to take a holistic view of this equipment to improve and /or purchase more if the need arises.

- viii. **Inadequate Funding:** Inadequate funding remains a critical challenge for the intelligence community. Intelligence gathering costs money, but there are often challenges on how to justify the demands for funding as its results are not exactly 'tangible'. Proactive intelligence requires modern technology, highly motivated and well-trained personnel. All these require an adequate and steady flow of funding in order to get reliable and timely intelligence.
- ix. **Lack of Indigenous Technological Equipment:** One of the challenges facing Nigeria's intelligence architecture is the lack of indigenous technological equipment. All the equipment and facilities are purchased from more technologically advanced countries, which have access to the information obtained from this equipment. An example is the NIGCOMSAT that was launched in China, though a Nigerian Satellite. The Chinese government has unhindered access to all the information that the satellite provides.
- x. **Inadequate Manpower/Technical Staff:** One of the mitigating factors is the inadequate technical staff to man our TechInt equipment. There is therefore a need

for continuous training of Nigerians to operate all the equipment needed for TechInt.

- xi. **Lack of Well-Spelt out Policies that Drive Intelligence Agencies:** Policies give direction on where an organization or a nation intends to go or achieve within a given timeline. The Nigerian Intelligence Agencies need to have timelines within which to attain certain milestones. These timelines are derivable from policy formulations. A deliberate effort should be made by the Federal Government to ensure that all the Intelligence agencies have a well-spelt out policy to galvanize each and every agency on its responsibilities as well as its relationship with others.

OPPORTUNITIES IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IN NIGERIA

The importance of intelligence in every endeavour of human existence and especially that of a country like Nigeria, cannot be overemphasized. Although one would have to appreciate the role of intelligence in the maintenance of Nigeria's security since the beginning of the 4th Republic from 1999 to date, more could have been achieved given the following:

- a. **Centralized Intelligence:** Centralization is the concentration of decision-making into the hands of a few top-level managers. Centralized intelligence would assist in ridding duplication of duties and waste of resources in gathering intelligence. This is more so as it aids them in the quick coordination of various intelligence agencies and units in achieving their given task without overlapping with other assigned duties.

- b. **Political Immunity:** The Nigerian intelligence agencies should be immune to any form of political interference. This would go a long way in improving objectivity in intelligence operations and reports that would aid in better decisions and policy making. This would also expedite several actions or intelligence operations to be taken without biases or favour from the political elites. Undue political influence on the intelligence has some implications for the objectivity of the different agencies.
- c. **Cooperation and Intelligence Sharing Amongst Organizations:** Cooperation between the intelligence agencies is paramount in order to consolidate the gains of intelligence gathering and to achieve the desired goals of establishing the organization. In order to achieve national security, diverse issues on Intelligence are to be shared among the security agencies and not limited to one sector of security alone. The formal requirements of intelligence cooperation and sharing among the Nigerian security outfits are to be able to direct their intelligence in a specific direction without missing the target. Cooperation and information sharing would ensure that unnecessary rivalry between different arms of the nation's security formations is avoided, leading to accurate identification of threat factors at their earliest stages and advising appropriate policy makers.
- d. **Improved Welfare:** Adequate funding of security and intelligence agencies is one of the most important measures to combat threats to national security. Huge

sums of money are required for training, recruitment of agents, purchase of equipment and the use of HUMINT to penetrate target organizations and obtain intelligence on a wide range of issues covertly. Although the CIA and the FBI budget for combating threats to national security is classified, a former CIA official, Mary Graham, revealed in 2005 that about 44 billion USD was set aside for national security with terrorism as a priority. Currently, Nigerian security and intelligence agencies do not have special funds of this magnitude to perform this role.

- e. **Acquisition of State-of-the-Art Technology:** The technological breakthroughs of recent years have led intelligence organizations to challenge the accepted truths that have historically shaped their endeavours. The hierarchical, compartmentalized, industrial structure of these organizations is now changing, revolving primarily around the integration of new technologies. This underscores the need for Nigeria's Intelligence to acquire advanced technological equipment to counter its adversaries and new security threats.

WAY FORWARD

The way forward:

- a. The need to train more technically sound and gifted staff in the intelligence cycle is paramount.
- b. The need to develop indigenous industries and capacity to avoid Nigeria's intelligence from being hijacked by foreigners.
- c. Every Intelligence agency is to determine its end state within a given time limit by drawing direction from outlined policies to foster a secure future for Nigeria.

CONCLUSION

The Nigerian intelligence community was created by the National Security Agencies Act. However, the ever-evolving nature of security challenges facing Nigeria and the urgency to find solutions to them have thrown up discussions regarding the need or otherwise of improving the capacities of the intelligence community to deliver on their mandates. This has become more imperative in view of some challenges in the current set-up. These include a lack of adequate technology, interagency rivalry and weak central coordination. Others are the absence of a central database and consumer apathy.

The ultimate objective of improving the capacities of the intelligence community is to reposition them for early warning capability for more proactive deterrence in containing threats to national security in the future. There is a need for sustained acquisition of technical equipment, effective intelligence sharing, need to critically look at

aspects of AI, cyber operations and communications technology as the new areas of future intelligence gathering mechanisms. Other areas would be the use of UAVs, improvement in OSINT and PSYOPS. These areas will ensure the quality of information that needs to be converted to intelligence and improve public perception as a panacea to the challenges facing the Intelligence Community. I believe that if these measures are emplaced, the future of Nigeria's intelligence would be meaningful in the overall protection of Nigeria's national security in the future.

While we must admit that Nigeria is not where it would want to be, it has not been static in managing its security over the decades. Nigeria has made some progress, even if this is not immediately visible, particularly in the face of the overwhelming security challenges its citizens are daily grappling with. The intelligence component of the nation's security architecture has fared equally well, particularly against the backdrop of both organizational and operational challenges it has continued to confront. That it has continued to weather the storm of these challenges and still performs its role is a testament to the fact of its ruggedness and determination. All that is now required is a little tweaking here and there and the full deployment of advanced technology in its operations. We hope that in the years ahead, this will be achieved.

108 <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intelligence> accessed September 2024

109 <https://www.oni.navy.mil/About/Intelligence-Community/> accessed September 2024

110 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_security accessed September 2024

111 Romm, Joseph J. Defining national security: the nonmilitary aspects. Pew Project on America's Task in a Changed World (Pew Project Series). Council on Foreign Relations. 1993, p. 122. ISBN 978-0-87609-135-7. Retrieved 22 September 2024.

112 <https://www.dia.mil/> accessed September 2024

ANALYSIS OF INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO SECURITY OPERATIONS IN NIGERIA

By Maj. General GA Wahab (Rtd)

“The Intelligence Community Committee and the Joint Intelligence Board shall provide timely and actionable intelligence support before, during and after IS operations”

National Defence Policy 2017

INTRODUCTION

Global security environment changed – erosion of state powers, security shifted from DIMES to cover all human endeavours. Scholars postulated the crisis to be more intra than inter-state. The turn of the century witnessed a high level of insecurity. No part of the world is immune to palpable global insecurity. Different ideas have been advanced by notable experts, on these should be briefly noted. Samuel Huntington, in his *Clash of Civilisations*, talks about the fault of differentiations and conflicts shifting from ideology to primordial tendencies. On the other hand, Dominique Moisi, in his book *Motions of Geopolitics*, emphasizes the growing influence of territoriality and how this is shaping nations’ perception of international politics. He analysed the place of fear, hope and humiliation in the structural dynamics of global politics. Thus, no part of the World is immune to insecurity. There is a blurred line between local terrorism and gun crimes in UK Lone Wolf attacks are now predominant. Authoritarian democracies of

China and Russia have been grappling with insurgency. Most affected areas are Africa, the Middle East and the Indian sub-continent, and activities of Al-Qaeda, IS, and collaborators were pronounced in the 3 areas. Developments in the areas are stunted due to high insecurity.

Nigeria has its fair share of insecurity with local and international implications. There are linkages between Boko Haram in NE Nigeria, Al-Shabaab in East Africa, Al-Qaeda and IS in Iraq and Syria. Their linkages include affiliation, training, equipment, leadership and strategic direction. The events in NE Nigeria are not isolated-with wider global implications. It is difficult to tackle Boko Haram due to issues, particularly in intelligence support. No single service or nation has with capability to tackle security issues alone. Intelligence is a major factor in the planning and execution of an operation. Intelligence itself must come from different sources and agencies. There is a deficit in operation due to many factors, including security architecture, and it is impossible to be proactive without intelligence support. However, for this course, two assumptions are made: Emphasis on the Armed Forces of Nigeria and some issues will not be elaborated upon due to the calibre of audience and time for security reasons.

CLARIFICATION OF TERMS

Analysis

This refers to the “separation of a whole into components, or making a statement of the constituents of a mixture or

clarification of an expression by elucidating its use in a discourse or function”¹¹³ To analyse an issue is to examine the parts and how they perform and express such clearly in a discourse based on their functions

Security Operations

Security operation is difficult to define but is simply the protection, safety and security of people and property from danger (security=development). Security Operations-activities conducted by MDAs in protecting Nigerians and their property goes beyond engagement of adversary to cover human, cyber and food security

TYPES OF OPERATIONS TO ARMED FORCES OF NIGERIA (AFN) JOINT DOCTRINE PROVIDES INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING

The federation shall, subject to an Act of the National Assembly made in that behalf, equip and maintain the armed forces as may be considered adequate and effective for the purpose.

- a. Defending Nigeria from external aggression.
- b. maintaining its territorial integrity and securing its borders from violation on land, sea, or air;
- c. suppress insurrection and act in aid of civil authorities to restore order, when called upon to do so by the President, but subject to such conditions as may be prescribed by an Act of the National Assembly; and
- d. perform such other functions as may be prescribed by an act of the National Assembly.

That is to say that the AFN promotes stability in the country, is for Peacetime Deterrence, Deterring Aggression in crisis, and War Fighting. However, General Krulak divided these into 3 types: 1. War Fighting, 2. MACA or Internal Security Operations, and 3. Peace Support Operations. The USA military and NATO allies grouped the operations into two: 1. War Fighting, and 2. Military Operations Other Than War

ESSENCE AND FACTORS FOR INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

Intelligence Support: Provision of reliable, timely and adequate intelligence by appropriate staff to the command. Focusing on threat by adversary, intent, capabilities, and centre of gravity and likely courses of action. It provides the commander with relevant information for planning and conducting operations. The intelligence covers relevant issues within the theatre, requiring coordination of the management of intelligence resources

Importance: Intelligence support's importance is covered in the National Security Strategy, Defence Policy and Defence Joint Doctrine. Chapter 4 of NDP is emphatic about the provision of timely and actionable Intelligence Support (IS) before, during and after operations by the Intelligence Committee and JIB. USA prioritise intelligence support as contained in the Joint Publication 2-01 (Joint and National Intelligence to Military operations reviewed in July 2017) – covering: Today's discussion, Force Protection based on counter intelligence to detect, identify, assess, exploit and

counter/ neutralize threat in whatever form, and DIA, Services and agencies participate

The major Factors were;

1. Planning Requirements,
2. Resource Allocation,
3. Process for requesting intelligence,
4. Proper and adequate Staffing and resourcing as a backbone for ops. Priority now on the need to share rather than the need to know

The Process must be: 1. robust, focused, understood by staff, starts with daily events, locally and on the international scene, influenced by direction from higher authority or national interest, 2. Next is the Collection Stage, based on planning consideration, 3. Followed by Processing and Exploitation, 4. Analysts then produce actionable intelligence 5. These are disseminated and integrated for better management, and 6. Outcome evaluated and fed back to the system.

PROVISION OF INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT IN AFN OPERATIONS

View operations from the national defence and the IS basis

1. National defence of territorial integrity. Actions on 3 layers: constructive engagement, apply soft power and combat
2. IS includes terrorism, violent extremism, kidnapping, cyber security, organized crimes and national infrastructure safety

CRISIS AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE

1. Operations to be aided by designated agencies with early warning, intelligence gathering and analysis, Technology aided fusion system to be pursued, Niche information targeting significant audience, Development of national information security system to protect electronic and non-electronic systems in all operations, Coordination of intelligence for strategic decision making, and Conduct analysis and timely sharing of intelligence
2. Discussed intelligence cooperation and buttressed intelligence sharing, noting shift from need to know. Noted the complexity of the international system, recognizing collaboration and partnership
3. Intelligence acquisition and management based on national interest, guided by threats and opportunities through occurrences and trends at all levels. These are to be identified by MDAs through liaison. At the Operational level, AFN is saddled with the National Defence, the NP's lead agency for IS. All security agencies are part of the security architecture. They are to train to enhance intelligence gathering and operational capabilities. AFN Doctrine encourages service to develop intelligence outfits. DIA is to develop to meet the requirements of modern warfare, and true of all agencies with their Acts providing for capabilities

ANALYSIS OF INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT FOR OPERATIONS

Clear various documents give guidelines for intelligence support. In analysing, it is necessary to examine the aim of intelligence support and 6 other factors

The aim of the intelligence support is to conduct operations based on planning which depends on intelligence (IPB-to provide a picture of imminent activities, CCIR, Sustenance, Maintenance of Tempo, and Force Protection. The other factors were: policy provision, implementation, monitoring, evaluation, feedback and deduction.

1. Policy Provision – 3 documents provide for what should be done, but how to do it is left to agencies. The JIB meets regularly and NSC meets periodically, but has less effect at the operational level. There are instances where 2 agencies are saddled with the same responsibility. NSS recognises NEMA to handle emergencies, while a Ministry is now for same creating a gap. Terrorism Prevention Act 2011 and 2013 tasked both the NSA and the IG with coordination
2. **Implementation** emphasis is mostly for the strategic level, with little thought for the operational level and those to implement. These were provided by the NDP on combat, put the MOD in charge, but had no input in the operation in the country, CTCOIN and anti-kidnapping operations without adequate coordination. Intelligence support is not managed, where available, as no communication

between various components, impossible to coordinate, cooperate and collaborate. Implementation is fair

3. **Monitoring-** No document provided for monitoring, no independent assessor to confirm adherence and provision of intelligence support, Agencies perform self-monitoring and adjust on their own, no corroboration even on allegation of whatever type, Monitoring is poor on intelligence support.
4. **Evaluation- Evaluation** based on a report of the agency or service concerned, since there is no monitoring. Provision of intelligence support is therefore viewed as a favour without consideration for national interest. Since monitoring is not done, evaluation is a mirage. It is a judgmental issue, as no agency wants to be monitored or evaluated. Heads frown when personnel are monitored or reported.
5. **Feedback-** No feedback mechanism embedded in documents, fault from the Implementation phase. It is difficult to know where something is not working and correct. Intelligence circle may be short-circuited and incomplete when serious operations are being conducted.
6. **Deduction:** Despite the provision of policy guidelines, important ingredients for better performance are missing. Personal relationships are more pronounced than processes and procedures

CHALLENGES TO EFFECTIVE INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

1. **Trust and Confidence in Agencies:** There is a lack of trust and confidence in some agencies due to perception or lack of competence. This has affected the support required and provided by such agencies
2. **Globalisation and Technological Advancement:** Technology has impacted on information available and intelligence gathering for operations. Nigeria is simply a consumer without an industrial base, affecting the intelligence community and support to operations. It has improved recently, but is still reacting to developments.
3. **Poor Training and Staffing:** Pessimistic view and trust in intelligence staff. Training is not sufficient to raise performance, yet results and support are expected. When they do not perform, they are derided. Structurally, not fit for purpose
4. **Poor Funding:** Intelligence is very costly. ISTAR assets, providing developed countries with cutting-edge intelligence, are very costly. HUMINT is also costly, and the Killing of Gen Quasem Suleiman on 3 Jan 20 took 18 months following him from Yemen, Syria, Lebanon and Iraq.
5. **Resistance to Change:** Nigerians appreciate and learn new ways of doing things, but resist the adoption of such new methods. Unfortunately, evaluation and review of the old ways are not usually conducted to correct anomalies. Thus, mistakes are made continuously.
6. **Exploitation and Dissemination Occurrence of Information:** Sentiments do not allow Nigerians to exploit information at hand. Information not

disseminated when required, they thus become obsolete when released.

7. **Under Utilisation of Some Agencies and Personalisation of Issues:** Some agencies not given deserved recognition. Correctional service is one, which could offer much. Closeness to Presidency is a licence not to perform.

WAY FORWARD

The Review of Policy Guidelines of the intelligence support for operation is sacrosanct. This will address some of the lapses and inadequacies of the operation. Understanding requirements by Stakeholders and address some of the issues emanating from their requirements. For effective and efficient operations, the capacity of the AFN should be improved, there should be Improvement on capacity, and this will be leveraging on technology advancement, the building institutions and processes, then the operations must be funded so as to get the overall rehabilitation.

CONCLUSION

Understanding the environment with adequate knowledge of the operation will aid in the plans and preparation of the AFN operation that will build trust and cooperation and collaboration among the stakeholders in the execution of the required functions expected.

113 <https://www-Merriam-Weber's-Dictionary.com> accessed September 2024

CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES IN INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY IN THE MEDIA: COUNTERING MISINFORMATION

*By Air Cdre BA Omoyungbo DSS PSC FDC MPA MA MSc
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INTRODUCTION

In the United States, there is our executive branch and Congress members who are elected. The dominant player influencing national security decision-making is the national mass media. To some extent, civil society and development workers attributed communism's end to the introduction of dissenting voices on radio stations such as Radio Free Europe and the underground production and distribution of restricted publications. The power of the media in reporting, analysing, and capturing images of military involvement around the world must be considered in the forging and execution of national security decision-making.

By its nature, the media can be counted on to show the cost of War, and the anti-war movement, not surprisingly, will do everything in its power to magnify those costs. It is the responsibility of the government to set national objectives and, in so doing, establish the value of military operations. Summers emphasized that in World War II, Vietnam and the Gulf Wars, the media played a key and changing role in national security decision-making.

Journalists revealed that French arms, including tanks and laser-guided missile systems, sold to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, were used by a Saudi-led coalition fighting Iran-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen. The French Defence Minister, Florence Party, moved swiftly to debunk the released information.

Similarly, the relationship between intelligence and media in developing countries, especially in Africa, has not been so smooth due to censorship, mistrust and national security measures. After independence, the media continued their watchdog role by speaking out against policies of the government which were considered obnoxious or inimical to the well-being of the society.

The proliferations of private media organizations in Nigeria were occasioned by Act No. 38 of 1992, which deregulated the ownership of media, particularly the electronic media. Consequently, Nigeria has evolved the largest and most active press community in Africa, with about 188 media organizations as against Kenya's 125 and South Africa's 143. According to Section 22 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, the media is established to uphold the responsibility and accountability of the government to the people. In recent times, the quest to uphold the media mandate of watchdog to the people gave room to the emergence of different forms of media sources of information. This lecture seeks to discuss controversial issues in intelligence and security in the media in an attempt

to strengthen a relationship that could enhance the security of the citizens.

CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATIONS

National Defence

National security is the aggregation of the security interests of the individuals, communities, ethnic groups, political entities and institutions which inhabit the territory of our great country, Nigeria. The primary objectives of national security are: “to strengthen the Federal Republic of Nigeria, to advance her interest and objectives, to contain instability, control crime, eliminate corruption, enhance genuine development progress and growth, improve the welfare and wellbeing and quality of life of every citizen.”¹¹⁴

Intelligence

This is the product resulting from the collection, evaluation, analysis, integration and interpretation of all available information that concerns one or more aspects of target groups, which is immediately or potentially significant to security, planning and operations.

Media

The Media are the channels of communication of information and entertainment in a society, such as publishing (newspapers, magazines, books), radio, television and the internet. Three of these concerns us in this

chapter; viz: (i) Traditional Media; (ii) Classic Media; and (iii) Internet is often described as the 'New Media'.

Misinformation

Misinformation refers to misleading information created or disseminated without manipulative or malicious intent.

Disinformation

Disinformation refers to misleading information created or disseminated with manipulative or malicious intent.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MEDIA AND INTELLIGENCE

Both parties are involved in collecting, analysing and disseminating information. One of the major sources of intelligence collection is Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT), which is largely sourced from the media. Traditionally, the media are used as an information collection and analysis tool for governments. An example here is the role of the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) as a veritable intelligence source for the British government during the Second World War. BBC's Monitoring service continues to operate in the media-rich environment of the twenty-first century, serving as both a news source and as a supplier of open-source intelligence to British government agencies. The media is a 'substitute watchdog' as the media may check the excesses of security forces that intelligence services may seek to hide. An example is the abuse of power and human rights infringements of detainees at Abu Ghraib Prison, Iraq, by

American soldiers. The need for intelligence agencies to ensure classified information does not become public knowledge usually creates conflict with the media. The British Government spent 32 million Pounds on a smallpox vaccine in 2003, The BBC reported that a million doses of the smallpox vaccine will be stockpiled by the government in preparation for mass vaccination

THE ROLE OF THE NIGERIAN MEDIA IN NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES

Information Dissemination

The mass media occupy the position of 4th Estate of the Realm and serve as watchdogs of society, agenda setters and force multipliers. It sensitizes, enlightens and persuades members of the public to participate actively in developmental activities. It is very relevant to National Security, especially in conflict. The media play a critical role in how conflicts develop and change.

Promotion of Democracy

The media are an important accountability mechanism, as they shape the perceptions of government and influence public opinion, promote democracy, good governance, as well as influence people's behaviour and support people-oriented policies. The Nigerian media derive its functional legitimacy from Chapter 2, Section 22 of the 1999 Constitution that empowers it to keep a check on the routine activities of the authorities, hold government accountable for

good governance and assist the citizens to evaluate the efficiency of the government.

Relevance in Statecraft Machinery

The mass media have eased the boundaries of different societies among the individuals through technological media, and thus create globalization. The modern news cycle allows for instant visibility of local events to a global audience and increased possibilities for citizens and civil society's participation in the generation of news.

Education and Entertainment

The advent of mass communication enables viewers and listeners to see and hear, and learn in real time from wherever they are.

THE IMPACT OF NIGERIAN MEDIA ON NATIONAL SECURITY IN NIGERIA

1. The mass media in Nigeria occupy the position of the fourth estate of the realm and often set the agenda for public discussions on national interests.
2. The Nigerian media also engage in the duty of information gathering, processing, storing and dissemination of information to the public.
3. The media serves as a platform for Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) for the Intelligence and Security Agencies.
4. The media have performed creditably well in enthroning the current democracy in Nigeria.

Cultural Insecurity

The mass media focuses attention on the relationship between violence/crime and what the media reports to their audience. People's behaviour is directly influenced by the media, and anti-social behaviour is usually a reflection of the consumption of negative media content.

Cultural Invasion

1. Mass media provide ideological guidance by offering assistance in orienting and implementing new values.
2. The mass media have affected the way of life as they are functionally linked to the popular media forms such as Radio, Television and the Press.
3. The traditional culture of greeting elderly persons is beginning to disappear because everyone is busy with their electronic devices.

Craze for Western Entertainment

African nations, including Nigeria, have a total dependency on foreign political philosophies and social ideas, and their shifts and movements. The ideological loyalty of the country's youth is susceptible to cultural warfare waged through alluring foreign pop culture and the infiltration of Western values, which portend a threat to security, as well as law and order. The US television or Hollywood's influence has penetrated Nigeria's young generation through a willingness to challenge authority.

CHALLENGES TO SECURITY AGENCIES- MEDIA RELATIONS ON NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES IN NIGERIA

Security Breach

1. In the performance of the reportage task, the journalist faces a dilemma that is evident as a conflict between professional responsibilities to report the truth, no matter how it reflects on one's country
2. The necessity for secrecy creates the risk of over-reliance on official information and manipulation of information provided to journalists.
3. The main issue regarding national security-media relations is how to strike a balance between national security and the public interest.
4. Leakers see it as information that brings accountability and transparency to government and exposes maladministration or corruption.
5. Governments have, over time, assumed the role of the sole interpreters of the public interest.
6. The media have had several issues with the security agencies over what is termed a "national security breach".
7. To a journalist, the questions are: how do we determine what national security is? Security for whom? Who is breaching what? By what means? and security at what time? At this juncture, the pose for thought is "Can a journalist be punished for publishing information considered to have been obtained illegally?"

Manipulation of the Official Secrets Act

The Freedom of Information (FOI) Act was passed into Law in 2011 to protect national security and to forestall the ugly trend of reporting falsehood. The media are aware of their responsibility to society in an era in which the trade-off between liberty and security is a crucial issue, “those who would sacrifice liberty for security deserve neither”¹¹⁵ by **BENJAMIN FRANKLIN**. Interestingly, the FOI Act has not significantly changed the situation of inadequate access to government information. All government agencies still operate within the ambit of the Official Secrets Act

Espionage

The media could serve as a threat to security by way of espionage by which a nation, organization or individuals employ to procure information concerning the interest of another country, to which they are not, by law, entitled.”¹¹⁶ National security is threatened by mass media as the media are increasingly internationalized in content. The media, along with independent civil society actors, play vital roles in monitoring security agencies. Lack of transparency and restrictions placed on the reporting of the activities, budgets, and expenditures of the security agencies are a major challenge. The government, on one hand, may restrict access to information or seek to co-opt journalists, while on the other hand, the media may risk internalizing official perspectives on perceived threats to national security.

Political Partisanship

The political elite sought the establishment and operation of the regional and state broadcast stations primarily for self-aggrandizement rather than for common interest. The media professionals collaborate with the politicians and the rich in their quest for money, power and fame. The political class has found it easy to impose its will on the media because of the challenges that media practitioners have faced in the course of discharging their duties. The media have not lived up to expectations in keeping to the path of honour due to nepotism, bribery or monetary inducement and blackmail.

Proprietorial Inclination

The Nigerian media are yet to exhibit maturity as they trivialize some sensitive national issues that can cause disaffection and disunity in the country. Most media houses use sensational headlines and publish stories that would attract public attention to make more sales and remain in business in the face of keen competition, in view of poor income, declining circulation sales and the general reading habit of Nigerians.

Corruption in the Media

The media are equally culpable of the corruption tag, though owing to systemic or societal influences. Brown envelope is another syndrome where journalists receive gratification to either suppress, plant or manipulate news items. The media have, in some cases, fallen under the influence of government, money bags, and religious bigots to colour or

outrightly disseminate falsehood. Most media professionals indulge in self-aggrandizement; hence, they cannot be trusted with objective reporting, especially when a salary is not paid for months and no hope for the benefit of long service or job security.

Poor Quality Journalism

Poor quality journalism sometimes allows disinformation and misinformation to originate in or leak into the real news system. Therefore, strong ethical journalism is needed as an alternative and antidote to the contamination of the information environment and the spill-over effect of tarnishing news more broadly.

The Way Forward

In resolving these issues, we have itemized below some measures:

National Legislation on Media

The FGN should have a well-articulated national legislation expressing the hopes and aspirations of the nation as well as the nation's perception of itself and social reality. Laws can hold technological companies accountable for the distribution of inaccurate information and online advertisements that allow fake news to spread. The legislation would also ensure that narrow partisan and sectional interests never exploit the poor situation to sow seeds of discord and disintegration.

Specialized Training and Education Programme

Journalists ideally should receive some specialized training and education in the subjects to complement their standard of professionalism. It is therefore not out of place if journalists can undergo Basic Intelligence Courses in our various Intelligence Schools. The major national newspapers and networks, as well as, few newspapers and local television stations, should have a military or intelligence expert on a permanent staff basis.

Accurate Reporting During a Crisis Situation

The media should develop standards of conduct in crisis coverage without exposing or compromising any sort of rescue operations. The National Union of Journalists with the National Broadcasting Corporation, could help in monitoring and enforcing acceptable professional practices and bring professional peer pressure on editors who have sent reporters into conflict areas, to increase rapid reaction capability. There should be a programme to expose the media to conditions of live counter-conflict operations and near-combat situations. Understanding what is going on in a conflict zone is critical in managing this often-complicated relationship.

Regular Conferences, Workshops and Briefings on National Security Issues

Regular workshops on conflict reporting, journalism ethics, mass media in a multi-cultural society, reporting terrorism,

and professionalism in journalism, among other topics, are essential to continually keep media workers abreast with trends in mass media use in combating insecurity in Nigeria.

Enhanced Synergy

The security agencies must soft pedal on the tradition of secrecy by making facts and data available to the media as and when due to avoid conflict between both parties. As professional journalists, they need to always cross-check or fact-check from official sources. Thus, for a responsible journalism practice, one must avoid fake news and hate speech. Therefore, to enhance the media's role in national security, security operatives should work in collaboration with media practitioners as watchdogs.

Enhancement of Rural Media

1. There is a need for the establishment of television viewership and radio listenership centres in rural areas.
2. The development of community-based media programmes should be encouraged, especially the establishment of radio stations.
3. The utilization of local indigenous languages should be encouraged in media communication and information dissemination.

Journalists Welfare Scheme

The welfare of journalists should be given serious attention, especially the provision of an insurance package which would encourage them to engage in dare-devil conflict reporting in the interest of the public. Again, the journalists'

pay package should be reviewed from time to time so that they eschew corruption or self-aggrandizement for objective reportage.

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RETHINKING INTELLIGENCE FUNDAMENTALS FOR A NEW INTELLIGENCE DOCTRINE


By Dr. Ubong Essien Umoh

INTRODUCTION

Intelligence may be understood as refined information aimed at evaluating the impact of specific policies or for the identification, evaluation and mitigation of specific threats. At the basics, intelligence has to do with information about a situation or a threat. It can be argued that intelligence uses all types of information but is geared essentially to penetrating those areas in which concealment and deception are endemic. Therefore, intelligence aims to produce accurate, timely, relevant and ideally actionable knowledge and insights into changes in the security environment.

INTELLIGENCE FUNDAMENTALS

This has to do with the basics of intelligence, which circumscribes the meaning, process and product of intelligence. It is generally framed as the intelligence cycle and has been the basis for understanding intelligence over the years. Intelligence is the product of an intelligence cycle. An intelligence cycle is an ongoing process in which information can be added to an evidentiary picture.



The cycle's intermediate process between collection and dissemination has been broken out into two steps, 'processing' and 'analysis', the former referring chiefly to the interpretation of data generated by collection activities and systems the latter identifying its implications for wider judgements and contextual issues that the collected 'raw' intelligence is supposed to clarify.

Also, the relatively narrow notion of 'tasking' has been generally supplanted by the broader notion of 'direction' within which the laying of requirements and priorities is but one part.

The Intelligence Cycle is "the process of developing raw information into finished intelligence for policymakers to use in decision making and action. There are five steps which constitute the Intelligence Cycle"¹¹⁷ **DCPAD (deecce-pad) Model;**

1. Direction

2. Collection
3. Processing
4. Analysis
5. Dissemination

. 1. Planning and Direction

This is management of the entire effort, from identifying the need for data to delivering an intelligence product to a consumer. It is the beginning and the end of the cycle--the beginning because it involves drawing up specific collection requirements, and the end. After all, finished intelligence, which supports policy decisions, generates new requirements. The whole process depends on guidance from public officials. Policymakers--the President, his aides, the National Security Council, and other major departments and agencies of government--initiate requests for intelligence.

2. Collection

This is the gathering of the raw information needed to produce finished intelligence. There are many sources of information, including open sources such as foreign broadcasts, newspapers, periodicals, and books. Open-source reporting is integral to the CIA's analytical capabilities. There are also secret sources of information. CIA's operations officers collect such information from agents abroad and from defectors who provide information obtainable in no other way. Finally, technical collection--electronics and satellite photography--plays an indispensable role in modern intelligence, such as

monitoring arms control agreements and providing direct support to military forces.

3. Processing

This involves converting the vast amount of information collected to a form usable by analysts through decryption, language translations, and data reduction.

4. All Source Analysis and Production

This is the conversion of basic information into finished intelligence. It includes integrating, evaluating, and analysing all available data--which is often fragmentary and even contradictory--and preparing intelligence products. Analysts, who are subject-matter specialists, consider the information's reliability, validity, and relevance. They integrate data into a coherent whole, put the evaluated information in context, and produce finished intelligence that includes assessments of events and judgments about the implications of the information.

5. Dissemination

The last step, which logically feeds into the first, is the distribution of the finished intelligence to the consumers, the same policymakers whose needs initiated the intelligence requirements. Finished intelligence is hand-carried daily to the President and key national security advisers. The policymakers, the recipients of finished intelligence, then make decisions based on the information, and these

decisions may lead to the levying of more requirements, thus triggering the Intelligence Cycle.

The Cee in the Deecee-pad model concerns sources (overt, covert) and methods (technical), while the P and A make for the “heart” of the intelligence process.

WALTER LIQUEUR’S¹¹⁸ ASSERTION

The first stage in the intelligence cycle is an indication by [intelligence] consumers of the kind of information needed. These needs are conveyed to senior intelligence officials, who in turn inform the collectors. The collectors then obtain information, then ‘raw’ intelligence is turned into finished intelligence, which is eventually supplied to consumers. While the five components of the intelligence cycle are essential activities, the ‘cycle’ or ‘process’ model does not fully represent their role or functionality

RETHINKING 1

Should the intelligence cycle represent a series of standard operating procedures (SOPs) or act as a conceptual framework that subsumes many different specific SOP schemata

RETHINKING 2

Should the intelligence cycle articulate a descriptive account of ‘doing’ intelligence? Or should it be a general conceptual expression of basic functions?

FROM COLLECTION TO DIRECTION

There are many situations where collection can and must 'push' information to the decision-makers to task it. The collection process can often provide opportunities for collectors to detect activities that are of significance to or threaten the concerns of the consumer, and which may not have occurred to the decision-maker to include in their requirements and priorities. Warning intelligence often takes this form.

Under these conditions there needs to be the opportunity for either for collection to short-circuit the processing and dissemination phases to present the evidence to the decision maker or for the collector to initiate the processing and dissemination cycle on their authority to ensure that the decision-maker receives a properly assessed product instead of raw reporting which may be misunderstood or taken out of context. This conforms to Michael Herman's alternative to the intelligence cycle in which 'entrepreneurial' intelligence collectors anticipate decision-maker needs and seize the initiative to push product to decision-makers.

FROM PROCESSING TO COLLECTION

Although typically the intelligence cycle represents tasking coming from the consumer and raw intelligence flowing to the analyst, the connection between analyst and collector can be reversed as the analyst may have to reach back to the raw intelligence reporting to assist their assessment process.

FROM ANALYSIS TO PROCESSING

The line between analyses has often been so thin, and fluidity permits a reverse osmotic process, sometimes getting to a high point where it is difficult to distinguish between the products of analysis and processing.

FROM DISSEMINATION TO ANALYSIS

Much as the analyst may need to reach back to the collector, so the drafter or briefer may need to mine down into the analytical judgments and reasoning undertaken in the possessing stage.

BETWEEN DISSEMINATION AND COLLECTION

Much as the analyst may often need to reach back into raw intelligence, the same may be true of the dissemination needing to consult with raw intelligence in order to aid the formulation and delivery of the finished intelligence product to the consumer. In this case, there must be provision for reach-back from Dissemination to Collection as and when required.

BETWEEN PROCESSING AND DIRECTION

In division-of-labour terms, the separation between dissemination and analysis often collapses when analysts double as drafters and briefers based on their work or that of their team

Moreover, the history of intelligence is replete with examples of consumers not merely passively receiving finished

intelligence products but insisting on being able to reach back into the analytical process and the combination of reporting and judgments that prompted the appreciation presented to them.

FROM DIRECTION TO DISSEMINATION TO ANALYSIS TO PROCESSING TO COLLECTION

While it might seem counterintuitive, the DCPAD cycle can run backwards, and often does. The intelligence cycle may appear to be a simple process of following one step at a time, but these steps may overlap, double back and jump over each other.

HIGHLIGHT OF CHALLENGES

1. Bureaucratic Inertia
2. The meticulousness in processing
3. Organizational culture
4. Professional standards

NESTED OR OVERLAPPING INTELLIGENCE CYCLE

The outcome is a nested or overlapping intelligence cycle that does not follow a linear cyclical pattern but is directed by priority and emergencies. This results in the concept of 'wheels within wheels', which challenges the rigid oversimplification of the traditional intelligence cycle. Based on this rethinking, one could 'break out' a core functions process from within each DCPAD. Thus, while the intelligence cycle outwardly appears to be a simple process,

in reality, it is a complex set of activities. It is a continuous process comprising many cycles operating at different levels and speeds. Although the 5 individual tasks are discrete, as information flows and is processed and disseminated as intelligence, the tasks overlap and coincide so that they are often conducted concurrently, rather than sequentially

1. DCPAD within Collection
2. DCPAD within Processing
3. DCPAD within Analysis
4. DCPAD within Direction and Dissemination
5. However, a common denominator is required for all!

This culminates in making for an intelligence web rather than a cycle.

E. H. CARR'S THESIS

No document can tell us more than what the author of the document thought-what he thought had happened, what he thought ought to happen or would happen, or perhaps only what he wanted others to think he thought, or even only what he thought he thought.

DOCTRINE

1. A doctrine is expected to articulate common operating standards as well as common concepts
2. Doctrine has always been a moving target
3. Is doctrine 'what is taught' or 'what is believed', or as Lt. Gen. John Kiszely has put it, 'what to think' as opposed to 'how to think'
4. In most cases, doctrine most likely ends up as the latter even if intended to be the former.

The formative perception of doctrine amongst many service personnel is precisely as a guide to specific procedures and practices

J.F.C. FULLER'S THESIS

The danger of a doctrine is that it is apt to ossify into dogma. No matter how sound an intelligence doctrine is, it should undergo regular and periodic scrutiny because of wide-ranging and accelerating changes in the intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) environment. To be useful, intelligence must be adequate, timely, and accurate. It must be well coordinated, quickly and properly disseminated, and considered by decision makers in a careful context of values and objectives.

POSER

Is intelligence meant to support policy or inform policy? The overriding need, aim, purpose and emphasis are KNOWLEDGE in a rapidly changing security environment

SUN TZU'S THESIS

If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained, you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle

RUMSFELD'S DOMAIN OF THE KNOWNS¹¹⁹

There are things we know we know; we call it the known known

There are things we know we do not know, we call it the known unknown

There are things we do not know we know; we call it the unknown known

There are things we do not know we do not know, we call it the unknown unknown

CONCLUSION

The contemporary security environment is violent, uncertain, complex and ambiguous (VUCA). Consequently, intelligence fundamentals have to modify their rather rigid flow process to meet a rapidly evolving security environment. The central argument reflects again that the fundamentals of intelligence circumscribed in the intelligence cycle neither accurately reflect the intelligence process nor accommodate important elements of it, such as covert action, counter-intelligence and oversight.

Consequently, the intelligence cycle needs a cycle as much as our doctrine needs a doctrine.

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INTELLIGENCE GATHERING ANALYSIS AND INVESTIGATION IN THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM, INSURGENCY, AND ORGANIZED CRIME

By Maj Gen B. M. Shafa


INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this discourse is to examine intelligence gathering, analysis and investigation in the fight against terrorism, insurgency and organized crimes in Nigeria. We intend to also highlight strategies to improve intelligence gathering, analysis and investigation in counter terrorism, insurgency and organized crime in Nigeria. Terrorism connotes the calculated use of violence or the threat of violence to achieve political, religious or ideological goals. Insurgency is an organized armed struggle aimed at weakening the authority of a country in order to force a political change through the propagation of extremist ideology. It is any large-scale and complex criminal activity carried out by a group of persons for the enrichment of participants at the expense of the community.

Map Showing the Continents



The Intelligence Cycle



Analysis involves meticulous investigation of items of information collected about an adversary to establish its relevance to the intelligence requirement

CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATIONS

Terrorism

The US State Department of Law Enforcement and Counter-Terrorist Agencies defined terrorism as “Premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience”¹²⁰. It is also ‘the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives. Terrorism is also “an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by semi-clandestine individual, group or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby, in contrast to assassination, the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. Terrorism can be in the form of: civil disorder, political terrorism, non-political terrorism, quasi terrorism, limited terrorism, official or state terrorism, criminal terrorism, and pathological terrorism.

CATEGORIES OF TERRORISM

- a. **Domestic Terrorism;** Domestic terrorism or homegrown terrorism is a form of terrorism in which victims "within a country are targeted by a perpetrator with the same citizenship" as the victims.¹²¹
- b. **International Terrorism:** Violent, criminal acts committed by individuals and/or groups who are

inspired by, or associated with, designated foreign terrorist organizations or nations (state-sponsored).¹²²

CHARACTERISTICS OF TERRORISM

1. **Organization:** Organization is one of the hallmarks of any terrorist group. Antecedents indicate that terrorists are a group of people who are well-focused and organized with the accurate aim at a particular target.
2. **Secrecy:** The activities or operations of terrorist organizations, including communications, are conducted under the condition of secrecy. This is one of the reasons terrorist groups are organized into cells, with each unit separated from the other
3. **Violent approach:** Terrorists share a belief that violence is the most appropriate way to achieve any objective. Operational activities of terrorists include unleashing terror and violence to disrupt and create an atmosphere of tension.
4. **Radical ideology:** A Terrorist group is always driven by a particular ideology. Studies have shown that most terrorists are people with ideas or actions that are extreme, unthinkable, unreasonable and unacceptable to the government and its citizens.
5. **Networking:** Terrorist groups maintain strong cooperation and synergy and could swap or borrow fighters sometimes. They also train together, share ideas and intelligence.

Insurgency

The United Nations Department of Defence defined insurgency as “An organized movement aimed to overthrow a constituted government through the use of subversion and

armed conflict”¹²³. The term insurgency is historically restricted to rebellious acts that did not reach the proportions of an organized revolution. It has subsequently been applied to any such armed uprising, typically guerrilla in character, against the recognized government of a state or country.”¹²⁴ An organized armed rebellion by a section of the population against the legally constituted government, with the support or sympathy of the bulk of the local population obtained voluntarily or by coercion. Insurgency referred no longer only to acts of violence on a limited scale but to operations that extended to a whole country and lasted for a considerable period. The insurgents attempted to win popular support for the rebel cause, while the threatened government sought to counter the efforts of the rebels. In such contests, military operations were closely connected with political, economic, social, and psychological means, more so than either in conventional warfare or in insurgencies of an earlier period.¹²⁵

THE TACTICS AND STRATEGIES OF INSURGENTS

Insurgent tactics include assassinations, kidnapping, murder, torture and blackmail to coerce terrorism, subversion, propaganda, military pressure and intimidation. In pursuit of its goals, the activist minority that forms the hard core of the attempt to overthrow the government will try to recruit a limited number of people for direct participation in their movement and to mobilize a large part of the total population as supporters and occasional helpers.

The leaders of the insurgency will also make intensive use of propaganda to secure international sympathy and support. The attacked government is expected to lose the will to resist long before it has exhausted the material resources that allow it to remain in power.

This strategy emphasises popular support, from which flow important tactical principles. In an insurgency, an activist minority counts on outlasting the government in a protracted struggle with the support of the population. The insurgents use terror tactics primarily and other guerrilla operations such as sabotage, ambushes, and raids.

Insurgents operate initially at the periphery of the governmental system, in the hope that they will slowly destroy the government's will to resist. Insurgencies rarely engulf the whole country in armed clashes. Their leaders seek out targets of opportunity when and where they can inflict maximum damage on their enemy at the lowest cost to themselves. In an insurgency, an activist minority tries to mobilize the population in support of its goals.

CHARACTERISTICS OF INSURGENCY

1. **Organization:** Organization is one of the major characteristics that enable insurgents to carry out their activities effectively. Insurgents often create parallel hierarchies to compete with government institutions
2. **External Support:** Insurgents seek external support from states and like-minded ideological groups across states. The supports could be moral, political, material or sanctuary in nature

3. **Difficult Terrain:** Insurgents are known to live and take advantage of difficult terrain as their operational base. History indicates that successful guerrilla warfare could be waged from rugged terrain like mountains, jungles and swamps

FORM OF ASSISTANCE TO INSURGENTS

Insurgents may receive many forms of support, but the impact of this assistance varies, like financial support, food and medical supplies, arms, ammunition, training, military advice, fire support for combat units, and sanctuary. Some forms of the support allow insurgencies to survive ferocious government onslaught or to weather a decrease in popular support. Other types, while useful, contribute far less to the overall success of the movement. To be successful, insurgent movements have a variety of requirements, most of which can be grouped into two categories – human and material. In general, insurgents most need outside support of all kinds when they cannot obtain this support domestically. In some instances, a dependency on state sponsors can have devastating consequences. A regime's goals and priorities are likely to change over time, and in some cases, a state will abandon an insurgency to take advantage of new strategic opportunities.

CRITICAL FORMS OF SUPPORT

Safe Haven and Transit

Safe havens, whether inside the country where the insurgents operate or across international boundaries, are

essential to the success of any guerrilla movement. Sanctuaries protect the group's leadership and members; provide a place where insurgents can rest, recuperate, and plan future operations; serve as a staging area from which to mount attacks; and, in some cases, function as an additional base for recruitment, training, dissemination of propaganda, and contact with the outside world. Such sanctuary allows guerrillas and their commanders to organize, train, recruit, plan, recuperate, and otherwise conduct essential operations outside the reach of the targeted state. Without a haven, insurgencies are constantly vulnerable to government forces.

Financial Resources

Money has a powerful effect on insurgent movements: It can be used to buy weapons, bribe local officials, pay operatives, write propaganda, provide a social network that builds a popular base, and otherwise fulfil myriad purposes. Insurgents are often able to acquire some of what they need via theft or from local supporters. However, they also require cash to acquire safe houses, procure weapons and ammunition, pay bribes, meet legal expenses, and, in some cases, pay stipends to militants. Some of these funds can be generated internally, through bank robberies, kidnappings.

Political Support and Propaganda

State patrons often provide important political support for insurgent movements. Cataloguing the entire range of this type of backing is beyond the scope of this study. However, this span includes everything from giving insurgents access

to the state's diplomatic apparatus and pushing for recognition in international fora, to encouraging aid agencies to assist the group directly, to otherwise underwriting insurgent causes by portraying and lobbying for them as a legitimate voice of a particular people or ideology. Moreover, political support often involves denying assistance to the government that the insurgents oppose. Diasporas, at times, indirectly contribute to state political support, using their electoral or financial clout to encourage their host governments to back an insurgency or oppose government counterinsurgency campaigns. Political support often has important consequences, both seen and unseen.

Propaganda is a critical instrument for generating political support and fundraising for every contemporary insurgent movement, both within its theatre of operations and among a broader international audience. Effective propaganda can help legitimize insurgent goals, aid in fundraising and recruitment activities, discredit opposing governments, and internationalize the armed struggle by bringing a movement's message to a broader audience.

States often assist insurgents in generating propaganda, helping rebel groups portray themselves as innocent victims who deserve assistance. Outside support can help make insurgent propaganda more potent in at least two ways. First, external actors can provide the technical expertise and resources that underground groups lack. States may provide insurgents with useful access to radio, television, the Internet and other media through which they can effectively spread

their message. Second, and more importantly, sympathetic states, front groups, ideological sympathizers, and diaspora members can serve as transmission belts for insurgent propaganda. Governments battling insurgencies are likely to find it far more difficult to control the propaganda activities carried out by proxies, supporters, and state sponsors across international borders.

Direct Military Support

States at times provide direct military support, using their armies to fight alongside insurgents. Not surprisingly, such direct assistance is rare, but when it occurs, it usually has a tremendous impact on the fighting. Outside military forces fundamentally change the nature of an insurgency's struggle. No longer is it a battle of guerrillas against armies while rival institutions compete for the loyalty and cooperation of the populace. When states step in, the confrontation becomes more comparable to an interstate war than a civil conflict. Armies fight directly in conventional clashes, while guerrilla conflict often assumes secondary importance. The level of weaponry increases tremendously, from small arms to advanced air and land systems. The insurgents are also far more likely to be able to conduct massive and coordinated conventional attacks, enabling them to occupy territory, outgun and outmanoeuvre rival forces, and otherwise conduct operations that were previously beyond their capabilities.

In general, state forces are better armed, organized, and led, and typically more able to conduct sophisticated operations.

As a result, the scope and scale of insurgent capabilities can increase exponentially, allowing previously weak groups that simply sought to survive to develop into a genuine security threat.

Valuable Forms of Support

Training

To become effective on the battlefield, militants must be given weapons training and instruction in small-unit tactics. Although this is often provided by the militants themselves, the relevant training skills are not always available in-house. On some occasions, insurgents must turn to outsiders for support. Particularly in the early days of a conflict, the group may lack a cadre of skilled, experienced fighters who can pass on their knowledge to recruits. In addition, training is often required in the case of more specialised techniques, much as terrorist tradecraft, small-unit tactics, and the use of more exotic weapons.

Minor Forms of Support

Fighters

Skilled, dedicated, and experienced fighters are the fundamental requirement of any successful rebel movement. By definition, insurgencies are protracted political-military campaigns involving the use of irregular forces. To achieve their objectives, insurgent movements need sufficient numbers of motivated combatants capable of performing credibly against government security forces and, in some

cases, anti-insurgent paramilitary entities. Recruiting suitable manpower will be a concern at each stage of the insurgency. If government forces are proficient, they will inflict casualties.

Counterintelligence operations, psychological operations, civic action, and other components of a well-crafted and well-executed counterinsurgency effort are also likely to deplete guerrilla ranks. Even when counterinsurgency efforts are poor, arrests, defections, simple exhaustion, and, in some cases, diminished commitment to the cause will also serve to reduce the number of combatants. Foreigners often directly aid insurgents by providing additional manpower to supplement native insurgents. The participations of foreign combatants contribute to the insurgents' goal of internationalizing their armed struggle and provides additional manpower to the native insurgents (see Engelberg, 2001, p. 1)¹²⁶. The involvement of guest militants offers concrete evidence that these insurgencies are more than mere local conflicts, but were part of a regional or global campaign.

Intelligence

To be effective, it is essential for any insurgent movement to understand the nature, objectives, and capabilities of its adversaries. This understanding includes the size and composition of security forces, the strengths and weaknesses of the opposition's leadership and strategy, and the level of the population's support for the underground movement as well as the government. In some instances, insurgents may

turn to outsiders to provide intelligence that is difficult or costly to acquire themselves. Outside provision of intelligence, however, is seldom decisive and often of only limited value. With most movements, the insurgents themselves have better information on local conditions than any outside sponsors or supporters could provide. In any clandestine movement, members are also part-time intelligence agents, operating among the population, gathering information, and conveying it to higher authorities. Insurgents typically are able to draw on a large network of informants and local sympathizers who can provide information useful to the cause.

Organizational Aid

When outsiders help an insurgency organize, the group is often better able to attract recruits, sustain operations, or otherwise perform basic functions essential to long-term success. Such assistance is particularly important in the early days of an insurgency. Governments often provide insurgent groups with organizational aid that takes many forms: attempts to broker deals among different organizational factions, assistance with recruitment, provision of financial incentives to encourage cooperation among opposition rivals, dissemination of lessons learned from previous insurgencies, and facilitation of propaganda.

Inspiration

Inspiration from abroad often helps get an insurgent movement off the ground, but seldom sustains it for long.

Marxism, Islamic radicalism, and other transnational credos have often inspired insurgents, encouraging them to resist government and transform society. In addition, the success of an ethnic group in advancing its cause in one country can convince other organizations in the same country or in neighbouring areas that they can change their status in society and that violence can be an effective tool¹²⁷ Sometimes a state's rhetoric or experience will inspire insurgents even when other forms of aid are limited. Such indirect support can demonstrate the viability of armed resistance, offer a particular organizing model, or illustrate the force of ideas. Even when it does not materialize, the hope of outside backing can make rebellion more likely.

1. Organized Crime

Organized crime is any large-scale and complex criminal activity carried out by groups of persons for the enrichment of participants at the expense of the community; a group of individuals with an identified hierarchy, or comparable structure, engaged in significant criminal activity. A crime committed by criminal organizations that use systematic violence and corruption to facilitate their criminal activities. A violence-prone, profit-oriented clandestine organization that provides, on a black market, illegal services or illegally obtained licit or illicit products for which there is a substantial demand, but one that governments or regular free market operators do not or cannot meet.

2. Intelligence Gathering

It is knowledge acquired by the collection, evaluation, analysis, integration, and interpretation of all available information concerning a possible or actual enemy or areas of operations, including weather and terrain. It includes deductions concerning current and future enemy capabilities, vulnerabilities, and probable courses of action which can affect the accomplishment of any mission. It is used as a basis for all operational plans and estimates.

Good Intelligence

Every good intelligence is anticipatory, timely, accurate, usable, complete, relevant objective and available. Its objectives are to reduce to a minimum all uncertainties regarding the enemy, weather, and terrain, assist the commander in making a decision and the troops in executing their missions; and also assist the commander in applying counterterrorism and counterinsurgency measures that will help to destroy the effectiveness of the adversaries.

Levels of Intelligence

a. Strategic Intelligence

The intelligence available to senior military and civilian leaders to develop national strategy and policy; Monitoring of international or global situation; assisting in developing military plans; assisting in determining major weapon systems and force structure requirements; and supporting the conduct of strategic operations

. Operational Intelligence

This is the intelligence available to theatre commander, subordinate force commanders and component commanders that focuses on military capabilities and intentions of enemies and adversaries, the analysis of the operational environment, and identifies adversary centres of gravity and critical vulnerabilities, monitoring events in the force commander's area of interest, and support the planning and conduct of joint campaigns

c. Tactical Intelligence

This is the intelligence available to tactical commanders. It supports planning and the execution of battles, engagements, and other combat activities, and provides commanders with information on imminent threats to their forces and changes in the operational environment, as well as obstacle intelligence

3. Analysis

Data and information on terrorism, insurgency and organized crime are of no use if they are not properly analysed or interpreted to meet the commander's intelligence requirements. "Analysis is the breaking down of a large problem into several smaller problems and performing mental operations on the data to arrive at a conclusion or generalization."¹²⁸ The process of breaking down a problem into its parts and studying the elements separately, to determine the extent to which they conform,

supplement or contradict each other and to establish accepted facts and relationships. The close examination of raw data, facts, statements, opinions and ideas, which are converted through a systematic, logical, reasoned thought process, into an intelligence picture or prediction that can be disseminated to those who need it

Characteristics of a Good Analyst

- a. Objectivity
- b. Broad perspective
- c. Effective communication

a. Objectivity

- i. Is the intelligence analyst's primary asset in creating intelligence that meets the facts, findings and forecast?
- ii. An Analyst presents a credible base of evidence to support the intelligence interpretation that he or she makes.
- iii. He must learn to eliminate bias to obtain accurate and reliable results or outcomes.

b. Broad Perspective

An analyst must be broad-minded with good background knowledge of information on any given subject. This is because he may need to draw upon a ready base of information when faced with new and unpredictable situations. An analyst must therefore keep background knowledge current and constantly broaden their personal knowledge base, and must learn to process information effectively to fulfil current needs and be able to assess the information for future requirements.

c. Effective Communication

- i. An analyst must learn to be effective in speech-making and writing. He must be lucid, prepared and articulate.
- ii. The intelligence product could take the form of a written document, a briefing or a simple verbal response to questions.
- iii. The highest quality analysis may be produced in vain if it cannot be effectively packaged and transmitted.
- iv. Ineffective communication could mar a well-analysed subject matter and therefore should be avoided.

4. Investigation

An investigation is required to determine the suspect's identification and possible links to crime networks. It is used to identify the underlying deficiencies in processes and procedures, raise public awareness of an incident or solution, analyse and monitor trends of attack and gather relevant data to provide information

Features of Criminal Investigation

a. Information management

It is the Act of proper organization and administration of data and statistics on a particular incident, effective and efficient collection, collation, analysis and evaluation of facts, details or evidence obtained at the scene of the incident or from other secondary sources

b. Handling of evidence

An investigator must carefully and promptly recognize any available evidence(s) which should be securely protected in case of need, and this may be a statement or physical item

c. Incident scene management

Incident scene refers to the place or location where the event being investigated occurred. This should be adequately managed to prevent crisis escalation and to avoid destruction of the incident evidence.

Nexus Between Terrorism, Insurgency, and Organized Crime

Terrorism, insurgency and organized crime became increasingly blurred, such that differentiating them can be counterproductive. The relationship between terrorism, insurgency and organized crime has evolved into something more complex and as such, the groups are increasingly becoming hybrid organizations. Insurgency and organized crime groups use similar tactics, strategies or violent means, which is often underlined as the defining feature of a terrorist group.

Threat Emanating from Links Between Terrorism, Insurgency, and Organized Crime

The potential exploitation of organized crime groups' infrastructures to procure tools, such as firearms and other materials that will be required by terrorist organizations to carry out attacks. And also, the use of organized crime actors to generate funds for terrorism-related activities.

Platforms for Intelligence Gathering

1. Human Intelligence (Humint)
2. Technical Intelligence (Techint)

3. Signal Intelligence (Sigint)
4. Imagery Intelligence (Imint)
5. Measurement And Signatures Intelligence (Masint)

HUMINT

HUMINT is the collection of information from human sources. This is most reliable because of the ability to physically confirm information. HUMINT is done through overt or covert means.

Overt HUMINT Activities

1. Exploiting open source/ unclassified publications
2. Conference materials
3. Congressional hearings
4. Extracting useful information from arrested terrorists, insurgents and organized criminals
5. Debriefing of victims of these criminals

TECHINT

TECHINT is derived from the collection, processing, analysis, and exploitation of data and information on foreign equipment and materiel designed to neutralize an adversary's technological advantages

SIGINT

SIGINT is derived from signal intercepts comprising, either individually or in combination, all communications intelligence (COMINT), electronic intelligence (ELINT), and foreign instrumentation signals intelligence (FISINT).

IMINT

It is a product of imagery analysis. Imagery includes representations of objects reproduced electronically or by optical means on film, electronic display devices, or other media.

MASINT

MASINT includes the advanced processing and use of data gathered from overhead and airborne IMINT and SIGINT collection systems.

Defence Intelligence Agency Architecture/Network in Combating Terrorism, Insurgency, and Organized Crime in Nigeria

The Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) was established vide Decree 19 of 1986 (now CAP No. 273 of the Laws of the Federation, 2004 as amended) as a member of the Intelligence Community.

The Membership of the intelligence community is are Joint Intelligence Board (JIB), the National Security Council (NSC), the National Defence Council (NDC), and the Intelligence Community Committee (ICC)

Intelligence Support to Armed Forces

HUMINT Platforms Emplaced by DIA to Support the AFN are; the State cells, the Special Intelligence cells, the Operation SCANNER, the Operation LONG HAUL, the DA System, the Joint Intelligence Fusion Centre (JIFC), the Joint

Intelligence Centre (JIC), the Central Situation Room, and the DIA State Cells

Military Operations Across the Country were the Operation LAFIYA DOLE, the Operation THUNDER STRIKE, the Operation HADARIN DAJI, the Operation SAFE CORRIDOR, the Operation WHIRL STROKE, the Operation SAFE HAVEN, the Operation AWATSE, the Operation DELTA SAFE, and the Operation Scanner

DIA maintains a 24-hour localized surveillance unit, Operation SCANNER, that monitors and reports on the security situation in the Federal Capital Territory (FCT). The purpose of Operation SCANNER is to provide timely and actionable intelligence that would guarantee the protection of VIPs, key/vulnerable installations and public institutions in the FCT

Operation LONG HAUL is an operation involving credible CJTF under the watch of DIA Cells in conjunction with military formations and units to hunt and arrest BHT elements escaping from the North East. Similarly, Operation SHIRWA was established and dedicated to tracking and arresting BHT key leaders in the North East.

Joint Intelligence Fusion Centre is Established as an effective and efficient mechanism to exchange information and intelligence, maximize resources, streamline operations, and improve the ability to fight crime and terrorism by merging data from a variety of sources; to maximize the agencies' ability to detect and respond to national security threats; and

to Provide platform for intelligence sharing and collaboration among security agencies.

The Central Situation Room is established to tackle the challenges of Herdsmen/Farmers clashes in Benue State, Jukun/Tiv clashes in Taraba State, as well as militia/armed bandit attacks within the other North Central States. It was commissioned on 17 May 2018 and is domiciled at the Operations room HQ DIA. The CSR is directly under the coordination of the DOps and serves as a fusion centre with representatives from the NN, NAF, NSCDC, DSS, NIA and staff of the Agency.

The Joint Intelligence Centre was established to deliberate on the security situation across the country. Domiciled at HQ DIA. Meets every Wednesday to brainstorm and forward weekly report to DHQ for CDS action, under the coordination of the DOps with representatives from the NA, NN, NAF, Police, NSCDC, Customs, ONSA and staff of the Agency.

Challenges of Intelligence Gathering, Analysis, and Investigation in Nigeria

Some of the challenges confronting the unit were dearth of trained intelligence collectors, as most of their trained intelligence officers lost their lives on the process of their duties; absence of a national policy to guide intelligence gathering and analysis, poor intelligence analysis capability, hence, some of the officers lack capabilities to perform well due to some inefficiencies on their part and also on the part

of the policies that guild their operation. Also lack of objectivity by the analyst and a qualified investigator. Their trainings are sometimes not well harmonized to a standardized form to profound the necessary acumen required. There is also poor intelligence sharing among security agencies due to some inter-agency rivalry. This makes them lack cooperation within the agencies. Low capacity of the national identity management commission is also another impending factor.

Strategies to Improve Intelligence Gathering, Analysis, and Investigation in the Fight Against Terrorism, Insurgency, and Organized Crime in Nigeria

i. Training of Personnel on Intelligence Collection and Analysis

Intelligence services could devote more effort to the training of personnel in these areas to acquire the needed expertise to handle issues of collection and analysis

ii. Improved Synergy Amongst Intelligence Agencies

This brings to the fore the need for the FG to compel intelligence agencies to collaborate and share information based on their areas of competency

iii. Harmonisation of Training Standards

It would bring about a cordial multi-agency relationship and thereby significantly eliminate mutual suspicion in the ongoing COIN and CT operations

iv. Expanding the Scope of the Intelligence Function

Intelligence must necessarily monitor and secure all contemporary sources of threats, even as it maximally exploits modern technology for effective intelligence operations

v. Improved Mutual Trust, Understanding, and Planning Processes

Comprehensive planning will facilitate the avoidance of the failure of most crises management efforts in Nigeria due to lack of adequate cohesive planning among stakeholders before, during and after the conduct of any COIN and CT operations

vi. Centralised Command and Improved Intelligence Gathering

All agencies are able to perform their tasks to the best of their abilities, while prompt execution of assigned tasks is facilitated. Security of joint operations depends on timely and accurate information and intelligence

vii. Intelligence Sharing with Contiguous Neighbours

There is the need for the various apparatuses to share intelligence among one another and coordinate their responses to such intelligence. There is also the need to respond effectively to the BHT/ISWAP challenge, seeking the cooperation of other security outfits within the neighbouring countries. They also need to elicit the cooperation of local communities in the affected areas of their operations.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the relationship between intelligence gathering and effectively combating insurgency is clear. Indeed, you need accurate intelligence to mitigate and counter insurgents' manoeuvres in a given social context. Accurate intelligence determines combat planning, strategies and complex operations. Without intelligence, therefore, it would be difficult to proceed with solutions to counter insurgency.

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ANALYTIC THINKING AND PRESENTATION FOR INTELLIGENCE PRODUCERS

By Dr Caroline O. Emeka-Ogbonna

INTRODUCTION

Intelligence is not the formulator of objectives; it is not the drafter of policy; it is not the maker of plans; it is not the carrier out of operations; it is rather the ancillary to these. It is the ability to learn or understand or to deal with new or trying situations, the skilled use of reason, and the ability to apply knowledge to manipulate one's environment or to think abstractly as measured by objective criteria. The mental acuteness and the act of understanding are therefore related. Its job is to see that the doers are generally well-informed; its job is to stand behind them with the book opened at the right page, to call their attention to the stubborn fact they may be neglecting, and—at their request—to analyse alternative courses without indicating choice.

Intelligence cannot serve if it does not know the doers' minds; it cannot serve if it has not their confidence; it cannot serve unless it can have the kind of guidance [and confidence any professional man must have from his client. Intelligence is knowledge; a bulk and assortment of knowledge; a special category of knowledge upon which nations base their high-level national and foreign policies. It, therefore, entails all knowledge of domestic scenes, all knowledge which lies

behind the police and military functions, all knowledge necessary for the defence of our country and its ideals. It is both the constructive knowledge with which we can work towards peace and freedom throughout the world, and knowledge indispensable to a nation's welfare and security.

WHAT IS INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION?

Intelligence production is therefore the cultivation of the two key specialisms of "surveillance" and "research" in devotion to the production of knowledge. National policies are aimed at either surviving in a world of competing states or serving defensive-protective purposes necessary for countering the policies of other states which are inimical to their national aspirations. As a result, the framers, planners, and implementers of such policies need a great deal of knowledge which is complete, which is accurate, which is delivered on time, and which is capable of serving as a basis for action.

The most important phase of the intelligence business, therefore, is a proper relationship between intelligence producers and the consumers who use their product. A proper relationship between intelligence producers and consumers is one of the utmost delicacies. This is because "without proper guidance and the confidence which goes with it, intelligence cannot produce the appropriate kind of knowledge"¹²⁹ When intelligence is improperly guided, the knowledge which it purveys may be inapplicable to the use it is supposed to serve, incomplete, inaccurate, and late. On the other hand, when intelligence errs, there seems to be less

tolerance of its error than there is for the error of other mistaken specialists. In the face of the foregoing, it is vital to dedicate time, resources and effort to improve the cognitive process of analysis done by intelligence producers.

FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYTIC THINKING AND PRESENTATION

A comprehensive approach to critical thinking is promoted by the California-based Foundation for Critical Thinking, with a framework adopted by the Intelligence Community and many other security institutions for teaching critical thinking. This approach is both active, meaning it makes users think about their thinking process (i.e., meta-cognition), and it is systematic, meaning it provides a framework users can adapt for any critical thinking situation.

The critical thinking framework is based on elements of thought, which are purpose, question, information, point of view, assumptions, concepts, interpretations/inferences, and implications/consequences. These can be categorized in three main stages; “observe the problem to build rational knowledge, ask questions to analyse and evaluate data, and find answers to the questions that can be formulated into a solution”¹³⁰ The Elements of Thought are used in conjunction with a set of Intellectual Standards which allow a check of the quality of the overall analysis, and assists the user in preparing quality written or oral presentations of their analytic results.

EIGHT QUESTIONS THAT SHOULD BE ROUTINELY ASKED WHEN WE UNDERSTAND THE ELEMENTS OF REASONING

1. What is the main purpose of the reasoning?
2. What are the key issues, problems, and questions being addressed?
3. What is the most important information being used?
4. What main inferences are embedded in the reasoning?
5. What are the key concepts guiding the reasoning?
6. What assumptions are being used?
7. What are the positive and negative implications?
8. What point of view is/should be represented?

What exactly is the problem? Study the problem to make clear the kind of problem you are dealing with. Figure out, for example, what sorts of things you are going to have to do to solve it. Distinguish problems over which you have some control from problems over which you have no control. Pay special attention to controversial issues in which it is essential to consider multiple points of view. Analysing the Logic of an Issue or Problem (Elder & Paul, 2016)¹³¹, identify a problem you need to reason through. Then complete the following:

1. The key Question(s) that emerge from the problem is/are...

State the questions as clearly and precisely as you can. Details are very important. Re Intellectual Standards: Is the question significant, is it important, is there another way to

look at it? Are there subsequent questions that emerge?
(Depth and breadth)

2. My Purpose in addressing the problem is...

Know exactly what you are after. Make sure you are not operating with a hidden agenda and that you're announced and real purposes are the same. Re Intellectual Standards: Is the purpose clear, accurate, and precise?

3. Actively seek the Information most relevant to the question. Include in that information options for action, both short-term and long-term. Recognize limitations in terms of power, time and money. Re Intellectual Standards:

- i. Is the information accurate? How do you know?
(accuracy)
- ii. Is it clear? Is there any example? would something else help to clarify? (Clarify)
- iii. Are more details necessary? (Precision)
- iv. Do you know where the information came from?
(Credibility)
- v. Are there any contradictions in the information?
(Logic)

4. Some important Assumptions I am using in my thinking are...

Figure out what you are taking for granted. Watch out for self-serving or unjustified assumptions. Re Intellectual Standards:

- i. Are there any problems that arise from these assumptions?
- ii. Does the assumption seem warranted? (Very likely to be true and realistic)
- iii. Would the consumer have any different assumptions?

5. If we solve this Problem, Some Important Implications are...

If we fail to solve this problem, some important implications are...

Evaluate options, taking into account the advantages of possible decisions before acting. What consequences are likely to follow from this or the other decision?

- i. What consequences are likely to follow if I take a line of reasoning seriously? Pursue the logical implications of the position, both overt and covert.
- ii. What are the implications of the implications? (Ripple effects)
- iii. If we fail to accept this line of reasoning, the Implications are... (What consequences are likely to follow if reasoning is ignored?)

6. The most important Concepts, theories, or Ideas I need to use in my thinking are...

Figure out all significant ideas needed to understand and solve the problem. You may need to analyse these concepts, and use a good dictionary

- i. What are the most important ideas that need to be known to understand the line of reasoning? Then briefly elaborate on what these ideas mean.
- ii. Are the concepts clear and precise? Is there any possibility they mean something different to the consumer?

7. The Point(s) of View is/are as follows...

Know the point of view from which your thinking begins. Be especially careful to determine whether multiple points of view are relevant.

- i. What other point of view (POVs), if any, are relevant or should be considered? (Fairness, breadth and significance)
- ii. Is this POV influenced by any assumptions that are being treated as fact?

8. After reasoning through the parts of thinking above, the best solution (conclusion) to the problem is...

If the problem involves multiple conflicting points of view, you will have to assess which solution is the best. If the problem is one-dimensional, there may be just one “correct” solution

- i. To what extent does the data support the conclusion?
- ii. Are there other reasonable inferences or conclusions to consider?
- iii. Are the conclusions logical? Are there any contradictions?

SUBSTANTIVE WRITING

Substantive writing entails the ability to identify important ideas and express significant implications of those ideas in clear and precise writing. Substantive writers apply Intellectual Skills and take ownership of what they reason and write. They write to clearly and accurately analyse and evaluate ideas in texts and their thinking to become more clear, precise, accurate, relevant, deep, broad, logical and significant as a disciplined thinker. Therefore,

To learn how to write something worth reading, one must keep two questions in mind. Is the subject or idea worth writing about? And what is there of significance to say about it? Having recognized possible variations in purpose, we also recognized that there are writing tools and skills for writing about anything substantive, for targeting ideas of depth and significance. These tools and skills are the focus of this series.”¹³²

THE LOGIC OF SUBSTANTIVE WRITING

1. **Purpose:** To communicate important concepts and ideas to a particular audience
2. **Question:** How can I approach my writing so that I communicate my ideas to my target audience?
3. **Information:** Information about the assumptions, points of view, and general knowledge of the issue, information about the characteristics of good writing, information relevant to the thesis of y writing, information about how to effectively communicate ideas in writing.
4. **Inferences/Interpretations:** Interpretations of the information we gather, conclusions we come to about the issues, about the assumptions we brought to the

issues, about the various points of views relevant to the issue, about the background knowledge of the target audience, Interpretations about the best ways to approach the issue to communicate the key ideas to the target audience, interpretations of the information which form the key ideas of the issue, key conclusions I am trying to communicate to the audience.

5. **Concepts:** All the key concepts essential to developing my main points, all the key ideas about how to write well that I use in thinking through my main points and how to express them.
6. **Assumptions:** That the ideas I am communicating can be effectively communicated, that there are better and worse ways of communicating these ideas, that if I want to be a good writer I must be committed to writing and rewriting my work, that the ideas I am communicating are worth spending the time to communicate well.
7. **Implications:** If I commit myself to effective writing, I can become an effective writer; if I achieve my purpose, I may be able to transform the thinking of the target audience.
8. **Point of View:** The point of view of a good writer (in other words, looking at substantive writing as a complex process that one improves at through discipline and practice) is the point of view relevant to the issues in the writing piece.

CONCLUSION

The role of intelligence producers might be described in two stages:

1. The exhaustive examination of the situation for which a policy is required

2. The objective and impartial exploration of all the alternative solutions which the policy problem offers.

Intelligence producers, therefore, need to develop analytic minds that would apply intellectual tools in questioning purposes, problem definition, and information, concepts and so on for the purpose of getting at the most fundamental logic of any problem or issue. This will also provide a means of presentation of judgment in the most substantive way to win the confidence of intelligence consumers.

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ASSESSING THE ROLE OF HUMAN SECURITY IN DEFENCE AND SECURITY MANAGEMENT

By Kayode Bolaji

INTRODUCTION

As Nelson Mandela writes in his autobiography, Long Walk to Freedom, "I cannot pinpoint a moment when I became politicised, when I knew that I would spend my life in the liberation struggle. To be an African in South Africa means that one is politicised from the moment of one's birth, whether one acknowledges it or not. I had no epiphany, no singular revelation, no moment of truth, but a steady accumulation of a thousand slights, a thousand indignities, a thousand unremembered moments, produced in me an anger, a rebelliousness, a desire to fight the system that imprisoned my people. There was no particular day on which I said, from henceforth I will devote myself to the liberation of my people; instead, I simply found myself doing so, and could not do otherwise. (Mandela, 1994:95)

Most of us are here not because we knew we would be in the military or any security agency or a scholar, administrator or a politician but perhaps because we wanted a better tomorrow for ourselves, our children, our country and the world in general. Central to this desire is the dignity and protection of human life. The central hypothesis is that human beings are fundamentally creatures engaged in the existential questions of the meaning of existence. This search for meaning in the events and circumstances of our individual lives forms the basis of socially constructed

narratives, which are experienced as an inter-subjective reality of any given group.

Human Fulfilment



Human security focuses on a limited core of individual activities and abilities, on a minimal subset of human development and human rights. “It would, therefore, be unfortunate or even tragic if institutions aiming to achieve human security were to accomplish their objective in such a way that undermined people’s ability to be fulfilled and enjoy a far greater range of freedoms”¹³³ People’s lives must not only be protected per se; they must be protected in a manner that is consistent with their long-term good.

The appropriate way to implement this consistency between protection and longer-term development will vary. “Rudimentary poverty programs may attend to wider goals simply by encouraging deep participation; refugee camps

may teach transferable vocational skills or may be sited where they will not degrade the local environment”¹³⁴.

In some places, dangers, climate, or the rhythm of grief may be such that longer-term considerations may be set aside for a while. But they should not ever fall entirely from view. The attention to longer term individual and group commitments does not threaten the focus of human security, because as the first part of the working definition clarifies, the priority of human security is to be effective – to protect human security in fact and not intention only.

Human security is a child who did not die, a disease that did not spread, a job that was not cut, an ethnic tension that did not explode in violence, a dissident who was not silenced.”¹³⁵

While the military focus on national security remains pivotal to peace and stability, the impact of today’s complex and multi-dimensional challenges reveals our shared vulnerabilities to a growing risk of threats that are wide spread and cross-cutting. Whether caused by internal or external factors, today’s threats heighten the recognition that insecurity can spread rapidly within Nigeria and give rise to more intractable crises that not only challenge our military but often spill over into broader national, regional and international security threats.

Security is no longer the concern of defence and humanitarian actors. Traditionally, it had focused on military activities, the control of military hardware, action against armed groups and networks and the reform of state

military institutions. However, increased attention is now being paid to other actors within the “security system” and the softer side of security, including governance of security institutions, the links between security and insecurity, access to resources, well-being, poverty, environmental risk and security.

In Africa and particularly Nigeria, this critical change has been paralleled by the emergence of national security frameworks upheld by intergovernmental organisations, whose creation is also advocated by civil society organisations. What has not fully taken place is a broad national debate on what security and human security mean in the Nigerian context, and what the priorities are, if any, to integrate human security into frameworks designed to maintain peace, order and physical security.

Therefore, this study aims to situate the concepts of security and human security to Nigerian Security and Defence Management. And to provide an overview of the main concepts, approaches and initiatives available internationally, with two core objectives:

1. To make available to Defence and Security Managers a wide range of information and essential sources on national and international initiatives and best practice on security issues to facilitate informed consultation and decision-making processes at all levels.
2. To raise strategic questions and identify key challenges to feed into the development of a national approach to security, using the human security model.

CONCEPTUAL DEFINITION

Human Security

Human Security is a critical component of the global political and development agenda. Two ideas lie at its heart: one is the protection of individuals, which is a strategic concern for national as well as international security. The second is that security conditions for people's development are not bound to traditional matters of national defence, law and order but rather encompass all political, economic and social issues, enabling a life free from risk and fear.

The international community has attempted to operationalise such definitions by combining the two agendas to mean "**Freedom from Fear**" and "**Freedom from Want**". This broader concept of security underpins reconstruction processes in countries emerging from violent conflict. For example, in Nigeria, national recovery strategies based on reconciliation (at the national and local levels) should sit alongside economic revival and institution building. Also, in the Millennium Report 2000, the international community was urged to take action to achieve "Freedom from Want" (the development agenda) and "Freedom from Fear" (the security agenda).

"The concept of human security is a people-centred approach that embraces both the dichotomies of individuality and universality, of indivisibility and personal freedom, of individual rights and collective rights."¹³⁶

Obuchi Keizo, former Prime Minister of Japan, 1998, speaking on human security stated that “it is his deepest belief that human beings should be able to lead lives of creativity, without having their survival threatened or their dignity impaired.” For Obuchi Keizo, human security represents the keyword to comprehensively seize all of the menaces that threaten survival, daily life, and dignity of human beings, and to strengthen the efforts to confront these threats.

Prof Amartya Sen spoke of human security in more detail, recalling that human security is a fundamental part of broader development processes, integrally connected with securing human capabilities, “the various combinations of functionings (beings and doings) that the person can achieve.; a set of vectors of functionings, reflecting the person’s freedom to lead one type of life or another; to choose from possible livings.”

In this context, illiteracy and innumeracy are forms of insecurity in themselves. Illiterate people have more difficulties finding employment and limited capacities to understand and demand their legal rights. Lack of education hinders people’s capacity to make informed decisions concerning their lives. According to Sen, the following distinct elements lie at the core of the human security concept:

1. A clear focus on individual human lives (in contrast to state security models)

2. An appreciation of the role of society and social arrangements in making human lives more secure in a constructive way
3. A reasoned concentration on the downside risks to human lives
4. A choice to focus on the 'downside'

HUMAN SECURITY AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

The international community began to relate security matters to development issues during the early 1990s. A consensus was reached on the need to broaden and deepen the concept of security, taking account of the political context at the end of the Cold War. Stronger collaboration also became possible between development, foreign policy and defence institutions within governments, helping to provide a new basis for North and South relations on these issues. "The human security approach argues that threats and challenges to security transcend national defence, and law and order to encompass all political, economic and social issues that guarantee a life free from risk and fear"¹³⁷

The focus shifted from the State to the security of persons; however, these are not mutually exclusive. Security can be thought of as a "public good", responding to the strategic need to support sustainable human development and at the same time promote national, regional and global peace and stability. The human security approach has also made it clear that any attempt to address security-related matters needs to

be based on consultation and collaboration with different sets of actors, which frequently have different interests, e.g.

1. Civilian/Military.
2. Governmental/Non-Governmental.
3. Local/National/Regional/International.

Notwithstanding this consensus, it has been difficult for international actors to reach an agreement on a single authoritative definition of security that assists the international community in effectively tackling multifarious challenges and threats, including violent conflict, crime, disenfranchisement, economic deprivation, and environmental degradation.

This is because security as a precondition for lasting peace is considered fundamental to the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the full development of human capacities.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HUMAN SECURITY AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

The power and novelty of the concept of human security is perhaps best shown when compared and contrasted with related concepts which are widely accepted. "For instance, human security and human development are often described as twin concepts, being simply 'freedom from fear' and 'freedom from want,' respectively"¹³⁸ To elaborate, human security is the ability to enjoy the fruits of human development in a safe environment. Human development is

one important means to create human security. The two initiatives are complementary and mutually reinforcing. Without one, the other becomes difficult, if not impossible.

Human security does not concern weapons – it is concerned with human life and dignity,” UNDP, 1994.”¹³⁹ The UNDP developed a broad understanding of human security resting on the idea that security should not focus exclusively on states, territory and military questions, as individuals are at the heart of security concerns. The Human Development Report of 1994, entitled *New Dimensions of Human Security*, was probably the first attempt to define such a concept holistically. Security was described concerning seven dimensions, reflecting almost all of the key components of human development.

- a. **Economic security:** Assured basic income and access to employment and resources.
- b. **Food security:** Physical and economic access to food for all people at all times. Hundreds of millions of people in the world remain hungry either through local unavailability of food or, more often, through lack of entitlements or resources to purchase food.
- c. **Health security:** Access to medical treatment and improved health conditions. Poor people, in general, have less health security, and in developing countries, the major causes of death are infectious and parasitic diseases.
- d. **Environmental security:** encompasses living in a healthy physical environment spared from desertification,

deforestation and other environmental threats that endanger people's survival.

- e. **Personal security:** Individual security from physical violence and threats. Threats can take several forms, like threats from the State, foreign states, other groups of people (ethnic tension), individuals or gangs; threats directed against women or children based on their vulnerability and dependence; threats to self (e.g. suicide, drug use, etc.).
- f. **Community security:** Most people derive their security from membership in a social group (family, community, organisation, political grouping, ethnic group, etc.). Tensions often arise between these groups due to competition over limited access to opportunities and resources.
- g. **Political security:** Living in a society that guarantees basic human rights and freedom of expression.

HUMAN SECURITY IN NIGERIA: DEFENCE AND SECURITY MANAGEMENT

The concept of human security (HS) integrates three freedoms: 'Freedom from Fear' (denoting violent threats to populations), 'Freedom from Want' (meaning poverty and absence of basic needs) and 'Freedom from Indignity' (which includes human rights abuses and limits on democratic participation). It was also defined by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to include all threats to the well-being of human beings and everything that affects the security of human beings.

HS is an approach to national and international security that emphasises human beings rather than the traditional focus on the security of the state. Moving the security agenda beyond state security does not mean replacing it. Instead, it complements and builds on it. This concept has continued to evolve. Threats such as natural disasters, conflicts, chronic and persistent poverty, health pandemics and international terrorism continue to compromise the prospects of sustainable development, peace and stability. When these threats overlap, they become insecurity multipliers, exacerbating existing issues.

The cumulative effect of this insecurity can be catastrophic, not only for individuals, but also for communities, nations and regions. This HS concept is now an international framework that considers pre-, inter- and post-conflict phases, examines early warning mechanisms and responds to violent and destabilising situations.

NIGERIA'S NATIONAL POLICY AND STRATEGY

Nigeria's HS approach is governed by domestic and international law and is complementary to the following Government strategies:

- a. National Security Strategy;
- b. Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (PCVE) National Framework and Action Plan
- c. Terrorism Prevention Amendment Act National Counter Terrorism Strategy

d. National Crisis Management Doctrine

NIGERIA'S INTERNAL SECURITY

There are several types of threats to Nigeria's internal security; some of them include; terrorism, sectarianism, perverted politics, political and criminal mafia, and secessionism; and the main causes of these security threats are poverty, intelligence failure, illiteracy, massive unemployment, weak political leaders, weak inter-agency collaboration, frustration among youth, etc.

CANADIAN APPROACH TO INTERNAL SECURITY

For a successful internal security setup, it is important that every Nigerian citizen is free from fear or want. The Canadian approach adds to the UNDP's concept in the following aspects:

- a. Acceptable quality of life
- b. Guarantee of fundamental Human Rights
- c. Satisfaction of basic needs
Freedom from fear and want
Rule of law, good governance, Sustainable economic development, and
- d. Social equity

HUMAN SECURITY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND NATIONAL SECURITY

Similarly, human security and human rights are intertwined. Firstly, human security (at least in its narrow definition) is a

human right. Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights affirms that "everyone has the right to life, liberty and the security of person" (emphasis added). Many national constitutions reaffirm the same right.

Conversely, it is recognised that where human rights are respected, human security can be well advanced. Also, the power of the human security concept is evident when contrasted with the traditional concept of national security. In the human security approach, the welfare of human beings worldwide is the object of concern rather than the military and strategic interests of a particular state. The defence of human life is more important than the defence of land, and personal integrity is as important as territorial integrity. Interstate wars in the world remain an important concern, but they are not necessarily more important than internal wars, which are known to cause even more human suffering.

The use of threats and force is not excluded as tools of international diplomacy under human security, but they are minimised because of the potential damage to human lives in their application. The deployment of armed forces for defence, collective security and humanitarian intervention is permitted, if not encouraged, but only so long as the application of force is justified, proportional, and legitimate under international law, while minimising, if not eliminating, deaths of innocent people.

Human security puts a premium on human life. Thus, peacekeeping is preferred to war-fighting, which is only seen

as viable as a last resort. Proper procedure, due process and cooperation are preferred to surprise attack, armed deterrence and robust defence as *modus operandi*. Emphasis is placed on conflict prevention in place of armed reaction because prevention can save lives as well as maintain human progress, and can be less costly in many ways. In the human security sphere, weapons are not the major tool; they are largely replaced with a host of cooperative endeavours to broaden dialogue and understanding.

Human Security and National Security are complementary concepts and need not necessarily contradict each other. Both seek protection against harm. To organise and ensure human security, armed forces are necessary. To provide for national security, the removal of threats, at home and abroad, is needed. Defence of the "Enlightened Self-interest" leads one to affirm the central tenets of human security, and the organisation of human security on the international level leads to a respect for national security. The human security paradigm itself leads to a special but natural set of tensions.

A balance point has to be reached, one which must take into account both the authority of the state and the freedom of the individual. In the human security approach, a much wider range of actors contribute to security.

Expanding from the notion of military and police forces as security providers, human security providers include the development community and civil society. These organisations help furnish the basis not only for development but also for disarmament. Civil society often

assists in the movement towards better gun controls and can lead in the implementation of disarmament measures, as seen in "CJTF in the North East", sponsored by local groups.

The rise of the human security concept can help explain the rapprochement of the security and development communities. As the issues of security and development tend to converge, so have many projects in these two fields, especially in war-affected regions. The development community has found itself playing an important role in fostering disarmament, and the security community is now thinking of development as a way to secure the peace.

Also, it should be stated that individual and community security is the foundation for long-term stability, economic and infrastructure development, political settlement, better societal relationships, good governance and the rule of law. In recognition of this, the Ministry of Defence (MOD) and other defence-related agencies have embedded several security themes under the aegis of HS. Monitoring and improving the security of these areas seeks to mitigate the most harmful effects of conflict and increase the chance of a sustainable, peaceful outcome. This method, therefore, requires a whole-of-government approach, with military objectives and activity integrated within a broader cross-government strategy.

This HS approach is essential for a compelling narrative, maintaining the legitimacy and campaign authority of Nigeria, its Allies and its partners. It will also assist in the identification of security risks to affected populations,

ensuring that the Defence is a force for good, but is also more likely to achieve its mission. In tandem, the Defence sector must also recognise that human insecurity is increasingly weaponised by the unhealthy policies of the state and our adversaries and thus should consider malign actions related to HS.

A Human Security approach will enhance our ability to work across government, better enabling us to shape the discourse on the security of human beings on the global stage and achieve our National Security Objectives. Nigeria Defence's approach at a strategic level must be refined: "To gain a heightened understanding of the human environment, potential conflict drivers and dynamics to improve integrated planning and entrench HS in the way Defence operates."¹⁴⁰ This will enable the Nigerian Armed Forces to act as a 'force for good', minimising harm to civilians and maintaining legitimacy. To support this, the MOD's HS governance should endorse the following strategic objectives:

Objective 1: to ensure Nigerian Defence personnel have the capability, understanding and training to incorporate HS considerations in their approach to military activity and planning;

Objective 2: to embed the HS approach into the way we operate, achieving greater effect by coordination with partners across government, allies and partners, International Organisations (IOs), Non-Governmental

Organisations (NGOs), Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) and the commercial sector;

Objective 3: to understand how emerging root causes of crises and instability will cause HS issues, develop better identification of opportunities for prevention and protection, mitigation of harm and enduring solutions.

OVERVIEW OF CROSS-CUTTING THEMES (CCTS)

CCTs specify a range of different topics which ordinarily fall outside of the military's primary responsibilities, but which could affect an operation in several ways due to their deep links to local societies and interaction with the core HS factors. These CCTs map onto one or more of the HS factors and are thematically categorised consequences of insecurity that exacerbate, perpetuate or entrench conflict or instability. Listed beneath are descriptions of CCTs, which highlight Nigeria's security management challenges and better prospects.

1. Protection of Civilians (POC).

Security agencies will contribute to the POC by integrating related measures in the planning and conduct of their operations and missions. POC includes all efforts taken to avoid, minimise and mitigate negative effects that might arise from conditions of insecurity, as well as our military operations. It is a vital aspect of our HS approach, and failure

to conduct these activities can undermine other political and strategic objectives. This includes:

- a. Considering POC as central to the HS approach and integral to all military and paramilitary operations.
- b. Continuing to consider measures to reduce the risks posed to civilians when conducting operations and missions. Planning should involve measures to avoid placing civilians in harm's way.
- c. Understand, consider, and, when required, plan to deliver specific protection needs for children, women, men and vulnerable groups.
- d. Continuing to protect and promote the humanitarian space and principled humanitarian action by civilian actors, seeking to avoid any politicisation or militarisation of aid provision.
- e. Seeking to address communities' key protection concerns assessed through context-relevant, meaningful engagement.
- f. Understanding and mitigating further harm to civilians through inappropriate conduct, including when spending power attracts criminal or unethical activity.

2. Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (PCVE).

Although violent extremism is not a new phenomenon, it has become a growing challenge over recent years. There is a growing recognition that counterterrorism, with its dependence on military, law enforcement and intelligence responses, cannot manage the problem alone. PCVE has

emerged as a paradigm that seeks to complement counterterrorism with non-coercive measures, particularly using preventative approaches which seek to address the causes, drivers and enablers of terrorism and violent extremism. There is a range of PCVE programmes that aim to support communities to resist recruitment into extremist organisations. Although PCVE should not be primarily a military responsibility, Nigerian security agencies should note that our behaviour towards the population can act as a driver of violent extremism and result in vulnerability to violent radicalisation. Therefore, Nigeria's security agencies should:

- a. Understand what limitations have been placed on the population's rights, including restrictions on their freedom of movement and freedom of expression, and highlight those early warning signs of rising extremism.
- b. Support and encourage the unique position women have in influencing community and family values, identify early signs of radicalisation, support religious tolerance and create counter narratives that provide a female perspective.
- c. Enhance engagement activities to consider engaging key members of the local population in dialogue and conflict prevention approaches. This is critical to ensure that these actions are holistic and effective. Engaging religious leaders to provide a platform for intra- and inter-faith dialogue is essential to effectively engage with communities to promote peace and tolerance. Youth leaders should also be part of any engagement strategy.

- d. promote good governance and the rule of law, including through providing support to the investigation and prosecution of perpetrators as applicable and appropriate.
- e. (5) seek to counter violent extremism through strategic communications, which will include a recognition of how violent extremists utilise the internet, social media and communications technology. Narratives should feature both men and women and be tailored to both audiences for them to have a real effect.

3. Building Integrity and Countering Corruption (BI).

Conflict fosters corruption, and corruption can foster and sustain conflict and become an objective of conflict actors.

Corruption can cause states to become unstable and weaken their economic governance systems. Corruption exists at different levels in every conflict, driving war economies and serious and organised crime, feeding cycles of violence and instability, as well as creating grievances and enabling armed actors to mobilise.¹⁴¹

Exploitation and support of corruption a tool used by third-party countries to exploit vulnerable states. Some individuals may engage in corrupt practices merely to survive, others to gain control over their populations, while others seek affluent lifestyles. In many states, almost every aspect of the economy and security sector can be affected. Thus, the root cause of many states' failure to respond to insecurity is often due to corruption. Unmitigated

corruption has five consequences for military and security operations:

- a. Undermines the desired end state
- b. Promotes instability
- c. Perpetuates conflict
- d. Wastes resources and effort
- e. Damages credibility.

Our Defence deployments, such as stabilisation missions, peacekeeping operations and security assistance deployments, will likely take place in environments affected by corruption and conflict.

THE SECURITY SECTOR REFORM (SSR) AGENDA: LINKING SECURITY, DEVELOPMENT AND GOVERNANCE

SSR stems from peacebuilding activities which aim to prevent and resolve violent conflicts, consolidate peace following war, and facilitate post-war reconstruction to avoid renewed conflict. SSR is a component of the human security agenda. Within this wider agenda, SSR concentrates on challenges states face by using means of coercion in a way that is consistent with democratic norms and supportive of human development goals. It highlights the need for approaches able to reconcile states' security interests with those of populations. The SSR agenda covers three interrelated policy challenges facing all states:

1. Developing the institutional frameworks that states require to handle development and security policy as integrated areas of public action;
2. Strengthening the governance of various actors and institutions that are responsible for formulating, managing, implementing and monitoring security policy;
3. Building professional security forces capable of carrying out their operational tasks and accountable to the civil authorities.
4. Security System Reform requires dealing with a wide range of actors (see below) and defining their roles, responsibilities and actions in a way that is compatible with the establishment of sound democratic governance principles, transparency and the rule of law.
5. In practice, however, its implementation has been very state-focused so far.

TYPES OF ACTORS IN THE SECURITY SYSTEM

1. **Core Security Actors:** armed forces; police; paramilitary forces; military and civilian intelligence and security services; customs authorities; reserve or local security units such as civil defence forces, etc.
2. **Security Management and Oversight Bodies:** executive institutions of national government; national security advisory bodies, legislature and legislative select committees; ministries of defence, internal affairs, foreign affairs; traditional authorities and local authorities; financial management bodies (ministries, budget offices,

financial audit and planning units); and CSOs e.g. civilian review boards, public complaints commissions, etc.

3. **Justice and law enforcement institutions:** judiciary; justice ministries; prisons; criminal investigation and prosecution services, human rights commissions; customary and traditional justice systems.

HUMAN SECURITY AND PRACTICE

Although the key elements of 'human security' are broadly recognised internationally, in practice, how security issues are handled continues to be primarily state-oriented, from which three observations arise.

- a. First, this accounts for the need for further conceptual clarification of human security, notably vis-à-vis the human development agenda.
- b. Second, the incoherence between the multidimensional nature of the concept – which may lead to conflicting short-, medium- and long-term objectives – and types of approaches and tools available to address human security threats and challenges in reality makes it difficult to create a holistic regime out of the existing norms, principles, institutions and practices.
- c. Third, in developing countries and namely in African countries, the security objectives of the State and populations often seem to be at odds.

Against this background, working together towards reconciling the expectations of populations and the goals of

states concerning security emerges as a priority for all stakeholders. Several opportunities exist to pursue this objective in situations emerging from conflict. For instance, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants, particularly the disaffected youth, are integral parts of state security and human security agendas. The young have been heavily involved, directly or indirectly, in violent conflict. The lack of economic opportunities and alternative perspectives may persuade them to join the fighting, where they would then be reluctant to abandon this lifestyle, let alone their arms, in the aftermath of a conflict. In the reconstruction and reconciliation process, it is essential to place DDR issues in the broader context of the youth challenges in the northeast.

CONCLUSION

Defence relates to defending national territorial borders as a traditional concept. Security traditionally denotes providing the right to life to citizens. Defence and Security depict the state's use of force to manage threats to its territorial integrity, its autonomy and its domestic political order. The Classical Unilateral Security model is not enough to deal with biological, environmental, economic and cultural threats to national security. What the world needs is an all-inclusive concept of comprehensive security. Human Security goes a step further than comprehensive security. It adds the need for the protection and welfare of the individual citizen or human being.

A comprehensive and integrated response to security and development challenges is indispensable to enhancing sustainable peace in Nigeria. This requires the involvement and concerted action of all government and societal approaches.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Two broad strategies are essential for assessing the role of human security in defence and security management. These are based on the notions of:

1. **Protection** requires concerted efforts to develop norms, processes and institutions that systematically shield people from any form of violence or threat of violence.
2. **Empowerment**, which enables people to develop their potential and become full participants in decision-making processes that affect their lives. Concerning conflict, protection, and empowerment should target the most vulnerable individuals and communities.

These are classified into three categories:

- a. People living in areas affected by violent conflict;
- b. People on the move;
- c. People living in areas emerging from conflict.

Promoting human security entails taking preventive measures to reduce vulnerability and minimise risks, otherwise taking remedial action where prevention fails. The following is a list of priorities requiring immediate action:

- a. Protect people in violent conflict.

- b. Protect people from arms proliferation.
- c. Support the human security of people on the move.
- d. Establish human security transition funds for post-conflict situations.
- e. Encourage fair trade and markets for the benefit of the extremely poor.
- f. Provide minimum living standards everywhere.
- g. Accord high priority to universal access to basic health care.
- h. Empower all people via universal basic education, through much stronger global and national efforts. Clarify the need for a global human identity while respecting the freedom of individuals to hold multiple identities and affiliations.

Others include:

- prevent conflict, promote human rights and development
- establish early warning mechanisms;
- create sanctions, fact-finding and diplomatic missions;
- develop preventive deployment of peacekeeping operations;
- place more emphasis on education,
- raise living standards and develop health security;
- Strengthening of civil society capacities.
- protect and empower individuals and communities
- build a protective infrastructure against critical and pervasive threats, e.g. police systems, environmental regulations, health care networks, education systems,

safety nets (e.g. food/cash for work, social protection), vaccination programs, etc.

- Deepen democratic principles and practices: Foster a democratic political order, buttressed by physical safety and economic growth, which helps to protect and empower people. It is therefore necessary to build strong institutions, guarantee the rule of law and foster citizenship practices.

Promote a human security culture and framework: raise awareness on human security issues in society; disseminate information on existing initiatives and networks to foster a more integrated approach.

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Issues in Intelligence Management and National Security

This volume contains lectures of Peace Building Development Consult on the “Issues in Intelligence Management and National Security”. The articles addressed issues on: (1) Intelligence support for security agencies in combating crime: considering the use of advanced technology (2) collaboration and the establishment of an intelligence fusion centre for sharing intelligence in complex operations in Nigeria. (3) Intelligence in national security strategy and the negligence of the strategic agenda in national development. (4) Intelligence variables in decisions and planning of security issues (5) Intelligence in international relations on the employment of statecraft, diplomacy, industrial and corporate espionage, negotiation, and bargaining. (6) Utilisation of the Dark Web in cybersecurity and the Media.

The publication offers a detail perspective on the intelligence challenges shaping the nation's security landscape, shedding light on institutional responses and the evolving mechanisms for safeguarding national stability. By addressing key gaps in intelligence management.



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